EVALUATING COLLABORATIVE PLANNING: A CASE STUDY OF THE MORICE LAND AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PLAN

by

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Abstract

Collaborative planning is widely used in British Columbia, Canada as a decision-making tool for land use management. This study uses a research design synthesized from the relevant literature to evaluate the Morice Land and Resources Management Planning process, which began in 2002. After 18 months of negotiation between local stakeholders, the Morice table produced a consensus agreement for land use in the region. Unlike other processes in BC, a two-tiered negotiation model was used to engage First Nations on a government-to-government basis. This study demonstrates a need to revisit the two-tier process design in a way that continues to respect First Nations' constitutional rights while also satisfying non-aboriginal stakeholders. Despite room for improvement, the Morice process was an overall success and generated important environmental and socio-economic benefits for stakeholders. This case study joins a growing body of research supporting collaborative planning as an effective land use management practice.

Keywords: collaborative planning; Land and Resources Management Planning; LRMP; Morice; government-to-government; G2G; First Nations; British Columbia

Dedication

For my mother and father who have supported me unconditionally through all my adventures and misadventures.

Acknowledgement

This thesis represents more than simply a step towards completion of my Masters degree. It is the cumulative result of numerous forms of assistance and encouragement I received from other people, sometimes randomly and sometimes calculated and well placed, but always valued.

Particular thanks goes to Dr. Tom Gunton, my graduate supervisor who provided guidance ever since I knocked on his door as an idealistic Geography undergraduate seeking ways to peacefully resolve environmental conflicts. Tom introduced me to collaborative planning and piqued my interest enough to pursue the topic. He also offered his wisdom and experience and nudged me incrementally toward a well-balanced view of the technique.

Dr. Chad Day also deserves recognition for his valuable feedback and insight during phone conversations as well as his editing suggestions. His input helped me produce a more polished product.

Special thanks goes to my good friend and confidant Jason Tockman who provided an intellectual soundboard for ideas and bounced more than a few good ones back. Our conversations have been challenging and fun and I suspect he will be happy to finally be free of 'collaborative planning'. I look forward to many more mutual adventures, both intellectual and in 'greater nature'.

During this process I was diagnosed with Lyme disease, which made things much more difficult than planned. Thanks to the incredible, tireless support of my fabulous mother and father and the help of innumerable doctors, health practitioners, yoga teachers, friends, and random acts of kindness, I made it through this thesis and am now on my way to recovery from Lyme. Words cannot express what that support has meant. Finally, I would be remiss if I did not mention the person who started me down this path. Maureen, you saw untapped potential and propelled me, perhaps unknowingly, in the right direction. Thank you.

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List of Acronyms

AAC	Annual Allowable Cut
ADR	Alternative Dispute Resolution
BATNA	Better alternative to a negotiated agreement
BC	British Columbia
BCCA	British Columbia Court of Appeals
BCSC	British Columbia Supreme Court
CCLRMP	Central Coast Land and Resource Management Plan
CFCLI	Coalition for Fair Canadian Lumber Imports
CP	Collaborative Planning
CT	Communications Team (Morice process)
COF	Coast Opportunities Fund
CORE	Commission on Resources and Environment
EBM	Ecosystem-based management
EDT	Economic Development Team (Morice process)
ENGO	Environmental Non Governmental Organization
FRPA	Forests and Range Practices Act
G2G	Government-to-Government
GIS	Global Information System
GPT	Government Process Team (Morice process)
GTT	Government Technical Team (Morice process)
GMD	General Management Direction
HGLRMP	Haida Gwaii Land and Resource Management Plan
IFPA	Innovative Forest Practices Agreement
ILMB	Integrated Land Management Bureau
IRPC	Integrated Resource Planning Committee
LUCO	Land Use Coordination Office
LUP	Land Use Plan
LRMP	Land and Resource Management Plan
MAL	British Columbia Ministry of Agriculture and Lands
MLRMP	Morice Land and Resource Management Plan
MOF	British Columbia Ministry of Forests
MSRM	British Columbia Ministry of Sustainable Resource Management
NCLRMP	North Coast Land and Resource Management Plan
NDP	New Democratic Party (British Columbia)
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
OCP	Official Community Plan
PIMC	Plan Implementation and Monitoring Committee
REM	School of Resource and Environmental Management at Simon Fraser University
SCC	Supreme Court of Canada
SDM	Shared Decision Making
SELES	Spatially Explicit Landscape Event Simulation
SFMP	Sustainable Forest Management Plan
SRMP	Sustainable Resource Management Plan

THLB	Timber Harvesting Land Base
TSA	Timber Supply Area
TOR	Terms of reference
USA	United States of America
USDA	United States Department of Agriculture
USFS	United States Forest Services

Map of Study Area



(BC ILMB, 2007)

1. INTRODUCTION

In this era of climate change, where a constant bombardment of media headlines warn of ecological collapse, and where we are told violent conflicts over natural resources are imminent, it is encouraging to know that humans are not entirely idle. As humanity shakes off inertia and lifts its weary collective mass to attend, yet again, to its own survival, it seeks an elusive goal: sustainability. Ever the toolmaker, in its search, our species has quietly crafted a modern peacemaker that aims to bridge cultural and ideological divides and, better still, to make more resources out of less. Such a tool is necessary, for, if we hope to reconcile our use of materials with the planet's ecological balance, we must also reconcile differences among ourselves. The tool that holds some promise toward achieving that task is called collaborative planning.

But, as O'Leary and Bingham (2003) ask of environmental conflict resolution in general, does the promise of collaborative planning match its performance? This study examines the application of collaborative planning in the Morice region of interior British Columbia, Canada where, after 18 months of negotiation a diverse group of local stakeholders reached consensus about management of lands and resources in their 'backyard'. The implications of their accomplishment are far reaching, for if collaborative planning really works, it holds the promise of future successes in British Columbia and the world. Valuable lessons are available from case studies like the Morice Land and Resource Management Planning process that require scrutiny before those lessons can become useful elsewhere. This study shows that collaborative planning is a complex tool with strengths as well as challenges. The technique requires careful attention to detail and design from talented process managers in order to tease out the best benefits and minimize negative effects.

1.1 Study Context

Collaborative planning (CP) follows on the heels of a very different planning paradigm that proved inadequate to ensure sustainability, much less satisfy a modern public. For most of the last century, scientific management dominated decision-making about the use of lands and natural resources (Beierle and Cayford, 2002). This approach, known as

'technocratic' planning, relied on independent experts and scientific analysis to make 'objective' decisions about resource use (Sandercock, 1998; Beierle and Cayford, 2002; Gunton and Day, 2003; Jackson and Curry, 2004). Decisions were administered using a top-down delivery with little room for public input. The failures of technocratic planning were increasingly obvious, particularly to North American and European publics who had amassed enough wealth and leisure time to enjoy recreation at wilderness destinations (Killan, 1998). A new value-set emerged as children of the industrial revolution were re-introduced to nature's beauty and their awareness of ecological interconnectivity began to bloom. The devastation wrought by forestry, mining and other extractive industries was impossible to deny. Soon, people wanted their newfound values protected. The public rose up to demand participation in resource planning and pushed planners and politicians to acknowledge socio-ecological values (Killan, 1998; Wondollek and Yaffe, 2000). At the same time, marginalized aboriginal governments made advances in legal and political arenas, which enabled them to push for protection of their own values and promote cultural heritage as an important resource (Hoberg and Morawski, 1997). Various attempts to include the public and aboriginal groups moved the planning paradigm incrementally over the last 30-40 years toward a participatory approach. Eventually, CP emerged from these experiments as a feasible alternative to technocratic planning.

Ideally, CP is a consensus-based approach, which uses face-to-face discussion among relevant stakeholders, and aims to establish land use strategies by applying shared decision-making and interest-based negotiation (Gunton and Day, 2003). Participants use these decision-making tools to develop management plans by consensus agreement among all parties. The model encourages participants to actively engage to develop innovative and sustainable land use solutions. When such collaboration occurs, 'new', and previously inconceivable resources are often created by what CP proponents call 'expanding the pie'. In an antidote to traditional top-down management, stakeholders are *empowered* to make decisions, thereby meeting public demand for increased input and transparency.

The CP approach is increasingly popular around the world, especially in North America, Europe and Australia (Innes and Booher, 1999; Margerum, 1999; Gunton and Day, 2003;

Brand and Gaffikin, 2007; Healy, 2003). But there are criticisms of the technique and plenty of room for improvement (see Flyvbjerg, 1998; Sandercock, 1998; Mascarenhas and Scarce, 1999; Huxley and Yiftachel, 2000). As such, there is a need for empirical evaluation of case studies to test the claims of CP proponents and critics. Evidence from case studies permits the academic community to extend lessons learned from various CP applications to resource-managers intent on generating sustainable land use solutions. In this way, CP evaluation helps managers develop strategies to satisfy the greatest number of stakeholders, thereby contributing to the protection of our future.

1.1.1 Collaborative Planning in British Columbia

When CP emerged in British Columbia (BC) the province was a mosaic of conflict over land use disagreements between industry, government, First Nations, environmental groups and the labour sector. British Columbia's land is primarily publicly owned as 'Crown land' and is rich in forest and mineral resources. For most of BC's history, the provincial government made land use decisions without public input, relying on the technocratic approach (Frame, Gunton, and Day, 2004). But the environmental ethic that began sweeping North America in the 1960s culminated for BC in a seemingly endless series of environmental protests during the 1980s and 1990s. Conflicts between "resource extraction and preservation intensified into what became known as the 'war in the woods'" (Frame, et al., 2004, p. 62). Meanwhile, First Nations in BC made significant progress in the courts toward recognition of rights and title to their traditional territories, most of which overlapped Crown land (Hoberg and Morawski, 1997). Environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs) and First Nations used their newfound collective leverage to pressure the provincial government into rethinking extractive practices it had facilitated for decades with minimal public consultation. With environmentalists, ENGOs, and First Nations weighing in from one side and labour and industry leaning on the provincial government from the other, a new method for making land use decisions was clearly needed.

In 1992, the Commission on Resources and Environment (CORE) introduced CP in an attempt to resolve disputes and achieve sustainability in land use planning (Hoberg and

Morawski, 1997). Today, most of BC's land base is managed using land use plans that were produced using this innovative technique (Frame et al., 2004). British Columbia is unique in the world because it is one of the few jurisdictions that systematically applied CP, region by region, for such a large area, so consistently, for such an extended period of time (Frame et al., 2004). As such, BC provides a perfect laboratory for studying CP processes.

1.1.2 The Morice Land and Resource Management Plan

One outcome of British Columbia's CP experiment was the Morice Land and Resource Management Plan (LRMP). Among the last of 21 LRMPs completed across the province, the Morice LRMP provides management direction for the use of 1.5 million hectares of lands and resources in the Morice region (BC ILMB, 2007) (see map, p. xv). The region is home to about 5,200 residents who live in the towns of Houston, Granisle, and several tiny communities such as Topley, Topley Landing, and Tatchet (BC ILMB, 2008a). As traditional territory for five First Nations, the area is abundant in cultural heritage, spiritual value, and traditional land uses. Morice also relies heavily on an extraction-based economy due to its rich timber and mineral resources, and the area's agricultural land, natural beauty, and world-class hunting and fishing provide significant agriculture and tourism opportunities (BC ILMB, 2008a).

Like other LRMPs, the Morice process utilized the same basic principles of collaborative planning initiated by CORE. As one of the last LRMPs to achieve completion, the process also benefited from past LRMP experiences. One innovation that emerged from these experiences was the application of a two-tier approach to LRMP negotiations. The second tier was designed to improve First Nations participation in the planning process, and to meet BC's legal obligations to consult and accommodate First Nations prior to making land use decisions in their traditional territories. Previously, multi-stakeholder planning tables presented LRMP agreements directly to BC for approval and ratification. Under this new approach, agreements negotiated by the planning tables were forwarded to government-to-government negotiations between affected First Nations and the provincial government. This model was used for five LRMPs: the North Coast, Central

Coast, Haida Gwaii, Sea to Sky, and Morice. Evaluations are now complete for the North Coast (McGee, 2006), Central Coast (Cullen, 2006), Haida Gwaii (Astofooroff, 2008), and, as a result of this study, the Morice LRMPs.

1.2 Research Overview

The School of Resource and Environmental Management (REM) at Simon Fraser University took advantage of the CP laboratory at its doorstep and, starting in 1990, began a multi-stage analysis of the CP process using the BC LRMP experience.

The analysis included four stages with the first stage running from 1990-1992. Researchers began their analysis by reviewing existing theoretical approaches to decision-making and examined the current institutional structures for land management (see Gunton and Vertinsky, 1990; Gunton, 1991; Gunton and Flynn, 1992). The second phase examined the early efforts of CP application during CORE and some initial LRMP processes from 1992-1996 (see Wilson, 1995; Penrose, 1996; Tamblyn, 1996). Third, researchers conducted a macro analysis of CP processes completed after 1996 by focusing on the following tasks:

1. Conduct a comprehensive evaluation of the LRMP process in BC;
2. Survey process participants and establish best practices in land use policy;
3. Assess LRMP implementation and monitoring practices

(Frame et al., 2004)

Lastly, detailed assessments were conducted at the case study level for several post-1996 processes (Peter, 2007; Cullen, 2006; McGee, 2006; Astofooroff, 2008). The Morice LRMP evaluation assists the larger project in completing another case study. As a result of these combined research efforts, an informed set of best practices for collaborative planning in BC, and a complete set of case studies assessing provincial implementation and monitoring practices will be completed.

1.2.1 Purpose and Objectives

The primary purpose of the Morice LRMP evaluation is to explore whether or not the promise of CP is actualized by its performance in the context of one case study. Objectives applied in this study include the following:

1. Evaluate the effectiveness of CP in creating a sustainable land and resource management plan for the Morice region;
2. Determine if certain innovations in the Morice LRMP process were successful in improving the level of First Nations participation in land use planning;
3. Examine and evaluate various elements of CP as an approach to sustainable land use planning more generally.

1.2.2 Methodology

Methodology for the assessment of CP is well developed in the literature by Innes and Booher (1999), Cormick et al. (1996), Campbell and Floyd (1996), Harter (1997), and Gunton, Day and Williams (2003). Frame et al. (2004) relied on these authors and other literature review to develop a CP evaluation methodology specific to the BC LRMP context. Ongoing CP research at REM, including this study of the Morice, relies on Frame et al.'s methodology. The general framework is outlined below:

1. Complete a literature review related to the theory of dispute resolution and collaborative planning;
2. Complete a literature review of planning and policy in BC with emphasis on the history of cross-cultural collaboration and First Nations engagement;
3. Review the LRMP process for BC and the Morice region;
4. Survey Morice LRMP process participants;
5. Evaluate the Morice LRMP in terms of process criteria and outcome criteria;
6. Incorporate the Morice case study results into a CP database;
7. Identify key findings and make recommendations on how to manage CP processes effectively by developing best practices guidelines.

1.3 Report Outline

This report is designed to provide a thorough review of collaborative planning as characterized in the literature, then to test claims made by CP advocates and critics in the context of the Morice LRMP case study. In addition, the impact of the Morice process' unique two-tiered negotiation model is explored. Chapter two provides a history of CP, outlines its strengths and weaknesses, highlights drivers and barriers to success that were experienced in other case studies, and provides discussion about the dominant evaluation methods used in the field of CP research. Following a description of research challenges in the field of CP, chapter two also details the methods used for this evaluation. In order to fully understand the Morice case study, it must be viewed within the larger context of land use planning in British Columbia. Chapter three is a history of BC land use planning with a particular emphasis on aboriginal responses to, and impacts on, the provincial land management regime. The Morice case study is then explored in detail in chapter four, including an overview of historical and contemporary land uses and a step-by-step description of the Morice LRMP process. The case study description is followed by a report of research findings in chapter five, including a general assessment of results and comparisons with the literature review and other LRMPs. Chapter six wraps up the document with recommendations and concluding remarks.

2. COLLABORATIVE PLANNING

Society is constantly shaped and pulled by the tensions that exist between its governing institutions, its economic function, and its rich diversity of individuals and groups that attempt to express their needs with varying degrees of intensity and organization (Douglas and Friedman, 1998). Planning is and always will be an imperfect attempt to resolve this tension. Planning is a practice that, of necessity, evolves through time by learning from its mistakes and successes, never fully achieving the ideals it is founded upon. At best planning can satisfy needs and improve lives, and at worst it can increase conflict by pushing societal tensions to the breaking point. Many theories and models have emerged over time in an attempt to capture the essence of successful planning and to define good practices that avert worst-case scenarios. One theme, that of public participation in the planning process, gained legitimacy during the last half of the 20th century. Although the debate continues and no one framework can ever truly be applied to all planning contexts, a promising outcome of the public engagement experiment is collaborative planning.

Collaborative planning is a consensus-based planning process unique from other methods of public participation in some key features. The basic, and seemingly straightforward, assumption at the root of CP is that those best suited to decision-making are the individuals or groups who will be most impacted by the planning outcome (McGee, 2006). Ideally, CP brings all relevant stakeholders together for face-to-face negotiations that result in administrative decisions around a particular issue (Gunton and Day, 2003; Beierle and Cayford, 2002). In resource management, the 'issue' is typically how best to manage resources such as lands, forests, waters, fish and wildlife. Decisions about these resources can be difficult because individuals in society value them in many different ways. This 'values-laden' decision-making atmosphere tends to polarize groups, creating a problem in public process. Stakeholder negotiations over resources have a tendency to slide into adversarial, 'positions-based' bargaining, resulting in outcomes that leave all parties unsatisfied (O'Leary and Bingham, 2003). Collaborative planning addresses this problem by applying 'interests-based' negotiation, a technique borrowed from the fields of mediation and alternative dispute resolution.

A typical CP process begins with identification and recruitment of representatives for all parties likely to be impacted by the final decisions. Once convened, the group defines the issues and each representative identifies their underlying interests in the outcomes of decision-making. The group then prepares a set of options based on their collective interests and negotiates outcomes that are agreed to by consensus.

Proponents allege that such 'interests-based' dialogue removes much of the tension that can block consensus in more traditional 'positions-based' negotiations by increasing mutual understanding between participants (Fisher and Ury, 1991; Ury, 2000). Once participants understand and relate to each other's motives they become inspired to invent new, previously unimagined options with an aim to win-win solutions that benefit themselves as well as other stakeholders (Fisher and Ury, 1991; Ury, 2000; Wondollek and Yaffe, 2000).

Currently, although CP for resource management is in its early stages, it is already utilized worldwide to varying degrees of effectiveness for a multitude of problems. This chapter demonstrates how CP emerged from post-WWII reactions against the planning status quo. Far from providing a silver bullet, CP's strengths are still dogged by stubborn challenges and each of these strengths and challenges are examined from the perspectives of researchers in the field. Studies from the United States, Canada, Europe and Australia highlight the application of CP in practice and lessons learned for CP success. The value of reviewing these studies is that all identified CP strengths, challenges, drivers, and barriers provide a foundation for other researchers to derive evaluative criteria. As such, review of the literature provides some background for understanding development of the criteria used in this study.

2.1 The Origins of Collaborative Planning

The origins of CP are rooted in a reaction that occurred during the 1960s and 70s against the mainstream planning practices of the time. After the Second World War, development planners in North America relied on a traditional planning approach referred to in the literature as the *rational comprehensive model* or 'technocratic planning' (Sandercock,

1998; Harper and Stein, 2006). Technocratic planning was concerned with "economic efficiency in the use of space" (Susskind et al. 2003, p.40). Governments imposed plans on the local landscape using a top-down delivery that relied on centralized community planning, limited public consultations with narrow cross-sections of stakeholders, and apolitical quantitative research (Sandercock, 1998; Beierle and Cayford, 2002; Gunton and Day, 2003; Jackson and Curry, 2004). Planning as a profession hinged on the planner's role as the expert who was 'best suited' to recommend strategies for achieving goals set by politicians (Harper and Stein, 2006).

2.1.1 Dissatisfaction with Technocratic Planning

By the 1960s citizens questioned the merits of top-down planning approaches (see table 1). Efforts to achieve maximum efficiency often overlooked negative impacts to the environment and human socio-economic well being. Nature was increasingly valued by the public for recreational uses and intrinsic worth, these often surpassing values of resource extraction and development and placing public interests at odds with developers and resource-based industries (Killan, 1998; Wondollek and Yaffe, 2000). Planners slowly awakened to the social and political dimensions at the root of resource planning and realized that these influences were not captured within a centralized, 'experts'-based, scientific approach. The traditional approach tended to homogenize public interests to produce idealized master plans that fit well within the tidy world of quantitative methods, but failed when applied to a distinctly heterogeneous society (Susskind et al., 2003). Meanwhile, a values shift occurred in which civil society pushed for greater accountability and participation in public decision-making. Citizens began to understand that government-led planning no longer adequately represented public interests and people grew dissatisfied with their inability to influence land use decisions (Sandercock, 1998). Legitimacy and public buy-in were increasingly difficult for planners to obtain because people felt ignored in their demands for greater democracy (Sandercock, 1998). The major criticisms of the rational comprehensive planning model are outlined in table 1.

Table 1. Criticisms of the Rational Comprehensive Model

1. Centralized, experts-based, scientific approach
2. Homogenization of public interest
3. Lack of public participation
4. Efficiency at the expense of effectiveness

(Adapted from Sandercock, 1998; Beierle and Cayford, 2002)

Ultimately, public unrest resulted in growing costs from legal action and delayed projects due to protests, forcing planners to consider a more democratic style of planning that used science and bureaucracy as part of a bundle of tools rather than as the primary decision-making mechanisms (Moote, McClaran and Chickering, 1997; Wondollek and Yaffe, 2000; Gunton and Day, 2003). In response to this shift, new theories challenged traditional planning.

2.1.2 Precursors to Advocacy Planning

In the 1970s different planning models gained coherence and some merged into the mainstream, including *advocacy planning* and its offspring, the *communicative action* and *mediation* models (Sandercock, 1998; Susskind et al., 2003). But the seeds of these models were sown much earlier by thinkers who wrestled with the problem of bringing greater democracy to government decision-making. For example, the pragmatist philosopher and educational reformist, John Dewey (1920) commented on the importance of discourse-based community consensus (Harper and Stein, 2006). Lewis Mumford in the 1930s envisioned governance that involved "human-scale, autonomous (decentralized) service units, co-operative processes, and avoidance of government compulsion" (Harper and Stein, 2006, p. 136), concepts that were in sharp contrast with the prevailing faith in authority and technical expertise. These ideas inspired a new generation of planners who, with the help of philosophers and sociologists, began to articulate their visions and promote planning reforms.

2.1.3 Advocacy Planning and Participatory Models

Advocacy planning sought to reorient decision making from a purely top-down approach to one that incorporated the voices of poor and working-class city residents (Sandercock, 1998). Planners moved out of city hall into poor communities and acted as advocates for disadvantaged groups, offering assistance and attempting to create new plans that took community needs into account (Sandercock, 1998; Harper and Stein, 2006). The hope was that planning based on closer interaction with local people would "redistribute resources more fairly, increase social equity, and improve quality of life for minority groups" (Susskind et al., 2003, p.41). Regardless of this reorientation, under traditional advocacy planning, decision-making power remained with the bureaucrats, but some planners learned an important lesson from their experience. The new approach revealed the value of local knowledge and the wealth of political skills that were untapped within communities (Sandercock, 1998). Inspired, some planners took advocacy planning a step further encouraging an even greater degree of democracy in decision-making.

John Freidman first promoted a *social learning* approach in the 1970s that was partly inspired by Dewey (Harper and Stein, 2006). Friedman felt the role of expert should be re-delegated to the planning client, whom he viewed to be in possession of the best knowledge about his or her own life and community (Harper and Stein, 2006). Later, in the 1980s, John Forester developed a *progressive planning* model that placed the practitioner in the role of justice and fairness seeker on behalf of community-based decision-makers (Harper and Stein, 2006). Forester's approach was connected to Jurgen Habermas' *communicative action theory* of the same decade, which was further combined with the work of Anthony Giddens and refined into *communicative action planning* by Patsy Healey and Judith Innes in the 1990s (Harper and Stein, 2006). In current literature, Habermas is often credited with providing the theoretical foundations upon which CP was built (Sandercock, 1998; Flyvbjerg, 1998; Harper and Stein, 2006). Innes (2004), however, is careful to point out, "consensus building grew up as a practice without knowledge of or reference to Habermas" (p. 10) and Healy stresses that Giddens was more influential than Habermas in her conceptualization of CP (Healy, 2003). Nevertheless, while claims of Habermas' parenthood of CP may be overstated, Innes also

acknowledges, “his concept of communicative rationality has an uncanny resemblance to the work of serious and skilled consensus building efforts” (p. 10) and it provides a useful normative lens through which we can explore CP.

Habermas was a social theorist who argued for public participation in management of public space and believed that “validity, truth and consensus are ensured” (Flyvbjerg, 1998, p.188) in a discourse where five conditions are present (see table 2): (1) no affected party is excluded; (2) all parties have equal opportunity to present and criticize; (3) each party is willing to empathize with all other parties; (4) power differences are neutralized to the extent that they have no impact on the creation of consensus; and (5) participants are transparent about their goals and interests and do not engage in strategic action (adapted from Habermas in Flyvbjerg, 1998). These basic tenets still reflect the ideal characteristics of CP today. Habermas’ conditions for effective public decision-making are outlined in table 2.

Table 2. Habermas’ Conditions for Effective Public Decision-making

1. No stakeholder is excluded
2. Equal opportunity to present and criticize
3. Power differences are neutralized
4. Willingness to empathize with other parties
5. Transparency among participants

(Adapted from Flyvbjerg, 1998, p.188)

While CP is similar to advocacy planning in its intent toward a more community based, bottom-up planning regime, it differs in the use of face-to-face dialogue between multiple stakeholders, thus addressing Habermas’ first condition of non-exclusion as well as his second condition of equal opportunity. Where the original advocacy planners entered neighborhoods to collect information from as many stakeholders as possible, then made decisions based on their findings, CP brings those stakeholders together and empowers them toward joint decision-making (Sandercock, 1998; Gunton and Day, 2003). It is the ‘collaborative’ in CP as well as its reallocation of decision-making authority that makes it distinct from other models. Collaborative planning therefore addresses Habermas’ third

condition of neutralized power differences not only by delegating decision making power to the stakeholders, but also through the requirement of consensus-based decisions. Further, Habermas recognized the tendency for polarization to occur within multi-stakeholder groups. Stakeholders tend to rely on positional bargaining to meet their objectives rather than interests-based negotiations, sometimes rendering public decision-making ineffective. Thus, Habermas' conditions required some mechanism to generate empathy and trust among participants. Collaborative planning addresses Habermas' fourth and fifth conditions through the use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR)[1], a technique borrowed from the field of mediation.

2.1.4 Incorporating Mediation Techniques

The use of ADR is another feature that sets CP apart from earlier planning standards (see table 3). The unique multi-interest nature of CP demands mechanisms to create space for diversity and resolve disagreements between collaborators. One way to forward these goals in a potentially combative environment is to build a sense of mutual understanding and trust. Alternative Dispute Resolution is a mediation technique that, since the 1970s, gained increasing legitimacy as a substitute for litigation (O'Leary and Bingham, 2003). In an ideal ADR scenario, each stakeholder learns about the interests of the other stakeholders, challenges previously held assumptions, and works together with the others to create mutually satisfying agreements (Susskind et al., 2003). The beauty of ADR, say proponents, is that it does not require participants to adopt the worldviews of others in the group, but it does require that they accept difference, move beyond combativeness, and agree to work together on issues despite the various values-based disagreements that may still exist between parties (Brand and Gaffikin, 2007).

The distinction between *positions-based* and *interests-based* is important to highlight. During a positions-based negotiation, participants rely purely on the planning outcome they support as their point of departure for negotiations. An example of a position is, "We are willing to negotiate further about the location of protected areas, but not about their

[1] Alternative dispute resolution is also referred to in the literature as conflict management, conflict resolution or, in a resource context, as environmental conflict resolution (O'Leary and Bingham, 2003; Cormick, 1982 in Penrose, 1996).

size, so if we are going to reach a compromise it will have to be with the first issue". On the other hand, in an interests-based approach the participant reveals their underlying reasons or motivating influences without attaching them to a position. A rephrase of the previous example might read something like, "We support a healthy environment. We also support job protection and are concerned about the loss of jobs that might occur if the size of protected areas is increased". Note that each part of the previous sentence is phrased in a positive sense ("we support") and leaves more room for negotiation than the either/or statement in the positions-based example. The stakeholder now provides an opportunity that did not previously exist: the possibility of inventing a solution that is good for the environment *and* protects jobs. The stakeholder may very well be willing to consider an increased size for protected areas if she/he is assured that no job losses will result.

Planners now understand that once a sense of mutual understanding, empathy, and teamwork is built, Habermas' final condition of transparency becomes a voluntary action as stakeholders develop a sense of responsibility towards their team's success at finding win-win options. Thus, the purpose for incorporating ADR into CP is to build relationships and trust, to ensure that stakeholders view the outcomes as fair, and to uncover all possible joint gains, thereby encouraging consensus (Susskind et al., 2003, p. 43). Features of ADR that are typically utilized in CP are outlined in table 3.

Table 3. Features of Alternative Dispute Resolution used in Collaborative Planning

1. Interests-based approach
2. Stakeholders' challenge their own assumptions
3. Win-win: maximization of mutual gains
4. Consensus-based decisions

(Adapted from Susskind et al., 2003)

2.1.5 Collaborative Planning - A New Model

Collaborative planning in its present form is a natural symbiosis between face-to-face, multi-stakeholder decision-making and alternative dispute resolution. Combining these

techniques increases the likelihood that Habermas' conditions are met (see table 4).

Table 4. Collaborative Planning's Answers to Habermas' Conditions for Effective Public Decision-making

Habermas' Conditions	Ideal CP Characteristics
1. No stakeholder is excluded	Multi-stakeholder representation
2. Equal opportunity to present and criticize	Face-to-face negotiations
3. Power differences are neutralized	Consensus-based; Decision making power to stakeholders
4. Empathy toward other parties	ADR; interests-based
5. Transparency among participants	ADR; interests-based

(Adapted from Flyvbjerg, 1998; Sandercock, 1998; Beierle and Cayford, 2002; Susskind et al., 2003)

While each process differs, the general CP framework follows three basic stages: *pre-negotiation*, *negotiation* and *post-negotiation* (Gunton and Day, 2003, Margerum, 2002; Susskind et al., 2003). During *pre-negotiation*, a government team might convene for the purpose of identifying relevant stakeholders and recruiting stakeholder representatives. A conflict assessment might be performed to highlight the major issues of the negotiation and predict the likelihood of an agreement. A planning team might be identified to design and guide the process and to collect all relevant information and data. Often a preliminary Terms of Reference (TOR) is drafted to streamline the process of adopting a TOR during the negotiation stage (Gunton and Day, 2003, Margerum, 2002; Susskind et al., 2003).

Table 5. Stages of a Typical Collaborative Planning Process

Pre-Negotiation	•Identify relevant stakeholders •Recruit stakeholder representatives •Meet with stakeholders to conduct conflict assessment •Form planning team •Collect and compile all relevant information/data •Draft Terms of Reference
Negotiation	•Identify stakeholder interests •Agree on Terms of Reference •Develop scenarios/options •Resolve information/data gaps •Evaluate scenarios •Choose scenarios by consensus
Post- Negotiation	•Complete plan document •Get plan approval •Complete administrative details necessary for implementation •Implementation •Evaluation and monitoring

(Adapted from McGee, 2006)

The *negotiation* stage typically begins with stakeholders sharing their interests in the process outcomes, adopting a TOR, and setting general rules of conduct. With all interests on the table, stakeholders begin brainstorming scenarios that have the potential to provide collective gains. During this stage, gaps in information are often identified and must be filled before negotiations can move forward. Stakeholders may convene into sub-committees dedicated to gathering missing information or developing solutions that require specific expertise. Plans may also be negotiated for monitoring and evaluation of implementation outcomes. Once a set of scenarios is identified, each is evaluated and a selection is made by consensus (Gunton and Day, 2003, Margerum, 2002; Susskind et al., 2003).

Post-negotiation involves completion of the plan document and securing legal approval and/or implementing the outcomes of the process. Some outcomes must be approved or

ratified into law by a designated authority such as a government or court. Lastly, any other administrative hurdles that are required before plan implementation begins are addressed (Gunton and Day, 2003, Margerum, 2002; Susskind et al., 2003).

2.2 Empirical Findings about Collaborative Planning

Before a CP planning process is adopted, it is important for decision-makers to weigh the pros and cons of the technique. Professionals need to answer questions such as: Will CP cost more/less? How effective was CP in similar cases elsewhere? Will CP save time or increase the duration of negotiations? And, is CP really better at reaching consensus than other methods? Further, for professionals already engaged in CP processes or for organizations already committed to their use, another important question is: How can CP be designed to succeed?

One historical problem within the field of CP was the prescriptive nature of its literature, which lacked evidence from evaluations assessing CP strengths and weaknesses (Frame et al., 2004; Mascarenhas and Scarce, 2004; Andrew, 2001). Although CP theory provided recommendations that intuitively made sense to many decision-makers, critics argued that too much of the CP literature was written by proponents (Huxley, 2000).

Despite the dearth of empirical evidence in the past, a significant, and growing body of literature now seeks to fill in the gaps as researchers dig into past and current case studies to evaluate outcomes (Scholz and Stiftel, 2005; Frame et al., 2004; Connick and Innes, 2003; Susskind et al., 2003; Beierle and Cayford, 2002; Leach, Pelkey and Sabatier, 2002; Andrew, 2001; Selin, Schuett and Carr, 2000; Wondollek and Yaffee, 2000; Innes and Booher, 1999; Carr, Selin and Schuett, 1998; Moote, McClaran and Chickering, 1997; Innes, 1996). Key findings from formal evaluations are essentially divisible into three types of useful information: (1) Empirical evidence that either supports or rejects the use of CP in relation to other strategies by highlighting strengths and challenges; (2) Identification of barriers and drivers of CP success to inform design improvements; and (3) Strategies for further CP evaluation. Key empirical findings from the CP literature are explored here with the intent of highlighting these three themes.

2.2.1 Strengths

Generalizations applied ubiquitously to all cases should be viewed with caution. Nevertheless, the evidence supports CP as a valuable tool for resource-based decision-making. Collaborative planning usually results in agreement, and in numerous studies, participants were overwhelmingly satisfied with the process (Carr et al., 1998; Selin et al., 2000; Leach et al., 2002; Susskind et al., 2003; Beierle and Cayford, 2002). For example, in Leach et al., 84% of process participants who responded to the authors' survey agreed or strongly agreed, "the best strategies for resolving watershed issues involve consensus-based processes" (p. 650). Several authors acknowledge that significant shortcomings in both the process design and evaluation methods must still be addressed (Mascarenhas and Scarce, 2004; Huxley and Yiftachel, 2000; Sandercock, 1998; Healey, 2003; Innes, 2004). But for the most part, researchers agree that CP should not be rejected as a planning strategy and that tinkering with process design rather than discarding the method outright will address most criticisms (Healey, 2003; Innes, 2004; Beierle and Cayford, 2002; Frame et al., 2004, etc.) In this section, the strengths of CP cited by proponents and critics in the general literature are compared to the evidence emphasized by selected researchers. While these selected studies are by no means a complete set, they do include evaluations by some of the most influential CP scholars and provide insights from both supportive and critical perspectives.

Collaborative planning has several advantages as demonstrated in table 6. Clearly, claims about CP strengths are well supported by empirical evidence, but the most consistently cited benefits are increased social and political capital, and the development of new, shared knowledge. Additional CP strengths are discussed below in the order of the frequency with which they are emphasized in the reviewed literature.

Table 6. Evidence Emphasized in the Literature for Collaborative Planning Strengths[2]

		Innes, 1996	Moote et al., 1997	Carr et al., 1998	Selin et al., 2000	Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2000	Margerum, 2002	Beierle & Cayford, 2002	Leach et al., 2002	Connick & Innes, 2003	Susskind et al., 2003	Frame et al., 2004	Mascarenhas & Scarce, 2004	Scholz & Stiftel, 2005	Brand & Gaffikin, 2007
Strengths	**Increased Social/Political Capital**	●	●	●	●	●		●	●	●	●	●			
	New shared knowledge-base	●	●	●	●	●		●			●	●			
	Representation	●	●		●	●			●			●			
	Satisfaction, Teamwork			●	●	●				●		●			
	New, Higher Quality Solutions					●		●		●	●	●			
	Legitimacy/Buy-in			●	●	●						●			
	Low Cost			●				●			●				
	Implementable plan								●						
	Environmental Benefits								●						
	Durable Agreement										●				

● *Indicates the strength was emphasized as an outcome of study results or as a direct line of reasoning from results in discussion or conclusion sections. Does not indicate strengths emphasized from other research mentioned in the study or general references to other literature.*

[2] "Evidence" is used here to refer primarily to the dominant perceptions of participants collected from questionnaires and during interviews. Document review and participant observation also contributed to several authors' findings.

a. Increased Social/Political Capital

Putnam (2000) defines social capital as "features of social organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit" (p.19). In a regional planning context, social capital refers to representatives of varying interests working together on a project and consequently building relationships that have a lasting positive effect on learning, decision-making, future planning, and outcome satisfaction. Where human capital is a society's endowment of educated, trained and healthy workers, social capital resides in the relationships formed between these individuals (Woolcock, 2001). Increasing empirical evidence points toward the fact that social capital can be viewed as another factor of production alongside physical and human capital (Woolcock, 2001). For example, Knack and Keefer's (1997) study asked the question, "Does social capital have an economic payoff?" The authors conducted a country-level analysis to determine which aspects of social capital are directly related to economic growth. The study revealed that increased inter-linkages between stakeholders did not directly correlate with fiscal growth, but that increased trust did have such a relationship. Departing from Innes and Booher (1999) I extend the definition here to include political capital, which facilitates future agreements through stronger linkages between different political actors.

When individuals come together at a CP table, they begin to form social and political networks that have value (capital). The resulting improvements in communication and understanding between alternate interests provides a more solid foundation for present and future negotiations, and encourages additional cooperative innovations outside of the planning process called *second-order effects* (Gunton and Day, 2003; Gunton *et al*., 2003; Frame et al., 2004). Impressively, Leach et al., (2002) found that 100% of participants felt the process improved their own stores of social capital after collaborative policymaking was used for water management in California and Washington. Carr et al., (1998) also found participants viewed building relationships, networking, trust building and sharing information as CP's highlights during multiple uses of the technique by the USDA Forest Service. Wondolleck's and Yaffee's (2000) results confirmed that CP is useful in multiple resource management contexts across the USA because it builds

understanding between stakeholders, creates mechanisms for effective decision-making, coordinates across jurisdictional and political boundaries, and builds capacity for future decision-making.

b. New Shared Knowledge base

An obvious byproduct of a CP process is the plan document, which acts as a guide and resource for plan implementation. However, behind that document is often a plethora of studies, research data, spatial data, cultural knowledge and other new information drawn from stakeholders throughout the planning process that provide invaluable project support. During collaborative policymaking for the San Francisco Estuary Project, Connick and Innes (2003) found the following:

> *…discussions, along with detailed examinations of the analyses, predictions and models, helped create trust in a shared set of data and a deeper understanding among stakeholders of technical issues, and they resulted in improved information* (p. 186).

When CP results in such products, it creates a valuable shared-knowledge base that increases intellectual capital and provides a key resource during plan implementation and future planning projects (Frame et al., 2004).

c. Representation

As previously outlined, one of the important goals of CP is better stakeholder representation in decision-making. But does CP truly represent the public? Based on multiple empirical accounts, the answer is yes. For instance, in 7 of 8 Californian cases studied by Innes (1996) all stakeholder interests were well represented according to participant interviews, document analysis, and direct observation. In three of those cases groups actively sought additional stakeholders who had not initially recognized their interest in the issue. Moote et al.*'s* (1997) study of riparian land use conflict in Arizona also found that despite their inability to reach an agreement, 100% of participants felt that CP achieved "unbelievably broad" (p. 882) representation.

d. Satisfaction, Teamwork

Rather than relying on one or two planners, CP relies on dynamic interactions among stakeholders. In an ideal CP process, stakeholders work through group development and coalesce into a functional team. This sense of teamwork generates trust among one-time adversaries and produces an overall sense of accomplishment that not only helps the process become more efficient and effective, but also extends beyond the agreement (O'Leary and Bingham, 2003; Susskind and Cruikshank in Gunton and Day, 2003; Andrew, 2001). Selin et al.*'s* (2000) research revealed that stakeholders were indeed satisfied by the process. Most respondents indicated that they felt a sense of belonging within the process, recognized their interdependence, and experienced mutual respect in their interactions with other stakeholders. Wondolleck and Yaffe (2000) also found that by focusing first on smaller, more manageable problems, CP processes instilled hope in participants incrementally, giving them a satisfying feeling of success as the planning effort progressed. Furthermore, those involved tend to be full of "energy, enthusiasm, and optimism" (Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000, p. 168) instilling a sense of fun during the process.

e. New, Higher Quality Solutions

Innovation is another strength of CP. Bringing stakeholders together to solve planning problems generates new options that were previously unconsidered by central planners (Frame et al., 2004). By pooling resources stakeholders soon realize they can create unique solutions that result in joint gains (O'Leary and Bingham, 2003; Gunton and Day, 2003; Andrew, 2001). Further, shared information ensures that solutions draw on a wide array of sources unavailable to central planners. For example, First Nations can share cultural heritage and traditional ecological knowledge while non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and industries can often bring a wealth of research and data to the table, sometimes using technology that is superior to that of public planning departments (Astofooroff, 2008). New, higher quality solutions are commonly reported as a result of CP processes: Beierle and Cayford (2002) determined that 68% of the 172 cases they studied achieved improvements in the substantive quality of decisions. Leach et al., (2002) found that CP successfully addressed the most serious watershed problems, not

just uncontroversial ones, and according to Connick and Innes (2003), participants developed agreements that "would have been impossible without the collaborative dialogue" (p. 187).

f. Legitimacy/Buy-in

Collaborative planning is a more democratic process than traditional styles of planning because it involves stakeholders directly in decision-making. As such, CP brings a wider range of affected stakeholders together to deliberate about the issues. Voices from interest groups that would not be heard in a technocratic planning regime are incorporated into the decision-making process. Further, unlike advocacy planning, CP provides those interest groups with real power to affect the outcome. Better representation provides the process with more legitimacy in the eyes of participants and the public and therefore increases the level of buy-in toward the process and its outcomes. Studies in Canada and elsewhere show that,

> *perceptions of procedural fairness have a significant impact on attitudes and behaviour, and that people who believe they have been treated fairly are more likely to accept a decision, even where the outcome has gone against them (Jackson and Curry, 2004, p. 30).*

Carr et al. (1998) captured collaborative planning's ability to achieve legitimacy and participant buy-in, stating, "One of the cornerstones of collaborative planning is its effectiveness in establishing or rebuilding trust [in the government agency]" (p. 774). This conclusion is supported by Selin et al.*'s* (2000) finding that most participants viewed the process they were involved in as credible.

g. Low Cost

For some, the most alluring (and contested) incentive for choosing CP over other methods is that it saves money. At first, this claim may seem counter-intuitive because multi-stakeholder planning requires more person-hours of work than centralized planning. But when costs of litigation and public dissatisfaction are accounted for, CP can become an attractive alternative. Centralized planning often leaves stakeholders dissatisfied and has a higher risk of dissolving into adversarial, courts-based, 'winner-

take-all' methods for resolving disputes (Frame et al., 2004). According to some empirical findings, supporting a multi-stakeholder team over a few years to produce an agreement that does not dissolve into public protests and expensive court battles saves money into the long term (O'Leary and Bingham, 2003; Gunton and Day, 2003; Andrew, 2001). In their study of ADR, Susskind et al. (2003) found that 81% of participants surveyed had the, "impression that it [the process] consumed both less time and less money" (p. 49).

h. Implementable Plan

Because CP strives toward participant buy-in, the likelihood of public protest or legal dispute is reduced; an important first step in ensuring the plan will work. Further, many table participants have direct roles in plan implementation. Involving those who will implement the plan improves the feasibility of strategies they produce because it generates a sense of ownership and helps motivate participants to see the plan through. Susskind et al., (2003) found that 69% of participants in the resource-based ADR processes they studied regarded their settlements as "more stable than what they probably could have reached through another process" (p. 47). In addition, 75% of respondents felt that their agreement was either very well or sufficiently implemented.

i. Environmental Benefits

Dryzek (in Jackson and Curry, 2004) views a 'radical decentralization' of decision-making to local communities as a pre-requisite to a more ecologically rational democracy. One challenge of land use planning is the attempt to reconcile development with ecological integrity. Collaborative planning produces more environmental benefits than other forms of planning because it incorporates diverse ways of 'knowing' about the environment. Combining local knowledge, whether traditional, anecdotal or scientific provides higher quality information about ecological complexities, local histories, and risks specific to each planning site and thus results in more effective, ecology-friendly planning strategies (Jackson and Curry, 2004). Leach et al. (2002) is the only study displayed in table 6 that tested for environmental benefits, reporting that most of the watershed partnerships participating in that study saw an improvement in their watershed

as a result of collaboration.

j. Durable Agreements

Collaborative planning results in longer lasting agreements due to increased participant buy-in (Frame et al., 2004). Those involved are more likely to support decisions into the long-term when they feel their voice is heard during the decision making process (Gunton and Day, 2003; Gunton et al., 2003). Working together toward joint gains causes stakeholders to take ownership of solutions and decreases future conflicts due to improved understanding and communication among process participants (Susskind et al., 2003). This durability is in contrast to centralized planning, which is often perceived as less stable because certain stakeholders are often favoured over others despite planners' best attempts to incorporate all interests. When such centralized decisions dissolve into litigation, there is no guarantee courts-based outcomes will placate angry stakeholders long-term.

2.2.2 Challenges

Most criticisms of CP are of the process itself rather than its outcomes, partially due to the fact that less research about process outcomes is available. An important point to recall in understanding the literature is the fact that CP was originally conceived as an antidote to the technocratic planning of the post-WWII era. Most CP literature frames the technique in contrast to what came before. The controversy over *technocratic* versus *participatory* planning is far from over and as such there is merit to this position (Brunner and Steelman, 2005). However, many CP critics have moved beyond the *technocratic* versus *participatory* debate to focus on problems within participatory processes (Huxley, 2000, Sandercock, 1998, Miraftab, 2009). From this critical-theory, or radical, perspective it is the nature and quality of participation now being examined, particularly in the context of power relations, not its merits over technocratic practices. Therefore, the 'debate' between these 'CP critics' and 'CP supporters' is really not a debate at all, since they are arguing from two completely different starting points. Therefore, in evaluating the pros and cons of CP, it is important to be aware of the paradigm within which each researcher is framing their criticism. Because this thesis explores the *technocratic* versus

participatory position, most of the CP challenges listed here are drawn from criticisms of participatory approaches in general. Nevertheless, some challenges from the radical viewpoint to the way CP processes are currently designed are also included. These challenges are statements about CP *as it is now* relative to CP *as it could be* in an ideal sense and generally relate to problems of power and representation.

Table 7. Evidence Emphasized in the Literature for Collaborative Planning Challenges[3]

		Innes, 1996	Moote et al., 1997	Carr et al., 1998	Selin et al., 2000	Wondollek & Yaffee, 2000	Margerum, 2002	Beierle & Cayford, 2002	Leach et al., 2002	Connick & Innes, 2003	Susskind et al., 2003	Frame et al., 2004	Mascarenhas & Scarce, 2004	Scholz & Stiftel, 2005	Brand & Gaffikin, 2007
Challenges	**Power Imbalances**		●			●	●					●	●		●
	High Cost		●	●		●	●							●	
	Participant Burn-out/Attrition		●	●		●	●							●	
	Unrepresentative		●			●		●					●		●
	Increased or Unreduced Conflict		●						●			●		●	●
	Poor Accountability		●									●	●		
	Disingenuous Inclusion		●										●		
	Lowest common-denominator agreements														●

● *Indicates the challenge was emphasized as an outcome of study results or as a direct line of reasoning from results in discussion or conclusion sections. Does not indicate challenges emphasized from other research mentioned in the study or general references to other literature.*

[3] See previous footnote.

Each of the claims about CP challenges is supported by the selected literature in table 7. Power imbalances are most commonly emphasized, but high costs, participant burn-out/attrition, poor representation of the public interest, and increased or unreduced conflict are also frequently demonstrated. Each challenge is explored below in the order of the frequency with which it was emphasized.

a. Power Imbalances

Collaborative planning addresses power imbalances *between* planners and stakeholders by giving stakeholders decision-making authority. It also attempts to address power imbalances *among* stakeholders by using consensus-based decisions. However, all participants do not come to the negotiating table equal (Susskind et al., 2003; Gunton and Day, 2003; Cornwall, 2003). Government and industry representatives often have access to more and better information, more training, and are paid for their participation. On the other hand, members of some NGOs, community groups and First Nations are typically at a disadvantage because they do not possess the same capacities. Less obviously, gender, race and ethnic inequalities are systemically embedded in society and therefore enter the process unaddressed (Sandercock, 1998). Yet, as Miraftab (2009) points out, governments still attempt to package these processes as inclusive:

> *Feminist scholarship has made an important contribution to understanding the fallacy of the liberal drama of citizenship, demonstrating that despite its formalistic assumption that citizens constitute a single, all-rights bearing entity with equal rights and obligations, the entitlements and obligations in actuality are unequal being differentiated according to gender, race, and ethnicity* (p. 40).

Each of these inequalities weakens the voting power some participants gain through a consensus-based process. Inequalities prevent some stakeholders from making meaningful contributions to the process by separating them from those with the capacity to set the agenda, thus, powerful stakeholders can more easily manipulate the process to their own advantage (Gunton and Day, 2003). One respondent in Margerum's (2002) study stated,

> *At first glance, it would appear that citizen members have better than equal representation on the committee; but in practice this is often not the case because their attendance is not always certain and they are not paid, but mainly because representatives of government departments have much greater access to office assistance, photocopying, printing, and research. Hence they can drive agendas with superior presentation, leapfrogging and squeezing out some citizen-initiated items* (p. 249).

Several participants in Scholz and Stiftel's (2005) study feared CP would augment the influence of more powerful stakeholders from industry, government and NGOs at the expense of less organized or geographically remote groups, highlighting a need to ensure adequate representation, but also to focus on issues of within-group equity.

b. High Cost

Although CP may encourage long-term financial savings by avoiding expensive litigation, it is still a costly process. Participants meet regularly, usually over a 2-5 year period, and a team of government workers who provide technical and administrative expertise typically supports the process. During negotiations it is sometimes necessary to commission further studies to gather information crucial for decision-making. Each of these components cost money. Sometimes, it is difficult to justify the expenditure; particularly if a process runs the risk of becoming obsolete due to political shifts or parallel processes that have more legislative power. Wondollek and Yaffee (2003) acknowledge that CP is not always appropriate for every conflict or decision-making process due to cost, duration and complexity. Scholz and Stiftel (2005) agree, stating that CP processes are expensive in terms of time and money, but qualify this by arguing that the expenditure is necessary to establish trust and instill public learning.

c. Participant Burn-out/Attrition

The time required to complete a CP process is often too long to maintain the commitment of all participants. In many cases, stakeholders are not compensated for their time, particularly if they are representing NGOs or community groups. If the demands of volunteering become too great relative to the demands of regular life, participants may exit the process. In this way, participant burnout can highlight power imbalances that may be embedded in the process. For example, paid employees from industry and government

attend meetings regularly as part of their jobs and therefore increase their share of decision-making authority when worn out volunteers choose to withdraw. Participant burnout also has impacts within the process when decisions are made simply to 'get on with it' rather than by truly collaborative discourse. Further, participant continuity is a problem when representatives are forced to leave the process due to career moves or when they move away to a new geographic location. Margerum (2002) found that because CP processes take longer, "committees changed – often before they reached consensus or produced a plan" (p. 247). For example, in Moote et al.*'s* (2002) case study the process began with more than 400 participants at inception and was whittled down to less than 40 two years later.

d. Unrepresentative

While including multiple stakeholders and/or sector representatives is an improvement in representation relative to technocratic planning, many argue that these individuals provide a very narrow cross-section of society (Wondolleck and Yaffe, 2000). Interest groups are often comprised of small numbers of people who feel strongly about a particular issue, but they do not necessarily embody the values of the majority in a community or region. This raises questions about CP legitimacy and its ability to create high quality, representative solutions, and ultimately to avert public dissatisfaction with land use decisions. Several studies found that participants viewed CP as unrepresentative of the public's interests. For example, based on socioeconomic criteria, Beierle and Cayford (2002) determined that 60% of 63 cases did not involve participants that were representative of the public and 58% of another 74 cases showed interests missing from the table. Moote et al. (1997) also found that 70% of respondents felt some interests were excluded from the process by lack of access.

e. Increased or Unreduced Conflict

Contrary to CP's intent, the technique can actually exacerbate existing tensions between participants. When participants are unwilling to negotiate in good faith, or when they are unwilling to empathize with other stakeholders, the process can create bad feeling. Even if an agreement is reached, if a negative relationship was built or amplified between two

or more stakeholders, it can last beyond the process and result in a deficit of social capital. Leach et al. (2002) discovered that 28% of surveyed stakeholders agreed or strongly agreed that there were frequent clashes between experts and non-experts over technical issues. Margerum (2002) found that positional tactics used by some stakeholders "endangered ongoing relationships amongst participants" (p. 32) and Scholz and Stiftel (2005) claimed that partnerships aggravated conflicts related to economy, regulation and property rights. Participants in Moote et al.'s (1997) case study did not reach consensus partly due to internal conflicts among stakeholders. Worse, the "divisiveness and outright hostility that is still felt by some participants – and has even been exacerbated by this process – is evidence of its overall failure to reduce conflict and thereby facilitate plan implementation" (Moote, et al., 1997, p. 885).

f. Disingenuous Inclusion

Some critics argue that CP is simply a way for government and industry to elicit public consent for business as usual, particularly when key aspects of the negotiations are exempted from the table (Mascarhenhas and Scarce 2004; Miraftab, 2009). In this sense, CP is viewed as a pursuit of hegemonic power through citizens' consent and perceptions of inclusion (Miraftab, 2009). Citizens are still excluded materially while being included symbolically in decision-making. Miraftab argues that, "as peoples' political rights expand, their access to livelihood resources may simultaneously erode" (p. 40). Officials can use CP to forward their own agenda by placing carefully designed limits on the parameters of the negotiation. Mascarenhas and Scarce (2004) found that respondents were frustrated by the control built into the process around certain 'untouchable' topics that stakeholders viewed as crucial, but government was unwilling to bring to the table. For example, during the BC LRMP processes, the Annual Allowable Cut for timber was not up for negotiation, a fact that rendered the consensus process almost meaningless for some. Participants stated that CP was

> *...nothing more than a hush puppy. It allows the public to feel some power, but the power that really matters – for instance, over the amount of timber to be cut – is retained by the government* (Mascarenhas and Scarce, 2004, p. 30).

Moote et al. (1997) highlight another example where some participants felt the process was used by government as a tactic to avoid costly and publicly damaging court battles by exhausting vocal stakeholders in a mire of participatory planning.

g. No Accountability

When elected representatives shift decision-making to non-elected stakeholders, some argue they are abdicating responsibility (Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000; Frame et al., 2004). Using CP may allow officials to bypass the mainstream democratic process and in so doing, they become unaccountable for any negative impacts of the planning agreement. In combination with accusations of disingenuous inclusion, this creates a multi-layered problem of bureaucratic engineering coupled with a lack of avenues for public recourse. For example, participants from Moote et al. (1997) complained that while the process was too controlled by government, at the same time it removed responsibility for decision-making from the appropriate institution. One respondent from Mascarenhas and Scarce (2004) captures this sentiment by stating, "this is a real hot potato, throw it back to the public, and when they churn something out, we [government] are not to blame because they came up with the answers" (p. 30).

h. Lowest Common-denominator Decisions

Collaborative planning is not always successful at motivating participants toward win-win solutions for every issue on the table. In these instances, critics argue, the process erodes and second-best solutions are adopted in order to avoid difficult issues and achieve consensus (Susskind et al., 2003; Gunton and Day, 2003). Planning directions that emerge reflect the avoidance occurring at the table by adopting vague language and unclear guidelines for practitioners (Margerum, 1999; Gunton and Day, 2003). It is interesting that few of the CP studies selected reveal participant perceptions that lowest common denominator agreements resulted from the CP process. This is primarily because most researchers who tested for this characteristic found that higher quality agreements were the outcome. The more critical studies such as Moote et al. (1997), Margerum (2002) and Mascarenhas and Scarce (2004) did not focus their inquiry on this feature. One study by Brand and Gaffikin (2007) did provide evidence of lowest

common-denominator decisions in several CP cases observed in Northern Ireland. The authors promote a more 'agonistic' approach to CP, one that is less reliant on consensus and more dependent on robust debate, stating:

> *…the search for consensus and 'buy-in' often involved platitudinous affirmations, sometimes referred to as 'empty signifiers', very low common denominators to which most stakeholders could acquiesce without cost…(p.303)*

The strengths and challenges of CP emphasized in the literature are reviewed in table 8, which also categorizes these according to process and outcome characteristics.

Table 8. Summary of Collaborative Planning Strengths and Challenges

Strengths		Challenges	
Process	Outcome	Process	Outcome
• Low cost • New, higher quality solutions • Legitimacy/Buy-in • Representation • Satisfaction, teamwork	• Durable agreements • Implementable plan • New shared knowledge-base • Environmental benefits • Increased Social Capital	• High cost • Increased or unreduced conflict • Participant burn-out/Attrition • Unrepresentative • Power imbalances • Disingenuous Inclusion • No Accountability	• Lowest common denominator agreements

(Compiled from Scholz and Stiftel, 2005; Frame et al., 2004; Connick and Innes, 2003; Susskind et al., 2003; Beierle and Cayford, 2002; Leach, Pelkey and Sabatier, 2002; Andrew, 2001; Selin, Schuett and Carr, 2000; Wondollek and Yaffee, 2000; Innes and Booher, 1999; Carr, Selin and Schuett, 1998; Moote, McClaran and Chickering, 1997; Innes, 1996; Mascarenhas and Scarce, 2004; Brand and Gaffikin, 2007)

2.2.3 Drivers and Barriers of Success

One important fact should be clear from the preceding section: all claims about both CP strengths and CP challenges are grounded in empirical evidence to a greater or lesser degree, and despite its shortcomings a high level of support exists for the process. The fact that participants consistently rank CP as the best method to deal with planning problems even after highlighting several frustrations with the process implies that replacing CP with a different planning paradigm is not the solution. Instead, the task is to design the process for optimal performance. One purpose of this thesis is to examine the

Morice LRMP process for valuable lessons about performance so that future processes may be refined and improved. However, before engaging in that discussion, there are several lessons already available in the literature about drivers and barriers of CP success.

These drivers and barriers can be organized into seven general categories: (1) Pre-conditions; (2) Access to resources; (3) Degree of inclusiveness; (4) Degree of authority; (5) Communications and dispute resolution; (6) Alternatives for stakeholders, and (7) Process mechanics. A well-designed process will attempt to harness drivers of success within each of these categories, whereas a poorly designed process will likely face barriers in one category or more.

a. Pre-conditions

Collaborative planning is not applicable to all land use problems (Carr et al., 1998; Susskind, 2003). There are things that CP does well and others that it does not do well, thus it is important to determine if the technique is appropriate to the context prior to engagement. An accurate pre-assessment will assist practitioners to determine whether or not CP is a worthwhile pursuit, thereby improving the likelihood of success. Practitioners should ask questions such as, "Does this problem require more immediate action than CP can provide?" or, "Is the scale of the problem sufficient to justify the expense of CP?" or, "Do stakeholders have enough incentive to participate?" If CP is considered appropriate, the next task is to predict its feasibility. For example, one indicator that CP is not the best choice is if deeply held, values-based beliefs are at stake, particularly if opposing beliefs already produce a climate of entrenched conflict and distrust that could undermine the process (Moote et al., 1997; Frame et al., 2004; Scholz and Stiftel, 2005). Recall that during one dispute studied by Moote et al. (1997) conflicts between stakeholders became exacerbated by the process and eventually led to its failure. Frame et al. (2004) identify several other common obstacles to CP success that can be appraised prior to project inception including institutional cultures that are resistant to change, significant power imbalances among stakeholders, unwillingness to participate, and poorly organized stakeholders who cannot clearly define their interests.

b. Access to Resources

Money, time, information and skills are four main resources that feed into a CP process. With adequate supplies of each, the process has a better chance of success. Sufficient funds ensure that the process can operate administratively and, if financial rewards are attributed to stakeholders, help ensure continuity of participants. Time affects the quality of agreement. For example, Leach et al. (2002) found that longer process duration was perceived by participants to have a positive correlation with outcomes. It was determined that watershed partnerships required about 48 months before significant milestones were achieved. On the other hand, Frame et al. (2004) point out that some stakeholders may not have enough time to participate effectively, especially when they are volunteers. If the process carries on for too long, participant burnout may occur, so it is important to establish a process timeline that is appropriate to each context (Frame et al., 2004). Information gaps also act as barriers. It is harder to reach consensus if all parties are not satisfied with the quality of information at the table. For instance, some stakeholders might contest data from certain sources as flawed or biased. Finally, Frame et al. (2004) indicate that an asymmetry of negotiation training and experience among participants poses obstacles to CP success. Selin et al. (2000) found that leadership training is an important component of effective processes. Carr et al.'s (1998), findings also indicate that negotiation training is an important driver of productive CP outcomes.

c. Degree of Inclusiveness

Andrew (2001) was surprised to learn that of 17 CP strengths he identified, only one was viewed by respondents as highly correlated with their satisfaction in the process: *participation of all stakeholders in the conflict*. Public desire to be included in decision-making, perceptions of fairness, and the important roles these played in CP's emergence is discussed previously in some detail (section 2.1). Inclusive representation is important to ensure legitimacy not only in the eyes of the general public, but also in the eyes of process participants. The literature indicates that participants are less motivated to develop win-win solutions when they feel important interests are not represented (Andrew, 2001). Consensus decisions are also more difficult to achieve when the

possibility exists that an unrepresented interest could sabotage, or at least ignore, the agreement.

d. Degree of Authority

To encourage success, stakeholders involved in a CP process need to have the authority to make decisions, and those decisions should have legal weight. Existing legislation and other parallel processes that threaten to supersede an agreement often complicate governments' ability to provide this authority. Moote et al. (1997) learned that one important driver of CP success is to reconcile the decision-making authority of the participatory process with the legal authority and responsibility of the elected organization. Carr et al. (1998) called for legislative changes freeing institutions from cumbersome administrative details that discourage the use of participatory processes, and also found that participants wanted decision-making authority delegated locally. Where it is not possible to delegate decision-making authority entirely, those who do have authority should be involved in the process. According to Andrew (2001), one of the most important characteristics for success is participation of the government body responsible for approving a final settlement. Of course, the dark side of delegated authority is confusion over who is accountable for the outcomes of decisions. Such confusion acts as an obstacle to CP effectiveness if stakeholders become uncomfortable with elected officials shifting responsibility to non-elected stakeholder representatives (Frame et al., 2004). Some also argue that when CP encourages coalition formation, it results in undemocratic decisions that are in the coalitions' interests but not those of the general public.

e. Communications and Dispute Resolution

Participatory processes can use a variety of communication techniques, but CP is unique in its use of ADR and interests-based approaches. Wondollek and Yaffee (2000) feel that using these techniques greatly improve the chances of CP success. Other potential communications strategies include the following suggestions: (1) Establish open and effective lines of communication among process participants and between the process and the public in order to maintain transparency and efficiency, (2) Build a well organized

online database as a central information source to save time and improve the quality of decisions by helping participants remain well informed, (3) Appoint a designated spokesperson to communicate with media and the public, and (4) Work from a single plan document. Often, barriers to effective communication and dispute resolution emerge due to erosion of trust. The next section addresses one reason trust can deteriorate.

f. Alternatives for Stakeholders

If stakeholders are not participating in good faith, or if they are engaging in strategic bargaining, it is possible that they have what Fisher and Ury (1991) refer to as a Better Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA). Stakeholders who perceive they will gain more outside the process have little incentive to cooperate and it becomes difficult to build trust within the group. Therefore, an important barrier to CP success is high BATNAs (Frame et al., 2004). Before engaging in a CP process, practitioners can assess the degree to which BATNAs are present and develop strategies for making the process the best available alternative to all stakeholders.

g. Process Mechanics

Effective process mechanics are key to achieving consensus. Typically, a mediator or facilitator manages the details of process structure, but some studies show that CP processes are more likely to succeed if stakeholders are included in the design (Carr et al., 1998; Andrew, 2001). Design strategies recommended in the literature include establishing rules of engagement, identifying tangible outcomes, using an appropriate scale of focus (i.e. local, regional), making appropriate use of scientific information and maintaining continuity of leadership and stakeholders (Scholz and Stiftel, 2005). Mechanisms can also be in place to address within group equity and particular sensitivity should be directed toward cultural differences (Wondollek and Yaffee, 2000).

Therefore, the answer to each of the questions for practitioners at the beginning of this section (2.2) is a resounding; “it depends”. Collaborative planning should not be viewed as a cure-all for environmental disputes, nor should CP be implemented haphazardly or ubiquitously. There are limitations to using CP that depend on the nature and context of

the dispute, the players involved, their incentives to participate authentically, the time and money available, and power dynamics operating both inside and outside the group. Nevertheless, CP is an effective tool that, when used appropriately and with thoughtful process design, can result in better quality decisions. Perhaps more importantly, CP builds relationships, understanding and networks among participants that increase stores of social, intellectual and political capital. These less tangible benefits should not be underestimated. Conflict does not disappear simply because consensus is reached. Therefore it is important to recognize that outcomes of CP are not defined solely by the boundaries of that particular conflict (Innes and Booher, 1999). Empirical evidence indicates that CP supplies the foundations upon which future dispute resolution and decision-making processes will be built. Building such a foundation pays off. While CP cannot guarantee agreement, its offshoot outcomes do help stakeholders make better, more informed decisions that take less time to organize and are thus less expensive and more representative of the interests of all stakeholders.

2.2.4 Evaluation Methods

a. Study Samples

One important factor influencing the results of a CP study is the nature of its sample. The empirical evidence outlined in the previous sections was obtained from analyses of a variety of environmental planning applications of CP or CP-like techniques. Riparian land use, watershed planning, water management, regional environmental planning, forest management, waste management and general land use are all represented in the aforementioned research. Researchers approached their studies using several types of samples at different scales of analysis.

Sample types ranged from single case studies of localized resource-based disputes (Moote et al., 1997) or regional CP applications (Wilson et al., 1996; Penrose, 1996; Day and Tamblyn, 1998; McGee, 2006; Cullen, 2006; Astofooroff, 2008) to multiple examples of CP performed by single organizations operating nationwide (Carr et al., 1998; Selin et al., 2000), or multiple cases within a particular planning context, such as water management or regional environmental planning (Innes and Booher, 1999; Duffy,

Roseland and Gunton, 1996; Andrew, 2001; Frame, 2002; Leach et al., 2002; Margerum, 2002; Scholz and Stiftel, 2005). Some studies are quite broad in scope, combining a large number of cases evaluated over decades. For example, Beierle and Cayford (2002) conducted a systematic analysis of public participation in United States environmental decision-making by screening more than 1800 cases. Other studies focused on particular aspects of CP such as ADR. Susskind et al. (2003), for example, reported findings of the US-based Consensus Building Institute, which interviewed participants in 100 disputes across the USA to assess the pros and cons of mediation for solving land-use disagreements.

b. Data Collection

One benefit of the larger empirical data set now available is its contribution to the improvement of CP evaluative frameworks. In order to understand the framework adopted in this study, it is necessary to be aware of the variety of methods used during previous research. Most CP evaluation methods can be sorted into five techniques: (1) direct observation; (2) interviews; (3) surveys; (4) document analysis; and (5) statistical analysis. Alone, each method is not sufficient to provide an accurate picture of CP in any given case, therefore research methods are usually paired with one or more others in order to triangulate results and provide a better understanding of context. For the most part, studies focus on the CP process, whereas on-the-ground changes resulting from implementation are treated as a separate issue.

Because most CP evaluations take place post-process, direct observation is rarely possible and statistical analysis is only recently emerging (Andrew, 2001). Therefore, the most common evaluation methods are interviews, surveys and document analysis, usually with an emphasis on one, but in combination with one or both of the others. For example, Carr et al. (1998), and Selin et al. (2000) relied heavily on the results of questionnaires to evaluate collaborative decision-making by the United States Department of Agriculture's Forest Service. The author's surveys identified perceptions of how CP was used; the degree of support for its use; the benefits and barriers to its use; expectations about future

uses; and suggestions for making CP more effective. Questionnaire results were then supplemented with document analysis to add context to the results.

In a different example, Susskind et al. (2003) used interviews with a subset of participants to assess the pros and cons of mediation for solving land-use disagreements. Interview results were then triangulated with document analysis. The research was based on respondent attitudes around four evaluative questions: (1) how satisfied were stakeholders with the process and the outcomes? (2) Were underlying issues resolved and relationships improved to the benefit of future dispute resolution? (3) Did mediation cost less and/or take less time? And (4) how important was the role of the mediator?

Others were more comprehensive, preferring a balance of methodologies (Moote et al., 1997; Wondollek and Yaffe, 2002; Scholz and Stiftel, 2005). Moote et al. (1997) for example, used an ethnographic approach that included participant observation, document analysis, questionnaires and interviews. Many of the BC LRMP evaluations used a similar approach (Wilson et al., 1996, Penrose, 1996, Day and Tamblyn, 1998, Duffy et al., 1996) but since Frame (2002) the emphasis is on questionnaire-based research coupled with document analysis and sometimes follow-up interviews.

The fact that BC is a virtual CP laboratory means that it provides an excellent opportunity for developing and testing common evaluation criteria across multiple cases. This thesis relies on the evaluation framework developed by the School of Resource and Environmental Management over the last 10-15 years. The next section outlines the evolution of that framework, which was used to measure the most comprehensive application of CP in the world (Frame et al., 2004).

2.3 Evaluating Collaborative Planning in British Columbia

Constant conflicts over the use of publicly owned land in British Columbia led to the 1992 establishment of the Commission on Resources and Environment (CORE) (see chapter four). The Commission was tasked with a large-scale experiment in land use planning: Use shared decision-making to resolve disputes and increase the sustainability

of BC's resource future (Jackson and Curry, 2004). Unfortunately, CORE failed to achieve consensus in its four regional-scale pilot projects, but the spin-off benefits and sub-agreements that followed served to entrench shared decision-making in BC's institutional framework. As the CORE processes progressed they provided an excellent learning environment for CP improvement. Initiated concurrently with CORE, the Land and Resource Management Planning (LRMP) process was designed to use the strengths of shared decision-making and interests based negotiation while "modifying the structure, scope and timeline of the [CORE] process to be more accountable, transparent and effective" (Astofooroff, 2008). With this process model in hand, BC secured one agreement after another across the province, achieving consensus for nearly the entire land-base (Frame et al., 2004).

Simon Fraser University's School of Resource and Environmental Management (REM) took advantage of the CP experience at its doorstep and followed the CORE and LRMP processes closely, conducting comprehensive evaluations along the way and ultimately settling on the framework that was used to evaluate 20 LRMPs. The results point toward a CP best practices applicable to BC and contain lessons that may be adapted, experimented with, or used as a springboard for new ideas elsewhere.

2.3.1 Existing Evaluations

The framework used to analyze the LRMPs was developed over several years by Wilson (1995), Penrose (1996), Tamblyn (1996), Roseland (1997), and finally Frame (2002). Following in the footsteps of Frame and subsequent LRMP evaluations (McGee, 2006; Cullen, 2006; Astofooroff, 2008), the Morice LRMP evaluation uses the same general set of criteria for its analytical framework.

Wilson (1995), Penrose (1996) and Tamblyn (1996) conducted the first evaluations using the Vancouver Island, Cariboo-Chilcotin and Kamloops CORE processes. Wilson et al. (1996) suggested that CP evaluations be divided into *design criteria* and *outcome criteria*. Their work focused only on design criteria, which they defined as "components of a process, which increase the likelihood of the parties coming to a successful resolution in a fair and equitable manner" (Wilson et al., 1996, p. 7). The authors used

interviews, personal observation, and document analysis to evaluate three overarching criteria: (1) incentive to participate; (2) participant involvement; and (3) process mechanics. Penrose and Tamblyn used similar methods, adding or altering criteria under the same three general categories, and relying on the same data collection techniques.

Building on prior methods, Duffy led a project from 1996-1997 for Forest Renewal BC called *Improving the Shared Decision-making Model: An Evaluation of Citizen Participation in Land and Resource Management Planning.* Duffy et al. (1998) expanded the scope of earlier research, studying 13 active LRMP processes, including three in-depth case studies of the Bulkley, Robson and Kamloops LRMPs. The authors used a three-stage literature review to develop evaluation criteria, followed by a telephone survey administered to a random stratified sample of participants. Survey results were used to design interview questions administered to participants for the three in-depth case studies. Like previous researchers, Duffy et al. focused more on process than outcomes, dividing their criteria into nine *design* and *process* criteria and also incorporating a Community Capacity Outcome Evaluation Framework to explore whether or not CP claims toward capacity building were demonstrated by the LRMPs. Duffy et al.'s nine process and design criteria were organized under the following categories: (1) Support for process; (2) Representation; (3) Resources; and (4) Process design. Duffy et al.'s work, coupled with Frame's (2002) represents evaluation of "one of the most extensive applications of CP to date" (McGee, 2006, p.20).

Like Duffy et al., Frame relied on literature review to develop criteria, expanding Duffy et al.'s set of nine criteria to 25. As noted, Wilson (1995) recommended splitting the Vancouver Island CORE analysis into design criteria and outcome criteria. Similarly, Frame (2002) divided her analyses into process and outcome criteria. The split is important because there are two ways to view CP success. Process criteria, once evaluated, illuminate performance of process design and mechanics, while outcome criteria generate data that either support or reject proponents' and critics' claims about CP's ability to achieve its purported end-products. Frame's criteria included 17 *process* and 11 *outcome* criteria, making hers the first evaluation in the series to examine LRMP outcomes. A mailed survey was issued to participants from 17 planning tables that had

completed LRMPs for 54% of the provincial land base. As was typical of previous assessments, based on 266 of 767 possible responses (35% response rate), CP was shown to be highly successful. Respondents felt that their knowledge, skills and understanding were improved because of their involvement in the process and 82% of people who replied to the survey agreed that CP improved relationships among and between stakeholders. Further, an impressive 14 of the 15 completed LRMPs reached consensus or near consensus.

2.3.2 The BC LRMP Evaluation Framework

The survey used in Frame's (2002) evaluation contained a series of closed- and open-ended questions designed to assess participant perceptions about process and outcomes. Each question was derived from an evaluative framework the author designed using analysis of the literature. Peter (2007) used the same framework for his evaluation of the Lillooet LRMP, the only LRMP at the time that did not achieve consensus. Subsequently, in 2006, the framework was adapted by McGee (2006) and Cullen (2006) to better capture the nature of First Nations involvement during the North and Central Coast LRMPs. Astofooroff (2008) retained the minor adaptations of McGee and Cullen for her evaluation of the Haida Gwaii LRMP, and this evaluation of the Morice LRMP follows suit. Each evaluation of CORE and LRMP processes for the regions of British Columbia are displayed in table 9.

Table 9. Evaluations of CORE and LRMP Processes in British Columbia

Process	Evaluation
CORE	
Cariboo-Chilcotin CORE	Penrose, 1996
West Kootenay-Boundary CORE	n/a
East Kootenay CORE	n/a
Vancouver Island CORE	Wilson, 1995
LRMP	
Kispiox LRMP	Duffy et al., 1998, Frame, 2002
Kamloops LRMP	Albert, 1990; Tamblyn 1996; Duffy et al., 1998; Parker, 1998
Fort Nelson LRMP	Duffy et al., 1998, Frame, 2002
Fort St. John LRMP	Duffy et al., 1998, Frame, 2002
Vanderhoof LRMP	Duffy et al., 1998, Frame, 2002
Bulkley LRMP	Duffy et al., 1998; Frame, 2002
Robson Valley LRMP	Duffy et al., 1998; Frame, 2002
Lakes District LRMP	Duffy et al., 1998, Frame, 2002
Dawson Creek LRMP	Duffy et al., 1998, Frame, 2002
Fort St. James LRMP	Frame, 2002
Prince George LRMP	Duffy et al., 1998, Frame, 2002
MacKenzie LRMP	Frame, 2002
Cassiar-Iskut-Stikine LRMP	Frame, 2002
Okanagan-Shuswap LRMP	Duffy et al., 1998, Frame, 2002
Kalum South LRMP	Duffy et al., 1998, Frame, 2002
LRMP with Government-to-Government Negotiations (see Ch. 3)	
Lillooet LRMP	Duffy et al., 1998, Frame, 2002; Peter, 2007
Central Coast LRMP	Frame, 2002; Cullen, 2006
North Coast LRMP	McGee, 2006
Morice LRMP	Morton, 2009
Sea to Sky LRMP	Kennedy (in progress)
Haida Gwaii LRMP	Astofooroff, 2008
LRMP Currently Underway	
Atlin-Taku LRMP	n/a
Regions with no LRMP	
Dease Liard	n/a
Nass	n/a
Sunshine Coast	n/a
Chilliwack	n/a
Merrit	n/a

(Table derived from displayed sources)

a. Process Criteria

Frame's (2002) process criteria were designed to embody characteristics that lead to CP success during the planning process, and thereby contribute to the overall success of a project. These features reflect a deeper understanding of 'success' than that achieved by

relying only on CP end products such as consensus. Where process criteria are met, Frame suggests CP has a better chance of reaching its outcome goals and also produces long-term benefits that extend beyond the process regardless of whether or not consensus was achieved. Frame's 17 process criteria are displayed in table 10.

Table 10. Process Criteria for Measuring Collaborative Planning Success

Process Criteria
1. Purpose and Incentives
The collaborative process is driven by a shared purpose, whereby all stakeholders involved believe that the process will produce the best solution available, relative to other available processes. Stakeholders negotiate in good faith with an ultimate goal of reaching consensus agreement.
2. Inclusive Representation
Representation is inclusive if the following parties are involved: those directing affected by or with a significant interest in the agreement, those necessary to implement the agreement, those that may challenge or destabilize the final agreement, especially non-activist and non-aligned members of the public, and the relevant government authorities. Coalitions may be sought when interests between stakeholder groups are comparable, to maintain a manageable table size and avoid overlapping representation.
3. Voluntary Participation and Commitment
Stakeholders are participating in the process of their own volition and have a genuine commitment to the process. No stakeholder is required to remain involved in the process if they feel that the process is not serving them adequately. This helps to ensure that table members respect each other and attempt to incorporate all interests.
4. Self Design
Flexibility allows participants to design a process and institute the ground rules and objectives that best suit the circumstances of the particular group. All table members are given an equal opportunity to involve themselves in the design process. Mediators and facilitators may propose design options, although the final decisions over design are left to the table members.
5. Clear Ground Rules
Ground rules are created and a Terms of Reference is developed that addresses the scope and mandate of the process, the roles and responsibilities of participants, a code of conduct for interaction between participants, a clear description of the term 'consensus', a defined method for resolving disputes, the use of sub-groups, and a strategy for media and outreach. Rules should allow for flexibility and adaptation.
6. Equal Opportunity and Resources
Every table member is able to participate effectively throughout the process. To ensure that all parties have the opportunity and resources to participate, training in consensus decision-making and negotiation are offered to participants, as well as access to any information relevant to the decision-making process. Finally adequate resources should be available to all participants.
7. Principled Negotiation and Respect

Diverse interests, values, and knowledge of all stakeholders are respected. Principled negotiation and respect allow for participants to learn from the diversity of knowledge and interests at the stakeholder table. This type of dialogue also encourages trust and honesty, and promotes interest –based negotiation rather than positional bargaining.
8. Accountability
Participants are held accountable to the collaborative process that they helped to design, and public outreach occurs to keep the public up to date on the process. This includes processes to confirm that the decisions of the stakeholder table are representative of the interests of the broader public, as well as the interests of those participating directly.
9. Flexible, Adaptive, Creative
The process is flexible enough and adaptive enough to allow for adjustments as circumstances change and/or as stakeholders move through the collaborative process. Creative and innovative problem solving allows for comprehensive and integrated solutions.
10. High Quality Information
Participants have adequate and accurate information that is given to them in a timely fashion. The information is presented in such a way as to be clear to all participants and is incorporated in the decision-making process.
11. Time Limits
Time limits set for the group to reach consensus and develop a plan are reasonable and realistic. The stakeholders recognize that if the deadline to reach agreement is passed, an alternate decision will be imposed on the group.
12. Commitment to Implementation and Monitoring
Participants feel ownership and commitment towards the plan and feel a responsibility towards implementing the final agreement. The agreement incorporates an implementation and monitoring plan, as well as a system for addressing issues that may arise.
13. Effective Process Management
Impartial process staff are useful in managing the process and ensuring that stakeholders do not suffer burnout. Effective process management will allow for: the management and execution of a process plan, coordination and communication, information management, meeting facilities, complete records of all meetings and decisions, and administrative support. Impartial, non-affiliated process staff may also perform a pre-negotiation assessment to ensure that all stakeholders are identified and that a collaborative process is appropriate given the circumstances of the situation.
14. Independent Facilitation
The use of a neutral facilitator or mediator that all parties can agree on is useful to bring parties towards consensus. Trained facilitators ensure that all table members feel respected and secure. Facilitators also work to move parties away from positional bargaining and towards interest-based negotiation, and to create a balance of power among participants through equal opportunity to voice concerns and ideas.

(Frame, 2002)

As noted, the process criteria chosen by Frame were drawn from the authors' review of the literature. Each of the strengths, challenges, drivers and barriers described previously in sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 are a result of my own literature review and closely correlate to the characteristics of CP Frame used to develop the criteria set shown in the above

table. Likewise, the literature review conducted in this report revealed similar CP traits as those leading to Frame's *outcome* criteria.

b. Outcome Criteria

The outcome criteria tested by Frame (2002) and others (McGee, 2006, Cullen, 2006, Astofooroff, 2008) were designed to measure the outputs of CP processes. It is important to note that only CP design and immediate process end products are evaluated here. Other considerations, such as impact of the plan on the environment post-implementation are treated as outcomes of plan implementation rather than planning process and are not measured. See Albert's (2004) evaluation of the Kamloops LRMP for one example where implementation outcomes were measured. Frame's 11 outcome criteria are displayed in table 11.

Table 11. Outcome Criteria for Measuring Collaborative Planning Success

Outcome Criteria
1. Agreement
An agreement is reached that is acceptable to all parties involved. A high-quality agreement is one that is feasible, stable, flexible, adaptive, and implementable. If full consensus agreement does not occur, sub-agreements and other minor agreements may move parties forward even without reaching a full consensus agreement.
2. Perceived as Successful
Stakeholders consider the process and outcomes to be a success, and are satisfied with their role in the process. The overall experience of collaborative planning is viewed positively by participants.
3. Conflict Reduced
Conflict is perceived as less than what it was prior to the collaborative process. Participants feel that both the process and the outcomes have reduced the potential for conflict over relevant issues.
4. Superior to Other Methods
The collaborative process is viewed by participants as superior to alternative models of resource management and land use planning in terms of both costs and benefits. Time, money, and resources should all be considered when weighting the costs of the process relative to other processes. Benefits include both tangible (final agreement) and intangible (increased trust and social capital) products.
5. Innovation & Creativity

The process produces innovative and creative strategies and actions. The principles of adaptive management are incorporated into the implementation of the plan, and unsuccessful strategies will act to foster growth and understanding, which will inform the subsequent actions.
6. Knowledge, Understanding & Skills
Participants increase their knowledge, understanding, and skills by partaking in the collaborative process. Skills gained may include communication, negotiation, and decision-making skills. Participants are also better informed as to the range of issues involved and the underlying interests of the other participants.
7. Relationships & Social Capital
New relationships and increases in social capital occur as a result of the collaborative process. This increase in social capital translates into a higher level of trust, cooperation, and respect among table participants, as well as a reduction in transaction costs.
8. Information
High quality information is available as a result of the collaborative process. Data collection and analysis is done in such a way that it is accepted as accurate by all participants. Joint-fact finding is used whenever possible to ensure that the information is deemed legitimate by all group members. The information collected during the process is then made available for general use.
9. Second-order Effects
By working together on the collaborative process, participants reap second-order benefits such as changes in behaviors and actions, spin-off partnerships, umbrella groups, collaborative activities, new practices, or new institutions. Participants may continue to collaborate with each other on projects outside the scope of the process.
10. Public Interest
The outcomes of the collaborative process are deemed to serve the greater public interest, as well as the more specific interests of process participants.
11. Understanding & Support of CP
Participants have a greater understanding and respect for the collaborative process. Participants are in favor of continued use of collaborative planning as an approach to decision making.

(Frame, 2002)

Assessing CP processes and their outcomes for the above criteria (tables 10 and 11) develops two types of useful information: (1) it provides practitioners with important data about improvements required for future process design; and (2) it contributes to the growing body of literature that either confirms or rejects prescriptive claims about CP strengths and critical claims about CP challenges. But there are limitations to the conclusions one can draw from the results as described in the next section.

2.4 Research Challenges and Limitations

As may already be apparent, the most important source of data for many CP evaluations is process participants. Some researchers argue that this is not enough, that process participants may be biased and that a true measure of success or failure should include those who live with the results day-to-day (Finnigan, Gunton and Williams, 2003; Mascarenhas and Scarce, 2004). Mascarenhas and Scarce, for example, conducted 199 interviews with respondents from a wide range of locations, backgrounds and occupations throughout BC to evaluate the BC CORE and LRMP processes. Individuals were selected for their direct involvement and for indirect involvement through work, recreation or other activities. The results revealed problems with CP that are underrepresented in the rest of the literature. Of course, there are difficulties with such methodology, not the least of which is the added time and expense associated with broad evaluations of the population. Further, many people remain unaware of CP processes either by choice, lack of public information, or poor channels of communication, making their responses less meaningful.

Other critics argue that CP research does not pay enough attention to real-world outcomes that might support its claims of improving environmental, social and economic conditions vis à vis higher quality decisions (Coglianese, 2003). However, to date, few evaluation frameworks are proposed to tackle this problem, likely due to the difficulty in drawing a direct line of causation between CP and those larger complex issues. A few studies, like that of Leach et al. (2002), collected data on participant perceptions of environmental benefits, but these are merely opinions uncorrelated with actual on-the-ground data. Building on the framework developed by Calbick (2003) and Albert (2004), Joseph (2004) evaluated BC LRMP implementation, but his study focused on the degree of action achieved, not the actual outcomes of that action. Albert et al. (2003), however, used a series of environmental and socio-economic indicators to study the Kamloops LRMP post-implementation. The study was encouraging, revealing that 25 of 30 desired outcomes were met, two were partially met, and only three were not met.

Finally, one objective of CP evaluation is to make comparisons and draw general conclusions that help practitioners. It should now be clear that CP evaluation does not rely solely on consensus agreement as an indicator of success; rather, as demonstrated by all of the studies mentioned in the last two chapters, multi-dimensional criteria are used. However, Gunton and Day (2003) point out that one shortfall of CP-study is its failure to produce best practices guidelines that are developed using a common set of criteria for performance evaluation. This problem is largely due to the fact that each researcher devises a different yardstick to assess the highly contextual nature of each CP process, thus it is difficult to compare across cases (Todd, 2001). A further limitation is that it is not possible to compare CP to non-CP techniques because there is no option to set up a parallel control group (Frame, 2002). Perhaps the greatest benefit of studying CP's application in BC over the last 15 years is that it enabled comparison across multiple cases using a common set of criteria, thus providing an opportunity to test those criteria and develop a comprehensive set of consistent data over a broad geographic region (Frame et al., 2004).

3. LAND AND RESOURCES PLANNING IN BRITISH COLUMBIA

British Columbia holds a unique status in the world because of its unprecedented application of collaborative planning (Frame et al., 2004). To understand how the province's land use management came to rely so heavily on stakeholder participation, it is necessary to examine the history of its land use strategies. As elsewhere, BC experienced the same transition from a technocratic style of planning to a more participatory approach. But the application of CP on such a large scale owes itself to a unique land-ownership regime, a powerful societal values shift, and the establishment of a new government. In particular, a new government that was motivated by an increasingly powerful indigenous population and a generally agitated electorate to be more accountable for land use decisions, and to manage resources in a way that that was more reflective of public values.

3.1 Historical Background

It is useful to view BC's resource development history in the broader context of Canada because, for the most part, the province followed Canada's development trajectory. Hessing and Howlett (1997) describe this progression as a four-stage process that began with a period of *Government Inaction* pre-1800 when Canada was still under British control (see table 15 for an outline of Canada's and BC's resource management history). Most of Britain's activity during this time focused on providing security to early forestry and mining operations by awarding various forms of property rights. Despite issuance of these limited rights, most land in Canada, including the Colony of British Columbia, was never 'alienated' but was instead retained by the Crown. This land ownership regime still exists today. Currently only 6% of BC's provincial land base is in private hands, leaving about 93% controlled by the provincial government[4] (Jackson and Curry, 2004; Frame et al., 2004).

Due to increasing demand for timber, mineral and other resources by 1800, the colonial governments in Canada began to charge different kinds of rent for the use of their lands

[4] The remaining 1% (approximately) is controlled by the federal government.

and resources, ushering in a new era of government *Revenue Generation* that lasted until 1880. During this era the first government departments were established to deal with resources and they "actively abetted the pillaging of Canadian resources by issuing many, and cheap, licenses to companies willing to extract resources at a rapid rate" (Hessing and Howlett, 1997, pp. 48-49). For the Colony of British Columbia, this policy of rapid resource extraction was particularly apparent once the completion of the Panama Canal in 1848 promised new export markets. By the time BC became part of Canada in 1871, mining, forestry, fishing and agriculture were securely established as staples of the regional economy (Hessing and Howlett, 1997).

By the 1880s, in other parts of Canada, the negative effects of hyper-extraction became obvious in the deforestation of most of the central and eastern part of the country (Hessing and Howlett, 1997). The need to restrain industries that were making rapid technological advances prompted the creation of new regulatory agencies for forests and mines, long-term tenures for pulpwood, and a system of national parks (Hessing and Howlett, 1997). Canada's *Conservation Era* lasted from 1880-1950, but BC did not start focusing on conservation efforts until 1912 after vast areas of forest were destroyed or degraded (Hessing and Howlett, 1997; Hayter, 2003). The carnage was encouraged by completion of the Canadian Pacific Railway in 1885, which signaled new access to markets in the east and caused BC to escalate resource extraction in earnest despite the regulatory climate that was sweeping the other provinces (Hessing and Howlett, 1997). Eventually, concern over the effects of intensive resource extraction did spread westward, resulting in a 1912 *BC Forest Act* and the halting of wholesale timber licensing by 1913 (Hayter, 2003). By 1930, the first attempts at reforestation were initiated and a revised *BC Forest Act* in 1947 empowered the BC Ministry of Forests to initiate its first province-wide plan for forest management (Hayter, 2003; Astofooroff, 2008). The plan's technocratic management approach built on the recommendations of the 1945 Sloan Commission, incorporating principles of 'sustained yield' and attempting to increase industry's sense of responsibility and ownership toward leaseholds through the use of long-term Tree Farm Licenses (Hayter, 2003; Jackson and Curry, 2004). An Annual Allowable Cut (AAC) was also established to limit the total amount of timber cut per

year (Hayter, 2003). Unfortunately, according to Bridge and McManus (2000), these efforts served only to establish an "accumulation system that favoured large corporations reliant upon mass exports from the forests" (p. 24). It was not realized until later years, but the yield that emerged in practice was unsustainable.

While BC entered a period of sustained yield and industrial growth, the 1950s marked the beginning of the *Management Era* for the rest of Canada. Echoing what was already begun in BC, the other provinces attempted to encourage long-term resource conservation and Canadian environmental protection gained increasing attention (Hessing and Howlett, 1997). During World War II concerns about resource depletion and environment had generally faded in the scramble to support the war effort. Now, a fragmented surge of post-war regulations was introduced to govern pollution inside the provinces. British Columbia, for example, initiated the *Land Act* and *Water Act* (Hessing and Howlett, 1997). However, BC continued to lag behind in practice, if not on paper. Despite the nationwide focus on sustainability, BC's AAC increased by 400% between 1956-1976 as new technologies continued to augment extraction (Jackson and Curry, 2004). Pre-war environmental apprehensions resurfaced after this exponential leap in BC's industrial extraction and prompted a review of forest resources and forestry practices by the Pearse Commission in 1976 (Jackson and Curry, 2004). The Commission declared that non-timber forest values such as recreation, environmental, and aesthetic values were relevant in the management of BC's forests, prompting new legislation in 1978 called the *Forestry Act* (Jackson and Curry, 2004). The new *Act* emphasized integration of other resource values into forestry and BC's era of *Multiple Use* or "integrated management" was born (Jackson and Curry, 2004; Astofooroff, 2008).

Unfortunately the province found integrated resource management difficult because, not surprisingly, it was hard to reconcile the maximization of sustained yield with other resource values (Jackson and Curry, 2004). To make things more challenging in terms of sustainability, the interests of logging companies were often compatible with those of government and the organized labour movement, so it was natural that these groups would form a triumvirate (corporations, government, unions), or what Hayter (2003) calls a "wood exploitation alliance" (p. 713). When a recession hit the BC forestry industry in

the early 1980s, resulting in a loss of about 21,000 jobs and $500 million in forestry revenues, the provincial government retracted integrated management in favour of "sympathetic" management, which relaxed environmental restrictions imposed on BC forest companies (Bridge and McManus, 2000; Hayter, 2003; Jackson and Curry, 2004). As a result of this shift, the triumvirate was essentially rendered impenetrable until an increasingly articulate environmental movement capitalized on the growing international profile of environmental issues by using boycott campaigns to impose significant market pressures on forest companies. At the same time, new court rulings about First Nations' rights and title brought aboriginal land claims to the forefront (Bridge and McManus, 2000).

3.1.1 War in the Woods

Largely triggered by fallout from the recession, BC was fraught with disputes throughout the 1980s over international markets, environmental values, and First Nations' rights (Hoberg and Morawski, 1997; Hayter, 2003; Frame et al., 2004). Conflicts between "resource extraction and preservation intensified into what became known as the 'war in the woods'" (Frame et al., 2004, p. 62). Environmental issues began to reshape BC's forestry agenda as the increasing publicity of protests and logging blockades lowered international market confidence in BC wood products (Hoberg and Morawski, 1997; Hayter, 2003; Frame et al., 2004). Congruently, three major challenges faced the BC forestry industry: (1) American accusations of subsidization via BC's low stumpage fees; (2) rapidly expanding competitive forestry industries in the southern hemisphere; and (3) First Nations' challenges to the BC's right to disperse tenures on unceded lands (Bridge and McManus, 2000; Hayter, 2003; Jackson and Curry, 2004). Realizing common interests, the American-based Coalition for Fair Canadian Lumber Imports (CFCLI) joined ranks with environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs) and First Nations to oppose BC's logging policies. Often assisted from a distance by the CFCLI, ENGOs and First Nations organized blockades in one valley after another to protest what they viewed as unsustainable and unfair logging practices (Hayter, 2003). Meanwhile, Greenpeace led a "brilliant campaign," that, "tapped the environmental concerns of international consumers to threaten boycotts of BC forest products," and, "gave both the

government and forest companies the incentives to promote more environmentally sustainable forest practices" (Hoberg and Morawski, 1997, p. 392). The formerly impenetrable wood exploitation alliance began to show cracks in its armour.

Despite making progress toward more sustainable practices, the new ENGO-First Nations partnership was an uneasy one. While they could unite against a common adversary, ENGOs and First Nations sometimes clashed over land ownership and management, with environmental protection interests perceived as an extension of colonial control over First Nations' rights, and First Nations' goals of development sometimes contradicting environmental values. Thus, while these groups leveraged greater influence, their differences made it clear that the effort to 'remap' BC would prove difficult and required a provincial-scale method of resolution (Hayter, 2003). Recognizing a deadlock between industrial, environmental and cultural heritage interests, the Social Credit (Socred) government first attempted to resolve conflicts in 1988 when it brought several stakeholders together from government, industry and the public to agree on a new provincial land use planning process (Jackson and Curry, 2004). The resulting Dunsmuir Agreement fed into the Roundtable on Environment and Economy that was convened a year later to address the issue of sustainable development (Cullen, 2006; Jackson and Curry, 2004). It was too late, however, for the beleaguered Social Credit government.

In 1991, the New Democratic Party (NDP) won the provincial election on a promise to bring "peace in the woods", ousting the Socreds that had run the province non-consecutively for a third of BC's 120-year history (BC, 2009; Hayter, 2003). The NDP initiated a series of new legislation, regulations, and policies intended to redefine the way forestry was done in BC. Stumpage fees were raised, temporarily appeasing the American Coalition of Fair Canadian Lumber Imports, and a new participatory approach to land use was developed, promoting fairness in decision-making for Crown land management (Hayter, 2003; Jackson and Curry, 2004). Jackson and Curry provide a list of the seven most controversial initiatives:

1. *Protected Areas Strategy* – to double the protected areas in BC.
2. *Environmental Assessment Act* – to address weaknesses of earlier legislation.
3. *Forest Practices Code* – to make the forestry industry more transparent and accountable, and to improve environmental conditions.
4. *Timber supply reviews* – to reassess AACs for sustainability.
5. *Forest renewal plan* – to ensure future yields.
6. *BC Treaty Commission* – to settle land claims with First Nations.
7. *Commission on Resources and Environment* – to facilitate a strategic land use planning system based on stakeholder collaboration and public participation.

It was the work of the Commission on Resources and Environment (CORE) (item 7 above), which initiated regional-scale collaborative planning in BC (Owen, 1998).

3.1.2 Commission on Resources and Environment

The Commission's directive was to develop a CP approach that could be incorporated into BC's resource planning framework and to implement this approach in the four regions of the province experiencing the highest level of conflict: Vancouver Island, Cariboo-Chilcotin, West Kootenay-Boundary, and East Kootenay (Owen, 1998; Frame et al., 2004). The proposed outcome of CORE was a separate land-use strategy for each region that was acceptable to all stakeholders (Frame et al., 2004). Broad land-use designations recognized under the mandate included: protected areas (PA), resource management zones (RMZ) and settlements (BC CORE, 1994). A key directive affecting the CORE process was the province's goal to implement the *Protected Areas Strategy* by increasing BC's protected areas from 6% to 12% of the land-base (BC CORE, 1994). Further, CORE was expected to encourage "the participation of Aboriginal peoples in all processes" (CORE Act, 1992, s.4.2). Five essential features were identified to guide the CORE process: (1) a vision of sustainability; (2) meaningful public participation; (3) inter-agency coordination by government; (4) effective dispute resolution mechanisms; and (5) independent oversight of the process (Owen, 1998).

The biggest challenge, of course, was to develop a participation process that would allow strongly opposed and politically influential public interest groups to settle their

differences (Owen, 1998). For this task, CORE applied shared decision-making. The Commission defined shared decision-making as a process in which,

> *on a certain set of issues for a defined period of time, those with authority to make decisions and those who will be affected by that decision are empowered to jointly seek an outcome that accommodates rather than compromises the interests of all concerned* (BC CORE, 1992, p.25*)*.

This approach was delivered using a sectoral model of representation (see figure 1) where, for each region, affected stakeholders were identified, then grouped into sectors with sector representatives empowered to make decisions on behalf of their interest group and in charge of communicating the table proceedings to their constituency (BC CORE, 1992).

As already noted in chapter two, all four CORE processes failed to reach consensus. Partially, this was due to an unwillingness to negotiate on the part of the forestry industry, which perceived itself as having high BATNAs (McGee, 2006). But the forestry industry became more willing to negotiate after CORE released its own version of the Vancouver Island plan, largely drawn from the results presented by the Vancouver Island CORE table. The backlash to CORE's decision resulted in 15,000 forest workers and their families protesting at the BC Legislature (Wilson et al., 1996). But the forestry industry got the message that if they did not participate in good faith, decisions would be enforced with or without their input. Shuttle diplomacy between affected parties ensued and all four land use plans were revised and agreed to by 1995 (Owen, 1998).

Its mandate complete, CORE was abolished in 1996 (Jackson and Curry, 2004). However, concurrent to CORE, a similar process called Land and Resources Management Planning (LRMP) was already underway in some of the remaining regions of the province (Frame et al., 2004). An inter-departmental government body called the Land Use Coordination Office (LUCO) adopted the Commission's strategic planning role (Jackson and Curry, 2004). Still attempting to achieve the NDP government's priorities, LUCO continued collaborative planning in BC, learning from mistakes during CORE and building on that experience using the LRMP processes (Jackson and Curry, 2004).

Figure 1. Sample Sectoral Model of Representation for CORE and LRMPs



(Day, Gunton and Frame, 2003)

3.2 Land and Resources Management Planning

Although CORE had produced land use plans for the four most controversial regions of the province, most of BC remained without a plan. Under LUCO, 22 more regions at the sub-regional scale (15,000-25,000 square kilometers) were identified as requiring LRMPs (BC IRPC, 1993; Jackson and Curry, 2004). The election of the BC Liberal government in 2001 resulted in another agency shuffle and LUCO dissolved, its mandate absorbed into the new Ministry of Sustainable Resource Management (MSRM), which was moved again in 2005 to the Ministry of Agriculture and Lands (MAL) a sub-agency of the Integrated Land Management Bureau (ILMB) (McGee, 2006). Undeterred by the administrative musical chairs, BC secured agreements from 21 LRMPs by 2009. This time, almost every process achieved full consensus (Frame et al., 2004; McGee, 2006; Cullen, 2006; Astofooroff, 2008; BC ILMB, 2007, 2008b). Relevant dates and agreement status for CORE and LRMP processes in each region of the province are shown in table 12.

Table 12. Relevant Dates and Agreement Status for CORE & LRMP Processes

Process	CP Process Initiated	CP Process Completed	Agreement Status: Tier #1	Agreement Status: Tier #2	Year Approved
CORE					
Cariboo-Chilcotin	1992	1994	No agreement	n/a	1994
West Kootenay-Boundary	1993	1994	No agreement	n/a	1995
East Kootenay	1993	1994	No agreement	n/a	1995
Vancouver Island	1992	1994	No agreement	n/a	2002
LRMP					
Kispiox	1989	1994	Consensus	n/a	1996
Kamloops	1989	1995	Consensus	n/a	1995
Fort Nelson	1993	1996	Consensus	n/a	1997
Fort St. John	1993	1996	Consensus	n/a	1997
Vanderhoof	1993	1996	Consensus	n/a	1997
Bulkley	1992	1996	Consensus	n/a	1998
Robson Valley	1993	1997	Partial consensus	n/a	1999
Lakes District	1994	1997	Consensus	n/a	2000
Dawson Creek	1992	1998	Consensus	n/a	1999
Fort St. James	1992	1998	Consensus	n/a	1999
Prince George	1992	1998	Consensus	n/a	1999
MacKenzie	1996	2000	Consensus minus one	n/a	2000
Cassiar-Iskut-Stikine	1997	2000	Consensus	n/a	2000
Okanagan-Shuswap	1995	2000	Consensus	n/a	2001
Kalum South	1991	2001	Consensus	n/a	2001
LRMP with Government to Government Negotiations (see Ch. 3)					
Lillooet	1996	2001	No agreement	In progress	n/a
Central Coast	1996	2004	Consensus	Agreement	2006
North Coast	2002	2004	Consensus	Agreement	2006
Morice	2002	2004	Consensus with one abstention	Agreement	2007
Sea to Sky	2002	2004	Partial agreement	Agreement	2008
Haida Gwaii	2003	2005	Partial agreement	Agreement	2007
LRMP Currently Underway					
Atlin-Taku	CP not used: Stakeholders consulted/engaged but not empowered to make decisions (more like advocacy planning); government-to-government negotiations				

(Frame, 2002; Peter, 2007; Cullen, 2006; McGee, 2006; Astofooroff, 2008; BC ILMB 2007, 2009b, 2009e)

Guiding policy for LRMPs is contained in the BC Integrated Resource Planning Committee's (BC IRPC) statement of principles and process (BC IRPC, 1993). In general, the guidelines: (1) define the relationship of LRMPs to higher and lower level

plans (see figure 2); (2) establish the multi-stakeholder nature of the planning project and the requirement for public participation; (3) highlight the inclusion of First Nations; (4) emphasize environmental sustainability; and (5) set some ground rules for negotiation, dispute resolution, and administration. The LRMPs' location in BC's land use hierarchy circa-1993 is shown in figure 2. The BC IRPC policy document also outlines an initial vision of the planning stages that should occur during the process. In practice, these were adapted to fit the context of each process but are essentially captured in table 13.

Figure 2. LRMP in the Provincial Land Use Framework circa-1993



(BC IRPC, 1993, p. 2)

Table 13. General Steps in the LRMP Process

1. Establish a stakeholder table that encompasses all relevant interests
   - The stakeholder table designs and manages the process to develop a land use plan for submission to government for approval
   - An independent chair manages each process. Support staff are available for technical matters, data collection, and logistical issues
   - A trained facilitator aids in negotiation and participant training for conflict resolution and shared decision-making
2. Develop a Terms of Reference
   - The stakeholder table establishes objectives, ground rules, and procedures to guide them through conflict and impasse
3. Develop goals, objectives and issue identification
4. Analyze data and develop suitability maps
5. Generate land use options using map overlay and a 4 zone approach
   - Zones generally include the following: protected area zone (no extraction), special management zone (limited extraction, environmental considerations high), general resource extraction zone (must return to natural state after use), enhanced resource extraction zone (intensive industrial activity permitted).
6. Develop the final decision using multiple-accounts analysis and interests-based/consensus negotiation
7. Submit the plan to government for approval

(Adapted from Astofooroff, 2008, p. 43)

3.2.1 Implementation and Sustainable Resources Management Planning

As a result of BC's LRMP process, approximately 85% of the provincial land-base is covered by either a regional (CORE) or sub-regional (LRMP) land use plan (Frame et al., 2004, also see appendix B). British Columbia also surpassed its goal of designating 12%

of the total provincial land base as protected areas (Jackson and Curry, 2004). Changes in land use resulting from the CORE and LRMP plans are shown in table 14.

Table 14. Changes in Land Use Resulting from CORE and LRMP Plans – 2009

Land Use	1991[5]	2009
Protected Areas	5.6%	14.3%[6]
Special Management	0.0%	22.6%[7]
Intensive Resource Extraction	0.0%	15.9%
General Resource Use[8]	91.6%	44.4%

(BC ILMB, 2009e; BC Parks, 2009b; Pierce Lefebvre Consulting, 2001, p. 9)

In addition to protected areas, over 22% of the provincial landmass is now designated as 'special management', 'area specific management' or other forms of specialized management. Many of these specialized zones place varying degrees of restriction on forestry in favour of other resource values such as tourism, recreation and environmental services (BC ILMB, 2009e). Approximately 60.3% of BC's land base is designated as 'general management', 'integrated management', or 'enhanced resource development' where industrial activities like mining and forestry are permitted and/or encouraged (see Table 14).

With the last of the LRMP processes still underway, local watershed-level plans known as Sustainable Resource Management Plans (SRMP) were developed to implement existing LRMPs (BC ILMB, 2009a). Designed to bridge the gap between broad CORE/LRMP objectives and efforts on-the-ground, SRMPs are detailed operational plans to aid implementation of the LRMPs and the new *Forest and Range Practices Act* (FRPA) (replaced *Forest Practices Code*). The SRMPs focus primarily on delineating conservation zones for old growth, wildlife management, and riparian areas but some also

[5] Each column represents 97.2% of the BC land area. The missing 2.8% is contained in rivers, lakes and federal land and is listed as 'other' in Frame et al., 2004.
[6] From BC Ministry of Parks website, retrieved December 4, 2009 from: http://www.env.gov.bc.ca/bcparks/facts/fact_fig.html
[7] Percentage totals for special management and intensive resource extraction were calculated by adding percent areas from all LRMPs completed since the Pierce Lefebvre Consulting report was published in 2001 (Kalum, Lillooet, Central Coast, North Coast, Haida Gwaii, Morice, Sea to Sky) to the results from that report.
[8] Includes general management zones, agricultural areas, settlements, private land and unplanned areas (Atlin-Taku, Sunshine Coast, Dease-Liard, Nass, Chilliwack, Merritt).

deal with economic development issues around tourism, agriculture, and recreation (BC ILMB, 2009a). Similar to the higher level plans, SRMPs rely on stakeholder participation via partnership agreements that can include local representatives from provincial ministries and agencies, local government, utilities, resource industries, First Nations, recreational users, environmental groups, and higher education establishments (Jackson and Curry, 2004). These partnerships can, but do not always, utilize a CP-like approach. When CP is used, it is typically a variation of the LRMP processes, with the most notable difference being greater flexibility for context-specific process design (BC ILMB, 2009e). Based on a review of several SRMPs, this flexibility translates to processes driven by special interest groups with narrower stakeholder representation and no requirement for consensus agreement or collaborative dialogue to produce a plan (public meetings are sufficient) (BC ILMB, 2009e). Unlike LRMPs, initiation of SRMPs is determined on a case-by-case basis and relies primarily on a strong business argument for a plan (BC ILMB, 2009a). However, the public sector, private sector, First Nations and government can propose an SRMP if a variety of benefits are perceived, such as enabling First Nations engagement, defining suitable land and resource use, resolving conflicts, and providing investment certainty (BC ILMB, 2009d). As of 2006, 102 SRMPs were completed in BC, with an additional 93 plans underway (BC ILMB, 2006).

Plans in the Bulkley region of northern interior BC provide a good demonstration of how LRMPs and SRMPs integrate to produce on-the-ground action. The Bulkley Valley SRMP represents one of eleven landscape units within the region delineated by the Bulkley LRMP (BC ILMB, 2005). The SRMP plan document states that "this plan follows Ministerial Policy as presented in the LRMP" and "the objectives in the LUP [SRMP] provide sufficient detail to provide direction to government, industry, and local residents and interest groups" (BC ILMB, 2005, p. 1). The management directions in the Bulkley LRMP required the Bulkley Valley Timber Supply Area (TSA) to maintain a timber harvest impact of 10% or less (BC ILMB, 2005). In other words, the cumulative removal of trees in the TSA is to be maintained at no more than 10% of total harvestable area. Because the LRMP also identified 7 resource zones within the Bulkley Valley landscape unit, each with varying degrees of restriction on industrial activity, a lower

level plan was required to provide more detail about where and how timber harvest could occur within the unit (BC ILMB, 2005). To achieve this goal the SRMP identifies core ecosystems and provides harvest options for landscape corridors, strategies for old-growth retention and recruitment, objectives for coniferous and deciduous diversity, targets for stand structure, and maps the timber harvesting land base according to three zones: Integrated Resource Management, Special Management, and Enhanced Timber Development (BC ILMB, 2005). The Ministry of Forests and the ILMB enforce these management directions when contractors submit timber harvest plans for approval (BC ILMB, 2005).

In addition to SRMPs, numerous operational plans, site level plans, and on-the-ground management activities/operations are currently active or under development throughout the province. A more recent variation of the 1993 planning hierarchy displayed previously in figure 2 is provided in figure 3. Of particular note, CORE and LRMP are now combined into one level called “Strategic Land Use Plans”, and a new category called “Landscape Level Plans” is included to reflect the SRMPs and Sustainable Forest Management Plans. The history of BC and Canadian land use paradigms reviewed in this chapter is outlined in table 15.

Figure 3. LRMP in the Provincial Land Use Framework circa-2003

(BC MSRM, 2003b)

Table 15. History of Land Use Paradigms in Canada and British Columbia

Canada	British Columbia		
Government Inaction Pre-1800	Pioneer Era		
Revenue Generation 1800-1880		Post-1800	Forest tenures granted liberally; MoF in charge of land use planning
		1848	Panama Canal completed
		1871	Colony of BC joins Canada
		1885	Canadian Pacific Railway complete
Conservation Era 1880-1950		1912	Forest Act
	Early Regulation	1913	MoF no longer granting new leases
		1945	Sloan Commission
	Sustained Yield & Industrial Growth	1947	Forest Act
Management Era 1950-Present		Post WWII	Rapid economic growth; 400% increase in AAC
	Multiple Use	1976	Pearse Commission
		1978	Forestry Act
	Towards Sustainable Management	1988	Dunsmuir Agreement
		1990	BC Roundtable on Environment and Economy; CORE established
		1992	LUCO established; Protected Areas Strategy released
		1993	4 CORE processes authorized by government
		1995	Forest Practices Code
		1996	CORE terminated; LRMPs continued; maintained by LUCO
		2001	MSRM takes over for LUCO
		2005	ILMB takes over LRMPs and other strategic planning
		2009	21 LRMPs completed across province; implementation, SRMPs

(Adapted from Hessing and Howlett, 1997; Hayter, 2003; Cullen, 2006; Astofooroff, 2008)

3.2.3 Alternative Narratives

The narrative presented in the previous sections and chapters is only one narrative and reflects that which is most prevalent in the literature. Common themes of this narrative include a characterization of past planning and extractive practices as 'bad' giving way to a current trend of participatory planning, which is perceived as more inclusive, less environmentally exploitative and 'good'. While this narrative is supported by extensive research from REM and other sources, the evidence is mostly derived from perceptions of process participants. It is worth noting that other narratives exist which might provide a different reading of events, such as those of First Nations, other stakeholders who chose to withdraw from the BC's CP experiment, or the general public (Mascarenhas and Scarce, 2004).

It is also true that aspects of the narrative are contested in the literature as a perpetuation of a sustainable development mythology that has delivered development but still fails to accomplish sustainability (see Willems-Braun, 1997; M'Gonigle, 1997; Bridge and McManus, 2000). Bridge and McManus, for instance, complain of the successful and premeditated construction of nature as a resource "owned by the province and managed by the logging companies within a complex system based on the estimated long-term sustained yield" (p. 28), and founded on a smokescreen of participatory democracy to subdue public dissent. The authors also state that the environmental movement is "disempowered as a force for piercing the curtain of green rhetoric," because it is now "tangled with a model forestry that is clearly un-ecological" (Bridge and McManus, 2000, p.16).

It is not the purpose of this thesis to debate the merits of one narrative over another, each of these accounts contribute important alternate perspectives to the mosaic of BC's planning history. Further, these alternate narratives do not support or reject CP as a valuable planning tool; they merely expose potentially systemic problems within BC institutions. Institutional culture and practice can certainly have a negative impact on CP design, but this does not necessarily imply inherent problems with CP. Despite this fact, alternate narratives should not be overlooked because they can provide valuable insights

into effective process design. The next section explores First Nations' reactions to BC's new participatory planning approach to demonstrate how alternative narratives led to a re-structuring of Provincial negotiations with BC's aboriginal population.

3.3 First Nations and Participatory Planning

In 2001, 170,000 individuals across BC identified as First Nations (BC, 2001). Most of these individuals were members of First Nations governments or tribal councils that were, and in most cases still are, asserting claims to rights and title over traditional territories (Astofooroff, 2008). Encouragement of aboriginal participation in the BC CORE and LRMP processes was a key component of BC's strategy to reduce conflict over land uses. Unfortunately, First Nations' participation proved difficult to achieve. The difficulty lay with alternative views about land use rights. Most BC First Nations view themselves as independent nations that exist within a land claimed by Canada without their consent. To negotiate at a planning table as stakeholders, equivalent to other sectors such as forestry or wildlife conservation, does not fit within many First Nations' perception of their status in the negotiation hierarchy. Instead, many First Nations demand to meet directly with BC and Canada in government-to-government negotiations (Wilson et al., 1996). Adding to the complexity, BC historically refused to acknowledge that First Nations traditional rights and title exist (Astofooroff, 2008). But centuries of unbroken land use by First Nations for traditional hunting, fishing and gathering presented a legitimate legal challenge to public title over BC's Crown lands that the courts could not ignore (Jackson and Curry, 2004). The courts, then, became First Nations' best avenue for gaining enforceable recognition of aboriginal rights and title. As a result, many First Nations felt that participating in LRMP negotiations might prejudice the courts by implying aboriginal acceptance of Canada and its provinces as sovereign (Wilson et al., 1996). First Nations were therefore reticent to attend LRMP processes.

In addition to these issues, participation in BC's CP experiment was impractical. In the Vancouver Island CORE region alone there are 44 First Nations, each busy with land claims and a multitude of other commitments, making it difficult to access the personnel to attend meetings, let alone manage such a large number of representatives (Wilson et

al., 1996; Duffy et al., 1998). Parallel processes such as the BC Treaty Commission and other direct negotiations with the governments of BC and Canada were viewed as more fruitful expenditures of limited time and energy.

Unfortunately, the BC Treaty Commission proved largely anti-climactic. By 2004, only one of 53 participating First Nations, the Nisga'a, had finalized a settlement[9] (Jackson and Curry, 2004). Despite a stagnant treaty process, significant aboriginal participation was never achieved during the LRMP process until the BC Liberal government initiated a second tier of LRMP negotiations as part of their 'New Relationship' with First Nations (Jackson and Curry, 2004). Before these improvements in aboriginal participation occurred, First Nations won significant legal battles, providing the leverage they needed to secure increased decision-making power.

3.3.1 A Shift in Canadian Aboriginal Law

Aboriginal assertion of title is not new. First Nations in BC demanded to enter treaties starting in the 1880s and became increasingly organized over the next decades, despite provincial stonewalling (Hemeon, 2007). But Canadian aboriginal law, which was originally designed to assimilate First Nations, did not shift until recently towards self-government. This shift was propelled by several landmark court decisions that dramatically altered Canadian law over the last 30-40 years, restoring some aboriginal power over off-reserve land use. As a result, First Nations are redefining their role in BC land use planning.

Calder v. Attorney General of BC ("*Calder v. AGBC*") in 1973 marked the first time Canadian law recognized that aboriginal title to land existed prior to colonization (Hemeon, 2007; Borrows, 2001). This case had far reaching implications, beginning a series of events that eventually led to the 1982 revisions of the *Canadian Constitution Act* to "recognize and affirm" the "existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada," which also prompted the new *Canadian Charter of Rights and*

[9] The Tsawassen, Maa-Nulth, and Lheidli T'enneh First Nations signed treaties in 2008 and 2009. Fifty-seven First Nations currently participating in the treaty process are still in negotiations (BC Treaty Commission, 2009)

Freedoms (Charter). The *Charter*, in turn, spurred revisions to the *Indian Act* by 1985 (Canadian Constitution Act, 1982 s. 35; Hemeon, 2007). The updated *Indian Act* extended official Indian status to off-reserve band members, women who married non-status Indians, and their children, effectively doubling the population of 'status' Indians in Canada (Indian Act, 1985; Hemeon, 2007). A gradual shift steered Canada away from assimilation, but the legal and regulatory landscape oscillated between First Nations' goal of sovereignty, and Canada's twin goals of absorbing First Nations into the Canadian system and divesting the Canadian government of the fiscal and administrative responsibilities associated with the so called "dependent" aboriginal population it had created (Etkin, n.d.).

Canada relied on legislation to forward its objectives, attempting with limited success to impose a made-in-Canada form of self-government (Etkin, n.d.). Unsurprisingly, most First Nations were opposed to this style of self-government, preferring an autonomous design. At the same time, courts were working diligently to define the nature of aboriginal rights and title: "Beginning with *R. v. Sparrow* in 1990, the Supreme Court rendered no less than 25 decisions in a 10 year period dealing with the rights of Aboriginal peoples in Canadian society" (Borrows, 2001, p. 12). Therefore, while Canada relied unsuccessfully on legislation, First Nations made significant headway in the courts. Some of the landmark decisions that, taken as a whole, now recognize First Nations' pre-existing rights, their rights and title to the land and the consequent requirement for provincial governments to consult and accommodate First Nations' interests in their traditional territories are outlined in table 16. Two cases in particular, *Taku River Tlingit v. BC* and *Haida v. BC*, provide clear rulings on the duty of the provincial government to consult and accommodate First Nations. These cases confirm that as long as there is a possibility of aboriginal rights (i.e. if First Nations say they exist), BC is now legally obliged to consult First Nations (Haida v. BC, 2004; Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. BC, 2004).

This new obligation for BC provides First Nations governments with significant new decision-making power over claimed territories, which collectively cover more than three-quarters of BC's land mass (Etkin, n.d.; Robinson, 2001). Obviously, the impact on

land use planning in the province was massive and the new legal regime played a large role in the NDP government's decision to form the BC Treaty Commission, and to encourage First Nations participation in the LRMP processes (Astofooroff, 2008). However, as court rulings became progressively more definitive, it was no longer sufficient to merely invite First Nations to participate as fellow LRMP stakeholders as was the previous practice; government now had a legal obligation to actively engage in consultation before land use decisions could be finalized. This presented a conundrum, because many First Nations were uninterested, if not opposed, to LRMP participation. Something was needed to permit the LRMP process to continue, while also providing First Nations with the direct-to-government negotiations they demanded.

Table 16. Landmark Decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada in Aboriginal Law

Decision	First Nation	Implication
Calder v. Attorney General of BC, 1973	Nisga'a	Canadian law recognizes that aboriginal title to the land existed prior to colonization & that pre-existing aboriginal rights were independent of Canadian law, derived from their own indigenous logic. Federal government now required to settle aboriginal claims.
Guerin. v. Regina, 1984	Musqueam	Aboriginal title extends not only to reserve lands but also to "traditional tribal lands"
R. v. Sparrow, 1990	Musqueam	Protects First Nations against infringement of aboriginal rights as per s. 35 of Constitution. (But contains a test by which those rights can be infringed for justifiable action such as conservation). Marked the beginnings of legal duty to consult.
R. v. Nikal, 1996	Wet'suwet'en	Requires governments to demonstrate a "reasonable effort" to "inform and consult" First Nations.
R. v. Gladstone, 1996	Heiltsuk	Aboriginals can claim rights to fish for commercial purposes. Government efforts to accommodate are "relevant" in determining infringement of aboriginal rights.

R. v. Van der Peet, 1996	Sto:lo	Legal test is defined for determining existence of aboriginal rights. Requirement for reconciliation.
Delga-muukw v. BC, 1997	Gitxsan & Wet'suwet'en	Legal test is defined for determining existence of aboriginal title; further expansion & definition of duty to consult. (But expanded government's right to infringe upon aboriginal rights beyond conservation).
Taku River T lingit First Nation v. BC (BCCA, 2002 & SCC, 2004)	Taku River Tlingit	Government has a duty to consult & where appropriate, accommodate prior to proof of aboriginal rights.
Haida Nation v. BC (BCCA, 2002 & SCC, 2004)	Haida	Government has a duty to consult & where appropriate, accom modate prior to proof of aboriginal rights. Industry has no duty to consult, only government.
Musqueam Indian Band v. BC, 2005	Musqueam	Refines the definition of consultation & accommodation.
Canada v. Mikisew Cree First Nation, 2005	Mikisew Cree	Canada has a duty to consult with First Nations even if their lands were surrendered pursuant to treaty.

(Adapted directly from sources listed in table and Hoberg and Morawski, 1997)

3.3.2 New Relationship

Pressured by legal changes, the BC Liberals embarked on a new policy direction toward First Nations. A summary of the 'New Relationship' is available on the provincial government website and lists a set of guiding principles, including "recognition of the need to preserve each First Nations' decision-making authority," and to implement "practical and workable arrangements for land and resource decision-making and sustainable development" (BC ILMB, n.d., p. 3). The document states that BC will work with First Nations to develop "new institutions or structures to negotiate Government-to-Government-Agreements for shared decision-making regarding land use planning, tenuring, and resource revenue and benefits sharing" (BC ILMB, n.d., p. 4).

The resulting remodeling of the LRMP process involves a second level of negotiation between aboriginal governments and BC. After an initial plan recommendation is

delivered from the usual multi-stakeholder planning tables, the plan is submitted to a higher level of government-to-government negotiations. With government-to-government policy in place, First Nations were more willing to participate in the remaining set of LRMPs, which included the Central Coast, North Coast, Haida Gwaii, Morice, Sea-to-Sky, and Lillooet LRMPs (BC ILMB, 2009a).

The number of First Nations governments and/or tribal councils that regularly attended CORE and LRMP processes and the role they played in each process are shown in table 17. In several cases, First Nations did not attend process meetings regularly but were still engaged in a consultative capacity outside the process. Where this degree of participation was the case, table 17 lists the number of participating governments/tribal councils as zero and only identifies the general role played by First Nations. In cases where table 17 lists a number for aboriginal governments or tribal councils, the corresponding role relates specifically to direct participants and not additional First Nations outside the process who may have been involved in a consultative role. As the table reveals, BC's CP experiment failed to secure significant aboriginal participation in land use planning. Less than 10% of BC's 274 First Nations governments and tribal councils were represented in CORE and LRMP processes, and three-quarters of this small number occurred only during the last six processes, after the New Relationship was initiated (BC ILMB, 2009f).

Clearly, as indicated by table 17, the addition of government-to-government negotiations improved aboriginal participation during the CP portion of LRMPs. However, the improvement did not extend to all processes. Despite assurances that government-to-government negotiations would follow, and that First Nations participation in the first tier of negotiations was without prejudice to subsequent negotiations or treaty decisions, several nations rejected their roles at first-tier LRMP tables.

Table 17. First Nations Participation in CORE and LRMP Processes

Process	First Nations Representation at Stakeholder Tables[10]	First Nations Role in CP Process	First Nations Represent-ation at G2G[11]
CORE			
Cariboo-Chilcotin CORE	n/a	n/a	n/a
West Kootenay-Boundary CORE	1	Observer	n/a
East Kootenay CORE	1	Observer	n/a
Vancouver Island CORE	1	Observer	n/a
LRMP			
Kispiox LRMP	0	Consultative	n/a
Kamloops LRMP	1	Consultative	n/a
Fort Nelson LRMP	0	Consultative	n/a
Fort St. John LRMP	0	Consultative	n/a
Vanderhoof LRMP	0	None	n/a
Bulkley LRMP	0	Consultative	n/a
Robson Valley LRMP	0	Consultative	n/a
Lakes District LRMP	0	Consultative	n/a
Dawson Creek LRMP	0	Consultative	n/a
Fort St. James LRMP	0	Consultative	n/a
Prince George LRMP	0	n/a	n/a
MacKenzie LRMP	2	Active Participants	n/a
Cassiar-Iskut-Stikine LRMP	1	Active Participants	n/a
Okanagan-Shuswap LRMP	0	Consultative	n/a
Kalum South LRMP	0	Consultative	n/a
LRMPs with Government-to-Government Negotiations			
Lillooet LRMP[12]	1	Consultative	1
Central Coast LRMP	10	Active Participants	17
North Coast LRMP	8	Active Participants	7
Morice LRMP	1	Active Participants	4
Sea to Sky LRMP	0	n/a	4
Haida Gwaii LRMP	1	Active Participants	1
TOTAL	28		33

(Frame, 2002; Peter, 2007; Cullen, 2006; McGee, 2006; Astofooroff, 2008; BC ILMB 2007, 2009b, 2009e)

[10] Number of First Nations governments with representatives in regular attendance.
[11] G2G stands for government-to-government. Numbers indicate signatory First Nations governments.
[12] The Lillooet LRMP was not designed with a second-tier of negotiations, as were other LRMPs in this category but began government-to-government negotiations after consensus was not reached at the initial planning table (BC ILMB, 2009e).

These governments preferred to wait for LRMP results and go directly to second-tier government-to-government negotiation. For example, table 17 shows that only one First Nations government participated directly in the Morice LRMP planning table, but four took part in the second tier of negotiations (BC ILMB, 2007). The Sea to Sky LRMP had no First Nations representation during the first tier of negotiations and relied entirely on a government-to-government relationship throughout the process (BC ILMB, 2009b). Therefore, First Nations' participation within CP processes remains patchy, with the strongest involvement occurring in only three LRMP processes (Central Coast, North Coast and Haida Gwaii). Nevertheless, First Nations input into land-use planning is drastically improved *outside* CP processes as a consequence of government-to-government arrangements.

Unfortunately, while First Nations achieved significant decision-making gains through this New Relationship, and BC met its legal obligations, recent studies of the North Coast and Haida Gwaii LRMPs indicate that several non-aboriginal stakeholders at LRMP tables were frustrated with their inability to contribute to government-to-government negotiations, expressing sentiments that the two-tiered approach undermined the relevance of the consensus process (McGee, 2006, Astofooroff, 2008). Chapter five reveals that government-to-government alterations to the Morice LRMP also generated significant dissatisfaction among some table participants.

3.4 Future Directions

In 2006, the ILMB published *A New Direction for Strategic Land Use Planning in BC*. The current phase of planning in BC is focused toward implementation of this 'new direction' (BC ILMB, 2009a). The new policy reflects a general shift in focus away from LRMP-style planning to an emphasis on smaller-scale, more business oriented planning, with a greater role played by the *Forest and Range Practices Act* (FRPA) and what the BC Liberals refer to as 'results-based' management (BC ILMB, 2006). Some goals of the new direction that are relevant to future planning initiatives include the following:

1. Establish multi-stakeholder plan implementation monitoring committees (PIMC) for all LRMPs and SRMPs. Include First Nations.

2. Restrict comprehensive LRMP updates unless a business case is made. Updates to specific components are permitted, particularly in response to Mountain Pine Beetle.

3. Complete development of legal objectives for Ecosystem-based Management on the North/Central Coast and Haida Gwaii LRMPs.

4. Continue various planning commitments under FRPA.

5. Drop the LRMP/SRMP terminology and rebrand as Strategic Land and Resource Plans (SLRP).

6. Restrict new strategic planning to the following priorities: to meet legal requirements, address conflicts, identify economic opportunities/constraints, and address First Nations' opportunities/constraints.

7. Continue building a framework for planning, funding support, and negotiation with First Nations on a government-to-government basis.

8. Ensure planning processes and government-to-government processes do not become surrogates for negotiating rights and title, treaty or individual land transactions with First Nations.

9. Establish a 3-year maximum time limit for ILMB funding for completion of various aspects of planning (i.e. conservancy planning, protected areas planning) after which implementing agencies are expected to contribute to costs.

(Adapted from BC ILMB, 2006)

Currently no documented plans exist to address participant dissatisfaction with the two-tiered approach utilized during the last set of LRMPs. As all but one LRMP are now complete, this issue will likely remain unaddressed under the current government. Indeed, the remaining LRMP (Atlin-Taku) discarded CP altogether in favour of an advocacy planning approach combined with government-to-government negotiations (BC ILMB, 2009e). Lower level planning processes such as SRMPs also currently engage First Nations as separate governments, and do not utilize public participation during that part of the decision-making process (BC ILMB, 2008b; BC, ILBM, 2009d).

4. THE MORICE CASE STUDY

4.1 Morice Plan Area

The Morice LRMP plan document describes the region as, “situated on the edge of British Columbia’s Interior Plateau,” and, “bounded by the eastern slopes of the Coast Mountains to the west, Tweedsmuir Park and the headwaters of the Nechako Reservoir to the south and a large portion of Babine Lake to the northwest” (BC ILMB, 2007, p. 3). In addition, “The Bulkley River valley winds its way through the centre of the plan area, providing an access corridor linking Prince George to the northwest coast. The plan area is approximately 1.5 million hectares, the majority of which is Crown land” (BC ILMB, 2007, p. 3). To provide an impression of scale, Vancouver Island at about 3.2 million hectares, is a little more than double the Morice plan area’s size. Five biogeoclimatic zones are encompassed within the plan area, but the working forest is primarily composed of spruce and lodgepole pine, making the region particularly vulnerable to the Mountain Pine Beetle infestation that gained momentum across BC as the Morice planning process was completed (BC ILMB, 2007). Focal wildlife species vulnerable to development in Morice include grizzly bear, caribou, fisher, northern goshawk, mountain goat, moose, mule and white-tailed deer, and bull trout. The area contains four major lakes and six watersheds, which drain into the Skeena and Fraser systems (BC ILMB, 2007). The Morice plan area is displayed in map 1.

Map 1. The Morice Land and Resource Management Plan Area



(BC ILMB, 2007)

4.2 Historical Land Use

Prior to colonization, the area now defined as the Morice LRMP region contained territorial lands belonging to four different First Nations: the Carrier Sekani (Wet'suwet'en); the Babine; the Yekoochee; and the Cheslatta Carrier[13]. These Nations occupied the area for thousands of years and practiced traditional livelihoods. For the Babine and the Wet'suwet'en, the feast or "Potlach" system was a core pillar of society used as a tool for defining territorial jurisdiction, governance, legal administration, dispute resolution, and ceremony such as funeral rites, honours and appointments (Office of the Wet'suwet'en, 2009; BC ILMB, 2007). Hunting and gathering for food and medicinal/ceremonial plants supported primary subsistence, culture and trade, and also produced a network of traditional trails leading to hunting and fishing grounds or other trading nations on the Pacific coast and distant parts of the continent (BC ILMB, 2007).

After European contact, trapping evolved into an important cultural and economic activity as the fur trade expanded across Canada (BC ILMB, 2007). During this period, some First Nations also took up farming and agriculture in the region (BC ILMB, 2007). However, unlike coastal BC, non-aboriginal development did not start in the Bulkley Valley until the Overland Telegraph Line went through in the 1860s, so First Nations were relatively undisturbed in the Morice region until the onset of European settlement. Once settlement did begin, it remained fairly insignificant until construction of the Grand Trunk Pacific Railway in the early 1900s (BC ILMB, 2007).

By the time the railway wound its way up to the Bulkley Valley, the Colony of British Columbia was already part of Canada, signaling important legal implications for First Nations. The *British North America Act* was signed in 1867, empowering parliament to make laws in relation to "Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians" (British North America Act, 1867 s.91(24)), marking the first legal legitimization of Canadian control over lands and resources. Despite signing no treaties with BC or Canada, First Nations in BC were restricted to reserves. The subsequent *Indian Act* was ratified in 1876, enabling

[13] Today there are five nations that claim territory overlapping the region. See BC ILMB, 2007, p. 6.

a ban on the Potlach and mandatory attendance at residential schools for aboriginal children (Hemeon, 2007).

As First Nations became familiar with the ramifications of their new 'allegiance', Europeans and other immigrants were drawn to the Morice region by farming, a now booming fur trade, and jobs in railway construction (BC ILMB, 2007). The railway opened the Bulkley Valley for forestry and by the mid-1900s several family owned sawmills appeared, foreshadowing the arrival of the first large-scale sawmill in the late 1960s and another in 1978 (BC ILMB, 2007). Chinese gold prospectors also discovered high mineral potential in the region and several mines were opened over the years for copper, silver, gold and other minerals (BC ILMB, 2007).

4.3 Contemporary Land Use

The Morice region still relies heavily on natural resources for its economic strength, and land uses in the area reflect that dependency (BC ILMB, 2007). Legacies of the pioneer era include a well-developed forest industry, a long history of mining, and agricultural activities such as livestock and vegetable farming. In addition, since the advent of multiple access options including highway, rail, and air travel, recreation seekers from outside the region contribute to a growing tourism industry, particularly in recreational fishing and hunting sectors (BC ILMB, 2007). Several hospitality and retail businesses also emerged to support the burgeoning tourism trade (BC ILMB, 2007). First Nations are involved in all sectors and they continue to harvest non-timber forest products and conduct traditional hunting and fishing activities (BC ILMB, 2007). Other land uses include non-commercial recreational uses for local residents, and sites for communities and settlements.

Forestry is the dominant land use activity in the region, accounting for 51% of basic income, with two large-scale mills producing a total of 939 million board feet of lumber per year (BC ILMB, 2008a; Tamblyn and Horn, 2000). The annual allowable cut (AAC) in the Morice LRMP area is 1,961,117 cubic meters of timber, plus an additional 47,009 cubic meters extracted by the private woodlot sector (2003 figures) (BC ILMB, 2008a).

In other words, depending on the availability and quality of trees per hectare, anywhere from about 6,500 to 10,800 hectares of forested land are logged in the Morice region each year. To assist in understanding the scale of this extraction, Saltspring Island in BC's southern Gulf Islands is around 18,200 hectares (Statistics Canada, 2001). Although the Morice region accounts for only 1.6% of BC's total land area, it contributes 3% of the provincial Timber Harvesting Land Base (THLB), generating about $68 million per year in government revenues (BC ILMB, 2008a). On February 9, 2004, Canfor celebrated the opening of its newly expanded mill in Houston, which, as a result of the expansion, is now the largest sawmill in the world (BC ILMB, 2004).

Mining does not compete with forestry in terms of jobs in the region, but the sector is economically significant for BC. The BC Ministry of Energy, Mines and Petroleum Resources rates 95% of the Morice LRMP area as either very high or high in terms of metallic mineral potential (BC ILMB, 2008a). Only one mine is currently operating. The Huckleberry Mine southwest of Houston is one of 8 large mines across BC extracting metals (BC ILMB, 2008a). Fourteen past producing mines exist in the Morice area, two of which completed extraction activities in 1982 and 1992 and are currently undergoing environmental remediation (BC ILMB, 2008a).

Agriculture is another important economic sector in the Morice LRMP area. Cattle-ranching is the most common activity and relies heavily on access to Crown lands for grazing (BC ILMB, 2008a). Other activities include "food production of lamb, pork, dairy and eggs, and crop production of hay, haylage, grain, vegetables, small fruits and bedding plants" (BC ILMB, 2007, p. 11). Prior to LRMP implementation, approximately 34,000 hectares of Agricultural Land Reserve and agricultural leases were dedicated to agricultural activities in the Morice region, with an additional 52,440 hectares of undeveloped, unprotected "High Arability Lands" potentially contributing to future agricultural expansion (BC ILMB, 2008a).

Despite its relatively low revenue generating capacity, the Morice tourism sector contributes more jobs than agriculture and mining combined, trailing only forestry and the public sectors (Tamblyn and Horn, 2000). The sector relies primarily on backcountry

tourism in the form of guide-outfitting, guide-angling, and adventure/wilderness tourism. Between 33 and 46 guide/operator outfits conduct activities within the Morice LRMP area (BC ILMB, 2008a). This sector has a particular interest in maintaining wildlife and fish populations, but also in retaining access to rivers, lakes and large tracts of protected land (BC ILMB, 2008a).

In addition to the primary revenue generating sectors outlined above, recreation, settlement and non-economic First Nations activities also impact Morice land use. The Morice LRMP area supplies an estimated 100,000 recreation days per year to people engaged in backcountry activities like fishing, hunting, hiking and camping, in addition to extensive front country activity such as boating and swimming (BC ILMB, 2008a). Settlements include the District Municipality of Houston (2001 pop. 3,600), the Village of Granisle (2001 pop. 350) and several unincorporated communities such as Topley, Topley Landing, and Tatchet, collectively contributing to a total regional population of 5,200 in 2001 (BC ILMB, 2008a). Other communities outside the LRMP area depend on the region for resources, including Smithers, Telkwa, Burns Lake and various small First Nations communities (BC ILMB, 2008a).

4.4 Land Use Planning Process

After 18 months of negotiation, stakeholders from the Morice region successfully produced a consensus agreement for land use management in their area. At the beginning of the process in 2002, the Ministry of Sustainable Resource Management (MSRM) stated that the purpose of the Morice LRMP is to:

> *enhance sustainable economic development in a way that balances competing uses and values and sustains environmental values by establishing a comprehensive and balanced land use vision, including land use zoning and management direction for a full range of resource values (BC MSRM, 2002a, p. 2).*

The Ministry further stated, "the LRMP process will provide an opportunity for interested stakeholders, the Province, first nations [sic] and other levels of government to negotiate recommendations on land use and resource management" (BC MSRM, 2002a, p. 2). As the Ministry suggested, the LRMP process brought stakeholders together from numerous

stakeholder groups, government, and First Nations to negotiate a plan for future land use in their region by utilizing the principles of CP. The approved plan provides a general land use strategy for the region and a foundation for "subsequent, more detailed plans and resource management decisions," which are intended to remain consistent with the directions outlined in the LRMP (BC MSRM, 2002a, p. 2). The planning process generally followed the same steps of CP and LRMP processes outlined in table 5 (chapter two) and table 13 (chapter three). For the purposes of this section, the framework of *pre-negotiation, negotiation* and *post-negotiation* from table 5 is used to organize an account of the Morice LRMP process.

4.4.1 Pre-Negotiation

Several preliminary steps were required to prepare for Morice LRMP negotiations. These efforts produced some of the pre-conditions necessary for successful engagement in the CP process. Interestingly, based on recommendations in the literature, pre-conditions for the Morice LRMP were not necessarily ideal. As in all the CORE and LRMP processes, deeply held, values-based beliefs were certainly at stake. Many of these beliefs were the same as those largely responsible for the 'war in the woods' that initially prompted the province-wide CP experiment. In addition, significant power imbalances existed among stakeholders, with forest sector interests overshadowing most other interests due to that sector's degree of economic importance in the region. With the possible exceptions of government and mining sectors, the forest industry also possessed much higher technical capacity in terms of data collection and negotiation training (Mascarenhas, 1999).

On the other hand, favorable conditions included the fact that any unwillingness from some sectors to participate, and resistance to change from some institutional cultures (particularly forestry), were previously addressed province-wide after the CORE processes. As noted earlier in chapter three, when the forest industry balked during CORE, the NDP government lowered that sector's BATNA by indicating that if it did not participate in good faith, the province would use existing near-consensus agreements to make binding land use decisions with or without the forest industry's input. Further, despite powerful ideological divisions among British Columbians, all but one of the

preceding LRMP processes achieved consensus, indicating that careful process design can overcome the challenge of deep values-based divisions. This province-wide learning experience set a strong positive precedent for successful application of CP in the Morice region.

The preparatory stage for the Morice LRMP lasted one year, from September 2001 to August 2002 (BC ILMB, 2003b). During this time, the MSRM established a government planning team to guide and support the process. Members from this team worked with First Nations and industry to define the nature of their participation, identified relevant stakeholder sectors, recruited participants for the planning table, and completed several administrative tasks such as developing a draft terms-of-reference and a work plan (BC ILMB, 2003b). The MSRM also engaged the forestry sector in data sharing agreements, gathered all relevant data and information, and produced a socioeconomic environmental base case to support negotiations (BC ILMB, 2003b).

a. Government Team

The initial government team included 13 individuals from MSRM and one representative from the Office of the Wet'suwet'en (BC MSRM, 2002a). The team was divided into the Government Process Team (GPT), Communications Team (CT), Economic Development Team (EDT), and Government Technical Team (GTT). The GPT was tasked with designing, managing and coordinating the LRMP process, including developing partnerships with First Nations and the forest industry. The CT was in charge of developing a communications strategy for apprising the public of LRMP proceedings. The EDT was to coordinate activities of a sub-committee called the Economic Development Working Group in its preparation of a Morice *Economic Development Action Plan*. The GTT conducted analyses, managed data and information, developed draft products to support plan completion, produced general management directions, resource management zones and the final LRMP document (BC MSRM, 2002a; BC MSRM, 2003a). The government team was also responsible for recruiting two independent facilitators to guide the LRMP process and coach participants through ADR and interests-based negotiation.

b. First Nations Participation

Initial consultations were held with First Nations to define the nature of their participation in the process. From the outset, First Nations involvement was handled on a government-to-government basis with First Nations establishing a *Senior Strategic Forum* designed to conduct direct negotiations with the provincial government (BC MSRM, 2002a). First Nations would still hold seats at the LRMP planning table, but where they could not agree to the table's recommendations, the issue would be resolved between the *Senior Strategic Forum* and BC after the LRMP table produced its final product. It was hoped that this two-tiered approach would improve First Nations participation in the Morice process as it did during the North Coast, Central Coast and Haida Gwaii LRMPs (McGee, 2006; Cullen, 2006; Astofooroff, 2008). However, prior to convening the planning table only The Office of the Wet'suwet'en was engaged in negotiation about its participation. Other nations were involved only in preliminary, informal discussions (BC MSRM, 2002a). By the time the planning table was convened, only two of five possible First Nations governments, the Lake Babine First Nation and The Office of the Wet'suwet'en, agreed to participate in the first tier of the LRMP process.

c. Stakeholder Participation

The first role of the public in the Morice LRMP process was to provide feedback about the government team's process model. Combined with previous LRMP experience, these initial design consultations helped the government team identify which sectors should participate in the process (BC MSRM, 2002a). Prior to convening the planning table, 15 sectors were identified in the region, each requiring representation at the table. Once sectoral participation was confirmed, two guiding documents called *Morice LRMP Sector Guidelines* and *Morice LRMP Steps for Sector Organization* were produced by the GPT to support sectors in choosing their table representatives and organizing their caucuses. Each interest group organized itself into a caucus and recruited table representatives based on the individuals' strong interpersonal or interests-based negotiation skills (BC ILMB, 2007). Based on current mailing addresses, 11 of 27 table representatives who received questionnaires for this study had addresses within the Morice region. Most of the remaining addresses were from nearby towns such as Smithers and Burns Lake,

indicating that more than half of table representatives were not from the Morice area. The final list of represented sectors and First Nations included the following:

First Nations
Office of the Wet'suwet'en
Lake Babine Nation

Sectors
Conservation and Environment
Fish and Fish Habitat
Forest Licensees
Guide Outfitters and Trappers
Labour
Local Government
Local Sustainability
Mining and Exploration
Motorized Recreation
Non-motorized/Wilderness Recreation
Provincial Government
Agriculture
Small Business, Woodlot Licensees
Tourism
Wildlife and Wildlife Habitat

(BC ILMB, 2007)

d. Data Agreements

One significant benefit of forest industry participation in the Morice LRMP was its possession of state-of-the-art forest and land data. Prior to inception of the Morice process, major forest license holders in the region participated in an *Innovative Forest Practices Agreement* (IFPA), which committed them to jointly develop sustainable forest management plans (SFMPs) for the Morice and Lakes Timber Supply Areas (TSAs). This partnership was developed to "capitalize upon the numerous opportunities for collaborative work to support both the LRMP and SFMPs for the Morice and Lakes TSAs" (BC ILMB, 2007, p. 3). The agreement included arrangements between government, First Nations and IFPA licensees for shared data collection and management using a common online public/private data warehouse (BC MSRM, 2002a). As a result of the IFPA, the province accessed and jointly improved important data from the forest industry and First Nations for use during the Morice LRMP process.

e. Preliminary Documentation

The government team drafted three key documents in advance to support the process. First, a draft *Terms of Reference* was prepared to define expected product outcomes and describe the process for completing the LRMP. Second, a draft set of *Ground Rules* was

produced outlining a code of conduct, defining the consensus process and decision-making rules, providing procedures in the event of disagreement, outlining general meeting procedures, and specifying rules for media and public communications (BC MSRM, 2002b). Third, a suggested *Work Plan* was developed to identify key project phases and milestones (BC MSRM, 2002a).

f. Relationship to other Plans

Several local plans already existed in the region or were in process prior to Morice LRMP inception. The government team clarified the LRMP's relationship to these plans by stating, "Once approved, the LRMP will provide direction to future local plans, and could also result in modifications to existing local plans" (BC MSRM, 2002a, p. 9). The sustainable forest management planning process for the Morice/Lakes IFPA was one example of a plan under development when the Morice LRMP process began. Other existing local plans impacted by the LRMP included:

- The Morice River Local Resource Use Plan (1992)
- The Nadina Local Resource Use Plan (1993)
- The Whitesail Landscape Unit Plan (incomplete)
- Bulkley River Angling Use Plan (1998)
- The Upper Bulkley River Round Table (initiated in 1997)
- Skeena River Watershed Fish Sustainability Plan (2002 draft)
- Telkwa Caribou Recovery Plan (1998)

(BC MSRM, 2002a, p. 9)

4.4.2 Negotiation

Negotiation included five overarching stages, which sometimes occurred in parallel. An overview of the Morice LRMP process timeline is provided in table 18.
The first stage from October 2002 – February 2003 involved general group formation, where *Terms of Reference* were issued, *Ground Rules* were agreed upon, training presentations were held, and sector interest statements were shared. The second stage from December 2002 – May 2003 developed draft general management directions (GMD) based on sector interest statements. The third stage from May 2003 – January 2004 involved table review and revision of draft GMDs. Area specific mapping was completed via negotiation of map boundaries and management directions for specific

areas of interest were developed from June 2003 – February 2004. Contractors were hired for the final stage to perform computer modeling and multiple accounts analysis of management scenarios from January 2004 – February 2004.

Table 18. Morice LRMP General Process Timeline (October 2002 – March 2004)



(Adapted from BC MSRM, 2003a; BC ILMB, 2009c)

Completed models from the contractors estimated expected timber supply impacts under different management scenarios and multiple accounts analysis predicted socio-economic and environmental impacts. The results were presented to the table to support final negotiations (BC MSRM, 2003a).

a. Negotiation Stage 1 - Group Formation

Table representatives initially varied in their knowledge and expertise around BC land use planning and interests-based negotiation. One of the first process steps was to hold training workshops that situated the project in relation to other provincial planning processes, outlined general goals, and described methods the table would use to accomplish those goals (BC ILMB, 2009c). Independent facilitators conducted training in interests-based negotiation, and the government team and others provided technical presentations about GIS and various items specific to each sector (BC ILMB, 2009c). Presentations were designed to ensure all representatives had equal access to knowledge and information as well as a general understanding of the strengths and limitations of available technical capacity (BC ILMB, 2009c). As the process progressed, participants could request presentations pertinent to a particular topic if they felt information was

lacking. The various workshops, presentations and technical training sessions held during the Morice LRMP process are detailed in appendix 1.

Prior to commencing negotiations, the *Ground Rules* required approval by the table. Participants negotiated several adjustments to this document, only finalizing the *Ground Rules* several meetings after process inception (BC ILMB, 2009c). Meanwhile, sector representatives shared interest statements developed in collaboration with their caucuses for the following theme areas:

Timber	Fish/aquatic habitat
Protected Areas	Visual Quality
Settlement	Wildlife
Cultural Heritage	Biodiversity
Subsurface Resources	Riparian
Agriculture/Range	Hunting/guide outfitting
Botanical Forest Products	Access
Recreation	Water (quantity & quality)
Tourism	

(BC MSRM, 2003b)

Some sectors stated "interests" related to all or most of the theme areas, while others highlighted only a few (see table 19). "Interests" is placed in quotations because, on examination, most of the sector statements were framed as positions, not interests. For example, the agriculture sector stated, "Wildlife *must* be managed holistically", and "Timber and Range managers *must* work co-operatively" (BC MSRM, 2003b, emphasis added). Only the provincial government sector statement was framed as true interests, with phrases that did not exclude other stakeholders such as, "A diversified and expanded resource based economy," or, "Maintain self-sustaining and productive ecosystems" (BC MSRM, 2003b). Other sectors needed to further examine their positions to derive the interests contained therein. The labour sector, for instance, stated, "Forestry *should not* be conducted on lands where timber returns are marginal and better returns or value would be gained by allocating the land to other resource concerns or interests" (BC MSRM, 2003b, emphasis added). To re-frame this position as an interest, the sector could have asked, "Why is it important to avoid forestry on marginal-return lands?" In this case, a

likely response would be that fewer jobs are created when there are low returns. Therefore, the sector's interest could be re-phrased; "For forestry operations, we support land selections that maximize job creation". This re-phrasing would accomplish two things favouring the labour sector: (1) The negative phrasing would be converted to a positive, more cooperative phrasing, and (2) The sector's interest, "job creation," would be clearly stated. Another problem was presented by the local government sector's interest statement, which broadly claimed interests in all theme areas without clarifying specific details about those interests. The fact that interest statements were consistently phrased as positions or were overly broad indicates that table representatives did not properly understand interests-based negotiation and may have required further training. Table "interests" according to documented sector statements are displayed in table 19.

The first stage of negotiation also produced two documents that provided a foundation from which further negotiations could evolve: the *Socio Economic* and *Environmental Base Cases* were completed mid-process as a reference tool for conducting social, economic and environmental benefit-cost analyses and for assessing various land use scenarios developed by the table (BC MSRM, 2002a). The economic development sub-committee also completed its *Economic Development Action Plan* mid-process to further support the completion of GMDs.

Table 19. Table "Interests" According to Sector Statements

Sector	Timber Resource	Protected Areas	Settlement	Cultural Heritage	Subsurface Resources	Agricultural Range	Botanical Forest Products	Recreation	Tourism	Fish/aquatic habitat	Visual Quality	Wildlife	Biodiversity	Riparian	Hunting/guide outfitting	Access	Water (quality/quantity)
Babine	✓																
Wet'su-wet'en	✓	✓					✓										
Conservation & Environment	✓	✓				✓						✓	✓				
Fish & Fish Habitat										✓				✓			✓
Forest Licensees	✓																
Guide Outfitters & Trappers	✓								✓						✓		
Labour	✓																
Local Government	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Local Sustaina-bility	✓			✓	✓	✓											
Mining & Exploration					✓												
Motorized Recreation								✓								✓	
Non-motorized Recreation								✓			✓	✓	✓			✓	
Provincial Government	✓				✓	✓							✓			✓	
Agriculture	✓					✓						✓					✓
Small Business / Woodlot Licensees	✓																
Tourism	✓			✓					✓	✓	✓	✓	✓				✓
Wildlife & Habitat					✓	✓						✓					

(Adapted from BC MSRM, 2003b)

c. Negotiation Stages 2 and 3 - General Management Directions and Review

General management directions were negotiated from December 2002 – May 2003. These directions provide a baseline for management that applies to all Crown land in the Morice LRMP area unless otherwise indicated by additional directions specific to particular resource management zones. Draft GMDs were developed by the GTT for each of the 17 theme areas based on issues and interests expressed during preliminary meetings (BC ILMB, 2009c). Management objectives were identified for each theme area accompanied by a set of indicators, targets, and strategies ('implementation directions'). From May 2003 until almost the end of the process, details of these management directions were repeatedly reviewed and revised as agreed upon by the table (BC ILMB, 2009c). A sample of one completed GMD for the cultural heritage theme is provided in table 20:

Table 20. Sample General Management Direction from Morice LRMP

Cultural Heritage Objectives	Measures/Indicators	Targets
1. Identify, record and report First Nations cultural heritage resources when encountered, particularly those that provide evidence or demonstration of use and occupancy, or which are archaeological sites.	1.1 Percent of areas or sites identified, recorded and reported to First Nations.	100
	Implementation Direction • Field or forest workers who work in areas where there is high probability of encountering First Nations' CHRs (as identified in archaeological overview assessments and inventories) are trained to properly identify, record and report areas and sites to First Nations. This is best achieved by the development of working relationships with First Nations to obtain a better understanding of CHRs and the importance of these sites and areas to First Nation culture, land use and identity. • Pre-1846 features, such as petroglyphs, are not publicly identified, but are reported to First Nations.	

(BC ILMB, 2007)

d. Negotiation Stage 4 - Area Specific Resource Management Zones and Protected Areas

Specific areas in the Morice region contained additional characteristics or management needs that could not be captured by GMDs. From June 2003 – February 2004 these areas were identified and mapped, and specific details were negotiated for their management.

Some areas required special consideration due to the presence of First Nations cultural heritage values, others contained important habitat and required a greater degree of environmental protection, and still others needed particular direction for development (BC MSRM, 2004a). Table negotiations resulted in the creation of 19 Area Specific Resource Management Zones, five of which where designated "No-timber Harvesting Areas" and the rest of which fell under the category "Other Area Specific Management" (BC MSRM, 2004a). The same process was followed for area specific management as with GMDs: The GTT proposed a set of objectives, indicators, targets and strategies based on sector interests, followed by table review and revision of the GTT's work (BC ILMB, 2009c). Sample management directions for Herd Dome, one of the no-timber harvesting areas, are displayed in table 21.

Table 21. Sample Area Specific Management Zone Direction from Morice LRMP (Herd Dome)

Objective	Measures/Indicators	Targets	Implementation Direction
1. Conserve the function and integrity of large contiguous forested ecosystems by managing as a non-timber harvesting area.	1.1 Incidence of timber harvesting or salvage.	Zero	
	1.2 Incidence of impacts to alpine ecosystems.	Zero	
2. Maintain the quality of the wilderness recreation experience.	2.1 Incidence of summer motorized recreational use in the Herd Dome area.	Zero	Refer to section 3.2.6 (Recreation) for the motorized and seasonal access restrictions and area boundaries.

(BC ILMB, 2007)

By definition, protected areas are completely removed from the Timber Harvest Land Base (THLB) and other types of development such as mining and tourism, and are managed for their significant natural, recreational, and cultural heritage values (BC Parks, 2009a). Four of these areas existed in the Morice plan area prior to LRMP negotiations and six additional areas were created as a result of the table's work during area specific management planning (BC MSRM, 2004a). Unlike other area specific planning, a set of general objectives, indicators, targets and strategies were first developed for protected areas across the region as a whole. Specific directions were then identified for individual

protected areas as displayed in table 22 for Old Man Lake Protected Area (BC ILMB, 2009c).

Table 22. Sample Protected Area Direction from Morice LRMP (Old Man Lake)

Objective	Measures/Indicators	Targets	Implementation Direction
1. Conserve the natural composition, structure and function of the grasslands, lakes and wetlands.	1.1 Incidence of loss of the natural composition, structure and function of the grasslands, lakes and wetlands.	Zero	Protected area boundaries to be fenced using wildlife friendly methods. Range tenure holders are not responsible for fence construction.
2. Conserve the functional integrity of breeding and migratory bird habitats.	2.1 Incidence of loss of breeding and migratory bird habitats.	Zero	
3. Conserve cultural and heritage features and values.	3.1 Incidence of loss of cultural heritage features and values.	Zero	Manage as per Office of the Wet'suwet'en values and intent.

(BC ILMB, 2007)

e. Negotiation Stage 5 - Map Overlay, Scenario Analysis, and Multiple Accounts Evaluation

In addition to interests-based negotiation and ADR, two important decision-making tools used by LRMP processes are map overlay and multiple accounts analysis (see table 13). These tools assist the CP process by providing stakeholders with a visual representation of various land use scenarios, and estimating the social and economic impacts of each scenario so participants are aware of benefits, costs and trade-offs before negotiating an agreement. Before advances in digital technology, map overlay traditionally required that stakeholders delineate the boundaries of their interest areas on separate semi-transparent paper maps of their region. Maps from each stakeholder were then placed on top of one another to provide an understanding of overlapping interest areas. In practice, Global Information System (GIS) technology, which is essentially a computerized map overlay technique, is now commonly used to generate scenario maps based on sector interest statements. Multiple accounts analysis uses scenarios developed via map overlay, other sector interest statements, publicly available socio-economic data and biophysical data

models such as Spatially Explicit Landscape Event Simulation (SELES) to provide an estimate of scenario effects on people, communities and local economies (BC IRPC, 1993b; BC ILMB, 2008a). Multiple accounts are used to demonstrate the range of effects that might occur at the regional and provincial scales (BC IRPC, 1993b). For example, BC IRPC's *Social and Economic Impact Assessment for Land and Resource Management Planning in British Columbia* recommends using four regional evaluation accounts that focus on: "regional economic development, regional environmental values, community characteristics/quality of life, and native community concerns" (p. 2), and four provincial evaluation accounts that focus on: "provincial economy, environmental resources and values of provincial significance, provincial government finances, and economic efficiency of resource use" (p. 3). Ideally, each scenario's performance under all 8 accounts is presented to stakeholders prior to finalizing land use decisions. Several methods are used to generate the required information, including benefit-cost analysis, economic impact analysis and social impact analysis (BC IRPC, 1993b). Socio-economic and environmental base cases like those prepared in the initial stages of the Morice LRMP negotiations are used as starting points for comparison (BC IRPC, 1993b).

The Morice LRMP table utilized GIS technology to delineate map boundaries for various interest areas. These boundaries were negotiated at the same time as management directions. Map scenarios were then assessed using a multiple accounts analysis similar to that described by BC IRPC (1993b). The government team hired consultants to produce a *Socioeconomic and Environmental Analysis Report* that compared the base case scenario with pre-consensus agreement to-date, thereby relying on a two-scenario analysis. Multiple accounts were prepared for the following 6 focal topics: industrial sector implications, backcountry tourism implications, recreation activities implications, plan area communities/settlements implications, First Nations implications, and environmental values implications (BC ILMB, 2008a). Highlights from the Morice LRMP multiple accounts analysis are provided in table 23.

Table 23. Highlights from Morice LRMP Multiple Accounts Analysis

Account	Base Case	Table Agreement Scenario	
		Benefits	**Costs**
Industry			
Forestry	• 1442 jobs[14] for BC (1018 for region) • Net economic value to BC - $45.71 million • AAC – 1,961,117 m^3	• Better land use certainty • Faster approval of forestry plans • Support for product certification initiatives • Better communication with community stakeholder groups • No jobs lost in first 10 years	• Reduction of THLB by 3.6% • Long-term decrease in harvest rates of 7.4% • Reduction in AAC starting in 10 years and amounting to 14.9% reduction over 60 years • Loss of $3 million per annum in net economic value – effective immediately • 112 direct jobs at risk over next 60 years.
Mining	• 215 jobs for BC (85 for region) • Net economic value to BC - $1.65 million	• Better land use certainty	• Access restricted to 0.3% of high and very high metallic mineral potential lands due to protected areas (minor impact) • Potential cost implications arising from LRMP Water Management Area
Agriculture	• 20 jobs for BC (all for region) • Net economic value to BC - $60,000	• 20,500 ha additional Crown land allocated to agricultural activities (cattle ranching)	• Potential cost increases to achieve best management practices on Crown lands
Energy	• Potential oil and gas and run of river projects	• None significant	• Potential impacts on small scale hydro development
Trapping	• 62 territories • Average annual revenues of $90,000 for region	• Enhanced wildlife conservation • Potential preferential access to some areas	• None significant
Botanical Forest Products	• Limited existing activity, some potential	• None significant	• None significant
Backcountry Tourism			

[14] Jobs are calculated as person years of employment.

	• 43 jobs for BC (all for region) • Net economic value to BC - $410,000	• Improved maintenance of scenic areas, facilities, features, trails • Enhanced wildlife conservation, fish habitat • Enhanced tourism potential due to new protected areas	• None significant
Recreation Activities			
	• 100,000 recreation days • Net economic value to BC - $1-5 million	• Improved maintenance of scenic areas, facilities, features, trails • Enhanced wildlife conservation, fish habitat • Designated non-motorized areas	• None significant
Communities/Settlements			
	• Population 5,200 • 56% sector income from forestry, 7% mining, 2% tourism, 2% agriculture, 12% public sector • Unemployment rate higher than BC average	• Capacity building, social capital, local empowerment, resource inventory data • No employment loss in the first 10 years • Greater economic diversity • Improved ecological integrity • Greater local governance	• 294 direct and indirect jobs at risk for Houston/Granisle & nearby communities over next 60 years • Population reduction for Houston/Granisle of 109 people over next 60 years
First Nations			
	• Population 6,000 for Bulkley-Nechako Regional District • Aboriginal title & BC's obligation to consult and accommodate recognized by law • Cultural sites dated prior to 1846 protected by law	• Better accommodation of interests and values • Reinforced conservation of archaeological sites & cultural heritage resources • Improved consultation • Botanical forest product directions • Recreation and ecosystem benefits • Hunting and angling recognized as acceptable uses in protected areas • Increased opportunity for backcountry tourism ventures	• None significant
Environmental Values			

	• Protected areas less than 0.04% of plan area • 49% of plan area classified 'scenic areas', most with high management consideration	• 8.2% of land base as protected areas • 18.1% of land base as no-timber harvest areas • 62% of land base as scenic areas • Increased ecosystem representation • Reduced biodiversity risk in forestry areas • Reduced risk to mountain goat populations, riparian ecosystems, rare and aquatic ecosystems • Minor benefits to grizzly, marten, moose, bull trout	• None significant

(Adapted from BC ILMB, 2008a)

In the contractor's review of the *Interim Socioeconomic and Environmental Analysis Report,* table participants were presented with an analysis of impacts to the AAC based on pre-consensus agreement-to-date. In general, the analysis predicted several benefits for ecosystems and wildlife, enhanced tourism and recreation, improved economic development and protection of cultural heritage for First Nations, and increased access to agricultural lands for the agriculture sector. The forestry and mining sectors would experience minor losses with some declines in forestry jobs, revenues and timber harvest levels, and a very small reduction in land access for the mining sector (see table 23) (BC ILMB, 2009c). In return, the forestry and mining sectors would benefit from increased certainty of land use in the region. Overall, the multiple accounts analysis indicated all sectors would be better off relative to the status quo as a result of the consensus agreement-to-date (BC ILMB, 2009c).

f. Public Review and Table Agreement

After scenario analyses were presented to the table, sector representatives agreed to submit the plan for public review. Fifty-seven members of the public attended the Granisle and Houston Open Houses and 15 individuals submitted written comments about the Morice LRMP document (BC ILMB, 2009c). Minor adjustments were made based on public review and subsequent revisions to the scenario analyses. On March 26,

2004 the table representatives agreed by consensus to ratify the Morice LRMP. The Office of the Wet'suwet'en abstained, preferring instead to finalize its decision during government-to-government negotiations (BC ILMB, 2009c). At the last meeting, several table members expressed concern that there would be no participation from the table during the second tier of negotiations, and that the table would be forced to "live with the results of Government to Government negotiations" (BC ILMB, 2009c, Minutes: March 26, 2004). Highlights from the 2004 Morice LRMP consensus agreement are displayed in table 24.

Table 24. Changes in Land Use Recommended by Morice LRMP Table

Pre-LRMP		Morice Table Consensus Agreement, 2004	
General Resource Management (all resource uses permitted; includes areas managed under Visual Quality Objectives, community forests, and woodlots)	84.2%	General Resource Management Zone (all resource uses permitted)	64.1%
Other (rangeland, ALR, recreation areas, private land, special land use areas, caribou recovery areas)	15.8%	Area Specific Resource Management – Specific Values (all uses permitted but limitations on some activities such as motorized recreation and settlement)	9.0%
Parks and Protected Areas	0.04%	No Timber Harvest Areas - Tourism & Mining (forestry & hydro not permitted)	20.5%
		Parks and Protected Areas	6.4%

Other highlights of final table recommendations:

- Long-term harvestable timber supply reduced by 7.4% with no immediate impact on annual allowable cut or employment
- Significant benefits to tourism, guide-outfitting, guided angling, non-commercial recreation
- Access maintained for 95% of high-potential mineral exploration
- Environmental risk reduced for all key wildlife species
- Improved protection of rare ecosystems
- Forest age structure and species range closer to natural levels in long-term
- Development of water management objectives and an ongoing water quality management framework

(Adapted from: BC MSRM, 2004a; BC MSRM, 2004b)

Figure 3. Important Milestones of the Morice LRMP Process
October 2002 – May 2007 *(BC ILMB, 2009c)*



4.4.3 Post Negotiation

As previously noted, the Morice LRMP is unique among the majority of LRMPs as part of a family of six LRMP processes that utilized a second tier of government-to-government negotiations with First Nations. Survey results in the next chapter demonstrate that some of the most important impacts on the perceived success of the Morice LRMP process stemmed from this stage of the process. This section outlines the major outcomes of the final government-to-government agreement and the details of plan approval, implementation and monitoring.

a. Government-to-Government Negotiations

Several changes were made to the Morice table's consensus agreement after the plan was submitted to BC and the four participating First Nations governments (The Office of the Wet'suwet'en, the Yekooche First Nation, and the Lake Babine Nation/Nedo'ats Hereditary Chiefs). Interestingly, these changes were relatively insignificant relative to the amount of dissatisfaction they generated among several table participants from the first tier of negotiations.

Second-tier negotiations took three additional years, from 2004 – 2007 (BC ILMB, 2007). Common changes to the GMDs included strengthened language around First Nations consultation/involvement for objectives under the following plan sections: consultation, recreation, minerals and energy, and water. Much stronger environmental stewardship directions were also added for the mining sector but language was broadened for guide outfitting to protect access options. Four new sections were added: community resiliency, invasive organisms, point source pollution, and use of fertilizers and pesticides (BC ILMB, 2007). One additional cultural heritage area (Le Talh Giz – Old Fort Mountain) was included as an Area Specific Resource Management Zone, and the Morice Lake and Atna River protected areas were added due to their cultural significance and ecological features. The only significant deletion from the GMDs was the removal of Morice West from arable land availability and leasing targets (negative impact for agriculture sector).

One controversial change to the original table's consensus agreement was the conversion of several Parks within the Babine Lake Protected Area to Conservancies. The Conservancy designation is a new type of protected area under the *Protected Areas Act* that safeguards the area from development but permits First Nations to perform social, ceremonial and cultural uses and allows a wider range of low impact commercial activities than do Parks (BC Parks, 2009a). Seven areas that were originally designated Parks under the original agreement were changed to Conservancies (BC ILMB, 2007).

However, overall the second tier of negotiations resulted in zero changes to the proportion of General Management Zones and a redistribution of only 2.3% from No-timber Harvest Areas to Area Specific Resource Management (0.5%) and Protected Area Zones (1.8%) (BC ILMB, 2007). Key land use changes made to the Morice LRMP table's consensus agreement as a result of government-to-government negotiations are indicated in table 25. A more detailed account of these changes is available in appendix C.

Table 25. Government-to-Government Changes to Morice LRMP Table Recommendations

Morice Table Consensus Agreement, 2004		Government-to-Government Agreement, 2007	
General Resource Management Zone (all resource uses permitted)	64.1%	General Resource Management Zone (all resource uses permitted)	64.1%
Area Specific Resource Management – Specific Values (all uses permitted but limitations on some activities such as motorized recreation and settlement)	9.0%	Area Specific Resource Management – Specific Values (all uses permitted but limitations on some activities such as motorized recreation and settlement)	9.5%
No Timber Harvest Areas - Tourism & Mining (forestry & hydro not permitted)	20.5%	No Timber Harvest Areas - Tourism & Mining (forestry & hydro not permitted)	18.2%
Parks and Protected Areas	6.4%	Parks and Protected Areas (includes Conservancies)	8.2%
Other outcomes of government-to-government negotiation: • Stronger language around First Nations consultation and involvement • Stronger management objectives for mining sector's environmental stewardship (e.g. remediation)			

- Broader management objectives for guide outfitting sector, protecting access
- 4 new sections detailing management direction for community resiliency, invasive organisms, point source pollution, use of fertilizers and pesticides
- 1 new cultural heritage site added to Area Specific Resource Management Zone
- 2 new Protected Areas
- 7 Parks converted to Conservancies
- 1 agricultural area removed from arable land availability/leasing

(BC MSRM, 2004a; Personal email communications with BC ILMB October 2, 2009)

b. Approval, Implementation and Monitoring

The Morice LRMP was finally approved in May 1, 2007, 4.5 years after the original table was convened. The Honorable Pat Bell, Minster of Agriculture and Lands addressed a letter to the Minister of Forests and Range, the Minister of Energy, Mines and Petroleum Resources, the Minister of State for Mining, the Minister of Environment, the Minister of Aboriginal Relations and Reconciliation, and the Minister of Tourism, Sport and the Arts, which stated, "I am pleased to confirm the approval of the Morice Land and Resource Management Plan (LRMP) and convey it to all participating ministries for implementation" (BC ILMB, 2007, page not numbered). Minister Bell's letter also identified the Skeena Region Managers Committee as the entity responsible for co-coordinating implementation activities, and the ILMB – Skeena Region as the agency responsible for monitoring and regular review (BC ILMB, 2007). At the time of approval, the plan document indicated one of Integrated Land Management Bureau's first tasks would be to produce an implementation plan and progress report, including "project descriptions, estimated timelines, and priorities for completion of LRMP related projects" (BC ILMB, 2007, p. 186). According to the plan, an LRMP monitoring report would also be produced to compile reports from individual agencies about implementation progress. Stakeholders and First Nations from the LRMP table would remain involved as members of a Plan Implementation and Monitoring Committee (PIMC) to "provide advice on an ongoing basis" (BC ILMB, 2007, p. 186), and to work with the Integrated Land Management Bureau (ILMB) to develop a terms of reference, receive presentations by the ILMB about monitoring progress, and review proposed plan amendments (BC ILMB, 2007). However, as the next chapter reveals, the original implementation and monitoring intent of the plan and actual events did not necessarily coincide.

5. MORICE LRMP EVALUATION RESULTS AND ASSESSMENT

5.1 Introduction

The CP evaluation framework and methodology used in this study was proposed by Frame (2002) and adapted by Cullen (2006) and McGee (2006) as outlined in chapter two. This chapter reports the results of participant responses to a mailed survey containing closed- and open-ended questions designed to measure the effectiveness of the Morice LRMP. Following Frame (2002), Cullen (2006), McGee (2006) and Astofooroff (2009), the evaluation of survey results is divided into process criteria results, outcome criteria results, open-ended question results, and the results of participant ranking of important features for success. A general assessment of process and outcome related responses as well as a comparison of the Morice results with other LRMP results wraps up the chapter.

5.2 Participant Survey

A total of 17 interest groups were represented at the Morice LRMP table. Survey questionnaires were mailed to 27 (71%) of 38 possible table representatives and their alternates, including 21 sector representatives, one representative of the Lake Babine Nation, three representatives of The Office of the Wet'suwet'en, and two representatives of the provincial government. Survey participants were contacted by phone or email prior to mailing the questionnaire to confirm willingness to participate and current mailing addresses. Eleven candidates were either untraceable by phone and email (7 individuals), declined to participate (3 individuals), or were deceased (1 individual). Twenty-three questionnaires were returned. The response rate was 61% of the entire population of 38 table stakeholders and 85% of the 27 stakeholders who were issued questionnaires. Only one sector, agriculture, did not return a completed survey from either the table representative or alternate, therefore 16 of 17 interest groups are represented by this evaluation. The response breakdown by sector is detailed in table 26.

Table 26. Number of Survey Responses by Sector

Sector	# of Responses
Agriculture	0
BC Government	2
Conservation/Environment	1
Fish and Fish Habitat	1
Forest Licensees	2
Guide Outfitters/Trappers	2
Labour	1
Lake Babine Nation	1
Local Government	1
Local Sustainability	1
Mining	1
Motorized Recreation	1
Non-Motorized Recreation	1
Office of the Wet'suwet'en	3
Small Business, Woodlots	1
Tourism	2
Wildlife/Habitat	2
TOTAL	23

The survey is divided into sections A, B, C, D, and E. In the first three sections, participants are asked to indicate whether they 'strongly agree', 'somewhat agree', 'somewhat disagree', or 'strongly disagree' to a series of closed-ended survey statements (Likert scale). A 'not applicable' option is also provided with each statement. In section D participants are asked to rank factors that may be important in determining the success of a collaborative process. Each factor is ranked as 'very important', 'somewhat important', 'somewhat unimportant', or 'not important'. The final section includes several open-ended questions designed to elicit greater depth of detail about responses to the closed-ended statements.

Frequency of response for each statement in sections A, B, and C are calculated as percentages (frequency of response divided by total number of responses). Where participants choose 'not applicable', their response is excluded from the calculation. To provide an indication of the degree of agreement achieved for each statement, positive responses ('strongly agree' or 'somewhat agree') are combined into a total 'agreement'

percentage. The ‘success rating’ for each criterion is determined by averaging the agreement rate of all the questions related to that criterion. Criteria that achieved averages of less than 50% agreement received a ‘low’ success rating, 50%-75% receive a ‘medium’ success rating, and 76%-100% receive a ‘high’ success rating (see table 27). Any criterion that achieved a combined result of 50% agreement or higher is considered as ‘met’ within the Morice LRMP process. Therefore, ‘low’ success ratings indicate unmet criteria, and ‘high’ or ‘medium’ success ratings indicate different degrees to which criteria were met, with medium ratings indicating room for improvement. The process for assigning success ratings is detailed in table 27.

Table 27. Assignment of Success Ratings

	Average Agreement for all Statements	Criterion met?	Success Rating
Criterion ‘x’	less than 50%	Unmet	Low
	50%-75%	Moderately Met	Medium
	76%-100%	Strongly Met	High

Responses to section D were assigned a numeric value from 0-3, with 0 representing ‘not important’ and 3 representing ‘very important’. The results from each respondent were summed and the average was calculated to provide rank scores for each factor. Factors were then organized from highest to lowest rank to indicate the relative degree of importance for each factor as perceived by stakeholders.

Responses to section E were analyzed by coding responses into similar categories. Data reduction was achieved by discarding categories that received the lowest frequency of comments.

5.3 Survey Results – Process Criteria

As previously discussed, Frame (2002) derived 14 process criteria, which included the following:

1. Purpose and Incentives
2. Inclusive Representation
3. Voluntary Participation
4. Self Design
5. Clear Ground Rules
6. Equal Opportunity and Resources
7. Principled Negotiation and Respect
8. Accountability
9. Flexible, Adaptive, Creative
10. High-Quality Information
11. Time Limits
12. Implementation and Monitoring
13. Effective Process Management
14. Independent Facilitation

(Frame, 2002)

The following sections (5.3.1-5.3.14) report survey results for process criteria, indicating the degree to which Morice LRMP participants felt the process was successful at meeting each criterion. All relevant survey statements are included in the reporting and a success rating is provided for each criterion.

5.3.1 Purpose and Incentives

> *The process was driven by a shared purpose, and provided incentives to participate and work towards consensus*

Results from survey statements for *purpose and incentives* indicate a high level of agreement for this criterion. Almost all participants became involved in the process because they thought it was the best way to achieve their goals (95%), and because they felt the planning issues at stake were significant problems requiring timely solutions (100%). Most participants (78%) also understood the provincial government would make land use decisions if no table agreement was reached. This response implies that to achieve their own goals, resolve significant issues, and/or avoid a unilateral decision by government, participants had strong incentives to work toward consensus. Likewise, table members agreed they brought clear goals to the table (100%) but significant value differences existed among the parties (96%), implying potential difficulties in achieving a shared purpose. Such difficulties may be apparent in the slightly lower level of agreement

expressed for clearly defined goals and objectives (71%). Nevertheless, most respondents did experience a sense of shared purpose and were motivated to participate. Despite minor concerns, overall this criterion was well met and received a high success rating as shown in table 28.

Table 28. Level of Agreement for 'Purpose and Incentives' Survey Statements

Survey Statements	Level of Agreement
A1. I became involved in the process because I/my organization felt it was the best way to achieve our goals/ with respect to land use planning.	95%
A2. I had clear goals in mind when I first became involved in the LRMP process.	100%
B2. There were significant differences in values among participants.	96%
B5. The process participants collectively identified and agreed upon clear goals and objectives.	71%
B10. Stakeholders had a clear understanding that if no consensus was reached, the provincial government would make the decisions.	78%
B26. The issues we were dealing with in the LRMP process were significant problems requiring timely resolution.	100%
SUCCESS RATING	**High**

5.3.2 Inclusive Representation

> *All parties with a significant interest in the issues and outcome were involved throughout the process*

Survey results reveal moderate agreement levels for *inclusive representation.* While most participants felt all appropriate interests or values were represented at the table (82%), fewer agreed that all the appropriate government agencies were represented (64%) and over half were unsatisfied with the way First Nations were involved in the process (52%, inverted from B8 in table 29). As a whole, this criterion was met, but answers to statements B3 and B8 indicate room for improvement. *Inclusive representation* achieved a medium success rating as shown in table 29.

Table 29. Level of Agreement for 'Inclusive Representation' Survey Statements

Survey Statements	Level of Agreement
B1. All appropriate interests or values were represented in the process.	82%
B3. All government agencies that needed to be involved were adequately represented.	64%
B8. I am satisfied with the way First Nations were involved in the process.	48%
SUCCESS RATING	**Medium**

5.3.3 Voluntary Participation

> *Affected or interested parties participate voluntarily and are committed to the process*

For this criterion, commitment is used as a proxy indicator for degree of *voluntary participation*. Interestingly, while 100% of participants agreed they were committed to making the process work, they did not necessarily feel their compatriots displayed the same level of dedication. Only 65% of respondents agreed that all participants were committed to the process. Therefore, results for statement A3 indicate a high degree of voluntary participation (via self-perceived commitment), but combined with B4 call into question the accuracy of that self-perception (table 30). This result is common among other LRMP evaluations (see Astofooroff, 2008; McGee, 2006) and may simply be psychological, a human tendency to perceive one's own commitment in a more positive light than that of others. However, another possible explanation for the discrepancy is that many stakeholders felt First Nations were less committed to the process due to high BATNAs arising from the two-tier process design. Overall, this criterion was well met and achieved a high success rating shown in table 30, but due to the discrepancy between statements A3 and B4, this success should be viewed with caution and further insight into the issue is required before concluding that the process was completely successful in terms of *voluntary participation*.

Table 30. Level of Agreement for 'Voluntary Participation' Survey Statements

Survey Statements	Level of Agreement
A3. I was fully committed to making the process work.	100%
B4. All participants were committed to making the process work.	65%
SUCCESS RATING	**High**

5.3.4 Self Design

> *Involved parties worked together to design a process that suited the needs of that particular process and its participants*

Sixty-five percent of respondents agreed that they were involved in process design and 59% agreed they were able to influence the process. Room for improvement indicated by these results is echoed by at least two responses to the open-ended questions, which indicate a perception from some stakeholders of inflexibility and a tendency of the government team to manage the process in favour of a provincial government agenda. Two respondents indicated that statement A4 (table 31) was "not applicable," suggesting that they were not aware they had a role to play in process design. Document review correlates with these results, revealing that participants were not significantly involved in creating their own terms of reference. Stakeholders did, however, participate in producing ground rules, and public consultations were held to solicit feedback about process design (BC ILMB, 2009c; BC MSRM, 2002a). This criterion received a medium success rating shown in table 31, indicating that the criterion was met but that there was room for improvement.

Table 31. Level of Agreement for 'Self Design' Survey Statements

Survey Statements	Level of Agreement
A4. I was involved in the design of the LRMP process (i.e. ground rules, roles, procedures).	65%
A5. On an ongoing basis, I was able to influence the *process* used in the LRMP.	59%
SUCCESS RATING	**Medium**

6.3.5 Clear Ground Rules

> *As the process is initiated, a comprehensive procedural framework was established including clear terms of reference and operating procedures*

Participant involvement in producing ground rules was worthwhile, because stakeholders responded positively to statements about clarity of *ground rules*. Most participants agreed procedural ground rules were clearly defined (83%) and their own roles were clearly defined (74%).

Table 32. Level of Agreement for 'Clear Ground Rules' Survey Statements

Survey Statements	Level of Agreement
B6. Participant roles were clearly defined.	74%
B7. First Nations roles were clearly defined.	39%
B9. The procedural ground rules were clearly defined.	83%
SUCCESS RATING	**Medium**

However, only 39% of respondents agreed that First Nations' roles were well understood. Again, this discrepancy was likely a result of negative perceptions about the two-tiered process design. The criterion *clear ground rules* was met, with room for improvement around definition of participant roles, particularly those of First Nations. *Clear ground rules* achieved a medium success rating shown in table 32,

5.3.6 Equal Opportunity and Resources

> *The process provided equal and balanced opportunity for effective participation of all parties (funding, training, influence)*

Most respondents agreed they made a difference in the outcomes of the Morice LRMP process (73%). Seventy-one percent of respondents agreed they received adequate training that helped them participate effectively, and 60% indicated that they received sufficient funding. Slightly more than half of participants said they had equal influence at the table and 65% of respondents agreed the process reduced power imbalances among

Table 33. Level of Agreement for 'Equal Opportunity and Resources' Survey Statements

Survey Statements	Level of Agreement
A6. I had or received sufficient training to participate effectively.	71%
A7. I had or received sufficient funding to participate effectively.	60%
A8. My participation made a difference in the outcomes of the LRMP process.	73%
B11. All interests/perspectives had equal influence at the LRMP table.	55%
B12. The process reduced power imbalances among participants.	65%
SUCCESS RATING	**Medium**

participants. Despite indicating room for improvement, these successful results refute some criticisms in the CP literature. Nevertheless, responses to open-ended questions reveal some concerns. The most frequently cited weaknesses of the process from the open-ended responses related to power imbalances. In addition, some participants thought their ability to influence table results was overshadowed by a bias toward government, industry, and/or First Nations (four responses). Three responses also indicated a sense of unfairness that some table representatives were paid to attend meetings by their workplace or organization while others were not compensated despite significant time commitments. *Equal opportunity and resources* was met, but, due to concerns related to funding and influence, received a medium success rating as shown in table 33.

5.3.7 Principled Negotiation and Respect

> *The process operated according to the conditions of principled negotiation including mutual respect, trust, and understanding*

Respondents agreed that table proceedings progressed with *principled negotiation and respect*. Nearly all participants agreed the process encouraged open communication about stakeholder interests (83%) and fostered teamwork (82%). Indeed, these benefits appear to have enhanced the process because nearly three quarters of respondents agreed other participants demonstrated a clear understanding of different stakeholder's interests around the table (74%). Seventy percent of respondents believed the process generated trust among participants and 61% (result for B15 inverted) agreed that communication/negotiation skills were sufficient to ensure a smooth process. Overall, this criterion was met as demonstrated by the medium success rating in table 34, but improvement was required for communication and negotiation skills in order to develop better trust relationships among participants.

Table 34. Level of Agreement for 'Principled Negotiation and Respect' Survey Statements

Survey Statements	Level of Agreement
B13. The process encouraged open communication about participants' interests	83%
B14. All participants demonstrated a clear understanding of the different stakeholder's interests around the table.	74%
B15. The process was hindered by a lack of communication and negotiation skills.	39%[15]
B16. The process generated trust among participants.	70%
B17. The process fostered teamwork.	82%
SUCCESS RATING	**Medium**

5.3.8 Accountability

> *The process and its participants were accountable to the broader public, to their constituents, and to the process itself*

The process was generally successful at achieving *accountability*. Most participants agreed that table representatives were accountable to their constituencies (87%) and that the process itself helped ensure accountability (82%). Only 27% of respondents experienced process-related constraints that hampered their ability to communicate and gain support from their constituency. Sixty-eight percent of table members agreed that their sector provided clear direction throughout the process and 61% agreed that the process was effective at representing the public interest. Lower levels of agreement for this last result are likely related to the fact that most participants disagreed the process

[15] Results for statement B15 were inverted for consistency to calculate success rating

utilized an effective strategy for communicating with the public (39% agreement). Two representatives remarked in correlating open-ended responses that the sectoral model of representation was insufficient to ensure public input and there should have been greater effort to include the general public in the planning process. Overall, this criterion was met, but better lines of communication between the process, the public, and sector constituencies would likely have improved perceptions of process accountability. This criterion achieved a medium success rating shown in table 35.

Table 35. Level of Agreement for 'Accountability' Survey Statements

Survey Statements	Level of Agreement
A9. Due to constraints of the process, I was unable to effectively communicate with and gain support from my constituency.	27%[16]
A10. The process helped to ensure I was accountable to the constituency I was representing.	82%
A11. The organization/sector/group I represented provided me with clear direction throughout the process.	68%
B18. Generally, the representatives at the table were accountable to their constituencies.	87%
B19. The process had an effective strategy for communicating with the broader public.	39%
B20. The process was effective in representing the interests of the broader public.	61%
SUCCESS RATING	**Medium**

5.3.9 Flexible, Adaptive, Creative

> *Flexibility was designed into the process to allow for adaptation and creativity in problem solving*

While 68% of respondents agreed the process was flexible enough to adapt to new information or changing circumstances, only 57% agreed that they had opportunities to

[16] Results for statement A9 were inverted for consistency to calculate success rating

periodically assess the process and make adjustments as needed. While indicating room for improvement, these results are still successful and indicate that the process met criteria for *flexibility, adaptability and creativity*. One related open-ended response identified specific knowledge sources that were not permitted at the table such as First Nations land use plans. This lack of flexibility perhaps accounted for some disagreement about statement B21. Also, given the compressed timeline of the Morice LRMP, lower results for statement B22 are not surprising. This criterion achieved a medium success rating shown in table 36.

Table 36. Level of Agreement for 'Flexible, Adaptive, Creative' Survey Statements

Survey Statements	Level of Agreement
B21. The process was flexible enough to be adaptive to new information or changing circumstances.	68%
B22. Participants were given the opportunity to periodically assess the process and make adjustments as needed.	57%
SUCCESS RATING	**Medium**

5.3.10 High Quality Information

> *The process incorporated high-quality information into decision-making*

Results for this criterion are slightly skewed due to a typographical error in the survey questionnaire for statement B33 (table 37). Several respondents received questionnaires that referred to the "Coast Information Team" rather than the "Government Technical Team," prompting seven respondents to answer "not applicable". Therefore, it is useful to note that while only 60% of participants who responded to this statement agreed that the GTT provided high-quality information, only 33% disagreed that this was the case. Judging by responses to statement B34, which show that only 32% of respondents felt the process lacked high quality information, it is likely that statement B33 may have received a higher level of agreement if the error were not present. In terms of technique, most respondents agreed that the map overlay approach was a useful method for evaluating

land use options (91%), as was the multiple accounts system used to assess social, economic and environmental impacts (80%). Fifty-seven percent of respondents indicated the provincial guideline for 12% protected areas was helpful and 55% agreed that the process was adequately prepared with information to support protected areas planning. The criterion for *high quality information* was met with room for improvement and received a medium success rating as displayed in table 37.

Table 37. Level of Agreement for 'High Quality Information' Survey Statements

Survey Statements	Level of Agreement
B33. The Government Technical Team provided high-quality scientific and social information to the planning table.	60%
B34. The process lacked adequate high-quality information for effective decision-making.	32%
B35. The setting of the provincial guide of 12% Protected Areas was helpful to reaching consensus.	57%
B36. The process was well prepared with the information needed to accommodate protected areas within the LRMP.	55%
B37. The overlay of resource values on maps was a useful technique for evaluating land use options.	91%
B38. The multiple accounts method was a useful way of evaluating land use options.	80%
SUCCESS RATING	**Medium**

5.3.11 Time Limits

> *Realistic milestones and deadlines were established and managed throughout the process*

Results for *time limits* were mixed. Participants agreed time management was effective, with 87% of respondents stating the process had a detailed project plan with clear milestones and 91% agreeing that established deadlines helped the process move forward. However, only 42% of respondents agreed the time allotted to the process was realistic.

This comment resurfaces in the open-ended responses as the second most frequently cited weakness of the Morice LRMP process after power imbalances. While time management *within* the time available was well received by participants, the *amount* of time available was not. Overall, this criterion was met, but achieved a medium success rating as shown in table 38, reflecting room for improvement in process duration.

Table 38. Level of Agreements for 'Time Limits' Survey Statements

Survey Statements	Level of Agreement
B23. The process had a detailed project plan (for the negotiation process) including clear milestones.	87%
B24. Deadlines during the process were helpful in moving the process along.	91%
B25. The time allotted to the process was realistic.	42%
SUCCESS RATING	**Medium**

5.3.12 Implementation and Monitoring

> *The process and final agreement included clear commitments to implementation and monitoring*

Many respondents did not agree that the process was successful in terms of *implementation and monitoring*. Less than half of survey participants agreed the table developed a clear implementation strategy and only 57% agreed that table participants shared a strong sense of commitment to carrying out plan objectives. This response should be viewed in light of the fact that the questionnaires were issued five years after the planning table convened. Three years of government-to-government negotiations followed the process and, according to some participants, the government failed to implement important aspects of the plan during the two years since its approval. If the questionnaire were issued immediately post-process, it is possible results for this criterion would be more supportive. This criterion was met and received a medium success rating as shown in table 39, but the criterion was met by a margin of only 1%. Responses to

open-ended questions indicate *implementation and monitoring* as an area of concern for several stakeholders (four responses). Further discussion of this issue is provided in later sections.

Table 39. Level of Agreement for 'Implementation and Monitoring' Survey Statements

Survey Statements	Level of Agreement
B39. The table developed a clear strategy for plan implementation.	45%
B40. At the end of the process, the table participants shared a strong commitment to plan implementation.	57%
SUCCESS RATING	**Medium**

5.3.13 Effective Process Management

> *The process was coordinated and managed effectively and in a neutral manner*

Only 30% of respondents agreed that lack of structure posed a barrier to the table's success. This response may be attributed to process managers' skill levels. More than three-quarters of respondents agreed that process staff and facilitators were skilled. However, only 57% agreed staff remained neutral and unbiased and 61% agreed the ILMB was neutral and unbiased. While this criterion was met, results indicate room for improvement around the issue of neutrality. This outcome is also reflected in answers to open-ended questions where four responses highlighted problems with bias. Overall, this criterion achieved a medium success rating as displayed in table 40.

Table 40. Level of Agreement for 'Effective Process Management' Survey Statements

Survey Statements	Level of Agreement
B27. The process was hindered by lack of structure.	30%[17]
B28. Process staff acted in a neutral and unbiased manner.	57%
B29. The agency responsible for managing the LRMP process acted in a neutral and unbiased manner.	61%
B30. Process staff (including facilitator(s) if used) were skilled in running meetings.	77%
SUCCESS RATING	**Medium**

5.3.14 Independent Facilitation

An independent facilitator was used throughout the process

Almost all respondents agreed the presence of an independent facilitator/mediator improved the effectiveness of the process (91%) and 70% agreed the facilitator/mediator acted in an unbiased manner. The latter response is much more positive than similar responses about process staff and the Integrated Land Management Bureau (ILMB), indicating that independent facilitation may have acted as an important moderator against perceptions of bias. Overall, this criterion was well met and received a high success rating as shown in table 41.

[17] Results for statement B27 were inverted for consistency to calculate success rating

Table 41. Level of Agreement for 'Independent Facilitation' Survey Statements

Survey Statements	Level of Agreement
B31. The presence of an independent facilitator/mediator improved process effectiveness.	91%
B32. The independent facilitator/mediator acted in an unbiased manner.	70%
SUCCESS RATING	**High**

5.4 Survey Results – Outcome Criteria

As mentioned, Frame (2002) also derived 11 process criteria. Following Cullen (2006), McGee (2006) and Astofooroff (2009), an additional criterion was added to capture the impact of First Nations participation. The 12 outcome criteria include:

1. Perceived as successful
2. Agreement
3. Conflict Reduced
4. Superior to other methods
5. Creative and innovative
6. Knowledge, understanding and skills
7. Relationships and social capital
8. Information
9. Second order effects
10. Public interest
11. Understanding and support of SDM
12. Impact of First Nations Participation

The following sections (5.4.1-5.4.12) report survey results in relation to outcome criteria, indicating the degree to which Morice LRMP participants agreed the process was successful. All relevant survey statements are included in the reporting and a success rating is provided for each criterion.

5.4.1 Perceived as Successful

Stakeholders perceived the process and outcome as successful

The Morice LRMP *experience* was more constructive in the eyes of participants than its results. Seventy-one percent of respondents viewed the process as successful, and 68% agreed it was a positive experience. However, many respondents were unsatisfied with the outcome of the process with only 52% agreeing that they were content with the results of their collaborative efforts. Like *implementation and monitoring*, this response should be viewed in light of the fact that the questionnaire was issued five years after the planning table convened and may have produced more supportive results if the questionnaire was issued immediately post-process. In general, respondents perceived this criterion as met, with some significant concerns related to outcomes. *Perceived as successful* received a medium success rating shown in table 42.

Table 42. Level of Agreement for 'Perceived as Successful' Survey Statements

Survey Statements	Level of Agreement
C1. The LRMP process I participated in was a success.	71%
C2. The LRMP process was a positive experience.	68%
C3. I am satisfied with the outcome of the process.	52%
SUCCESS RATING	**Medium**

5.4.2 Agreement

The process reached an agreement that was acceptable to parties

Considering the fact that the Morice LRMP table achieved consensus, it is revealing that only 65% of survey participants agreed the plan addressed the needs, concerns, and values of their constituency. This result raises interesting questions about consensus and

supports the argument that it is not consensus, but the quality of consensus that is important to ensuring a successful CP process. Nevertheless, 65% is still a positive result with the majority of participants in agreement. This criterion was met with room for improvement, achieving a medium success rating as shown in table 43.

Table 43. Level of Agreement for 'Agreement' Survey Statement

Survey Statement	Level of Agreement
C4. The resulting plan addressed the needs, concerns, and values, of the group I represented.	65%
SUCCESS RATING	**Medium**

5.4.3 Conflict Reduced

The process reduced conflict

Only 58% of survey respondents agreed that the Morice LRMP decreased conflict over land use in the region. Again, this level of agreement could be partially explained by the amount of time passed since the table convened. However, given allegations of power imbalance (12 responses) and bias (four responses) in the open-ended responses, as well as some perceptions of disingenuous inclusion (two responses), this result is not surprising. Nevertheless, more than half of respondents felt the Morice LRMP process reduced conflict, indicating this criterion was met, but with room for improvement. *Conflict reduced* achieved a medium success rating displayed in table 44.

Table 44. Level of Agreement for 'Conflict Reduced' Survey Statements

Survey Statement	Level of Agreement
C6. As a result of the LRMP process, conflict over land use in the area has decreased.	58%
SUCCESS RATING	**Medium**

5.4.4 Superior to Other Methods

The process was perceived as superior to alternative approaches

Despite dissatisfaction with some aspects of the process, participants still agreed that there was no better way to approach land use planning (76%). However, almost 60% of participants agreed their caucuses could have done better using alternative means (table 45). This is an interesting response because it reveals that several table representatives acknowledged the best planning process for all stakeholders is not necessarily the one that helps their specific sector achieve the greatest gains. Overall, this criterion was met with room for improvement and received a medium success rating as shown in table 45.

Table 45. Level of Agreement for 'Superior to Other Methods' Survey Statements

Survey Statement	Level of Agreement
C7. The LRMP process was the best way of developing a land use plan.	76%
C8. I/my organizations' interests have been accommodated better through the LRMP process than they would have been through other means.	57%
SUCCESS RATING	**Medium**

5.4.5 Creative and Innovative

The process produced creative and innovative ideas and outcomes

A strong majority of participants agreed that the Morice LRMP process produced creative ideas for action (90%). This result is surprising considering participants' weak support of process outcomes. Despite the fact that nearly half of sector representatives were dissatisfied with outcomes, they still felt process results were creative and innovative.

Table 46. Level of Agreement for 'Creative and Innovative' Survey Statements

Survey Statement	Level of Agreement
C9. The planning process produced creative ideas for action.	90%
SUCCESS RATING	**High**

This discrepancy may be explained by the perception of non-implementation expressed by four responses to the open-ended questions. While participants were frustrated with an apparent failure to follow through with many of the plan's objectives, they still thought the plan was creative and innovative. Overall, this criterion was well met and achieved a high success rating as shown in table 46.

5.4.6 Knowledge, Understanding, and Skills

> *Stakeholders gained knowledge, understanding, and skills by participating in the process*

All respondents agreed they acquired a good understanding of other participants' interests and a better understanding of the Morice region as a result of the Morice LRMP process (100%). Sector representatives also agreed they gained a better understanding of how government works with respect to land and resource management (95%) and a majority of participants reported that they developed new or improved skills as a result of their involvement in the process (90%). Overall, this criterion was very well met and received a high success rating as shown in table 47.

Table 47. Level of Agreement for 'Knowledge, Understanding, and Skills' Survey Statements

Survey Statement	Level of Agreement
C10. As a result of the process, I have a good understanding of the interests of other participants.	100%
C11. As a result of the process, I now have a better understanding of how government works with respect to land and resource management.	95%
C12. As a result of the process, I have a better understanding of my region.	100%
C13. I gained new or improved skills as a result of my involvement in the process.	90%
SUCCESS RATING	**High**

5.4.7 Relationships and Social Capital

> *The process created new personal and working relationships, and networks among participants that encourage continued information exchange, understanding, cooperation and trust*

Correlating with the literature reviewed in chapter two, *relationships and social capital* were among the highlights of the Morice LRMP. Eighty-six percent of respondents agreed that relationships among participants improved during the process and 90% agreed those relationships extended beyond the process to better working relationships in general (table 48). In addition, 80% of respondents agreed that they acquired useful contacts because of their participation in the LRMP. Positive results for this criterion were further supported by the open-ended responses where the most frequently cited strengths of the process related to social capital. Overall, this criterion was met and rated a high level of success displayed in table 48.

Table 48. Level of Agreement for 'Relationships and Social Capital' Survey Statements

Survey Statement	Level of Agreement
C14. The relationships among table members improved over the course of the process.	86%
C15. I have better working relationships with other parties involved in land use planning as a result of the LRMP process.	90%
C16. Contacts I acquired through my participation in the LRMP process are useful to me and/or my sector/organization	80%
SUCCESS RATING	**High**

5.4.8 Information

> *The process produced improved data, information, and analyses through joint fact-finding that stakeholders understand and accept as accurate.*

Possibly due in part to time pressures, table representatives were divided about whether or not information was adequately absorbed. Only 50% agreed that the information produced by the LRMP process was understood and accepted by all participants (table 49). This outcome may also be explained as a product of cognitive dissonance. Participants may have felt they understood the information very well, but that others did not. Positive responses to the remaining statements for this criterion indicate that the latter explanation may be likely. Most respondents agreed they used LRMP information outside the process (74%). Most respondents also agreed the information acquired through their participation in the process was useful, either to themselves or to their sector/organization (85%). Overall, this criterion was met with room for improvement, achieving a medium success rating as shown in table 49.

Table 49. Level of Agreement for 'Information' Survey Statements

Survey Statement	Level of Agreement
C17. The LRMP process produced information that has been understood and accepted by all participants	50%
C18. Information acquired through my participation in the LRMP process is useful to me and/or my sector/organization	85%
C19. I have used information generated through the LRMP process for purposes outside of the process.	74%
SUCCESS RATING	**Medium**

5.4.9 Second Order Effects

> *The process had second order effects including changes in behaviors and actions, spin-off partnerships, umbrella groups, collaborative activities, and new practices or institutions. Participants worked together on issues or projects outside the process.*

Morice respondents did not feel the process was successful in terms of *second order effects*. Slightly more than half of respondents agreed that behaviors and actions changed as a result of the process (53%) and only 32% were aware of spin-off partnerships, collaborative activities or new organizations resulting from the networks developed. This result is surprising considering the high degree of agreement for *relationships and social capital* (section 5.4.7) and raises questions about what form that social capital has taken and the degree to which it has actually created benefits. This criterion was not met and received a low success rating.

Table 50. Level of Agreement for 'Second Order Effects' Survey Statements

Survey Statement	Level of Agreement
C20. I have seen changes in behaviors and actions as a result of the process.	53%
C21. I am aware of spin-off partnerships or collaborative activities or new organizations that arose as a result of the process.	32%
SUCCESS RATING	**Low**

5.4.10 Public Interest

> *The outcomes are regarded as just and serve the common good or public interest, not just those of participants in the process*

More than three-quarters of respondents felt the process served the common good or public interest (76%). The fact that 71% of respondents agreed the process was a success (table 42) and 76% agreed the LRMP design was the best way to produce a land use plan (table 45) reinforces the high level of agreement for statement C22. However, this result is interesting when considered alongside responses to statement C3 (table 42), which indicate only about half of participants were satisfied with the process outcomes. One valuable implication of these responses is that some participants did not require complete satisfaction of their own interests to agree the common good was served. This criterion was well met and achieved a high success rating as shown in table 51.

Table 51. Level of Agreement for 'Public Interest' Survey Statements

Survey Statement	Level of Agreement
C22. I believe the outcome of the LRMP process served the common good or public interest.	76%
SUCCESS RATING	**High**

5.4.11 Understanding and Support of SDM

The process resulted in increased understanding of CP approaches and participants support future use of CP

All respondents (100%) agreed the government should involve the public in land and resource use decisions, and most agreed that CP was the best strategy with 80% indicating that consensus based processes are effective. Sixty-nine percent of respondents also agreed that they would get involved in a similar process again.

Table 52. Level of Agreement for 'Understanding and Support of SDM' Survey Statements

Survey Statement	Level of Agreement
C23. I believe that consensus based processes are an effective way of making land and resource use decisions.	80%
C24. The government should involve the public in land and resource use decisions.	100%
C25. Knowing what I know now I would get involved in a process similar to the LRMP again.	69%
SUCCESS RATING	**High**

The comparatively less enthusiastic agreement for C25 (table 52) may reflect current frustrations among some table representatives about failure to implement certain aspects of the plan, but the result is still positive and reveals that despite frustrations stakeholders approve of CP. Results for *understanding and support of SDM* were well met and this criterion achieved a high success rating as shown in table 52.

5.4.12 Impact of First Nations Participation

Inclusion of First Nations in the process was an integral part of process outcomes

Sixty-seven percent of respondents agreed that First Nations participation made a significant difference in the outcome of the LRMP process. This result was likely skewed

by respondents' opinions about government-to-government negotiations. One of the largest sources of frustration for many participants was the two-tier design that many viewed as a betrayal of the consensus process. Open-ended responses indicate the second tier of negotiations had a significant negative impact on perceptions of process outcomes, ranking second only to lack of representation in the frequency of cited weaknesses for First Nations participation (ten responses). Agreement to statement C5 (table 53) may be lower than expected because some participants perceived "significant difference" in the positive sense and therefore did not agree. However, it is also likely the lower agreement level stemmed from poor First Nations representation at the table during the first tier of negotiations. Overall, this criterion was met, with room for improvement. *Impact of First Nations participation* achieved a medium success rating shown in table 53.

Table 53. Level of Agreement for 'Impact of First Nations Participation' Survey Statement

Survey Statement	Level of Agreement
C5. First Nations participation made a significant difference in the outcome of the LRMP process.	67%
SUCCESS RATING	**Medium**

5.6 Survey Results – Open-ended Questions

Seven open-ended questions allowed respondents to elaborate on their answers to the closed-ended questions. Most responses in this section provide explanatory value and help confirm or expand on results from the closed-ended questions.

5.6.1 Achievements

While respondents provided a rich set of statements about the achievements of the process, the majority of these were related to social capital (see figure 4). Participants regularly cited new relationships, networks and information sharing as the biggest achievement of the process. The facts that consensus was reached and a plan was produced were also frequently mentioned as accomplishments. A few table

representatives stated that considering the small time allotment for the Morice process, it was an achievement simply to have met the deadlines. The establishment of protected areas was also noted. In addition, capacity building, resolution of conflicts and meeting of sector interests were each considered process achievements by more than one participant.

Figure 4. Most Frequently Reported Process Achievements



5.6.2 Who Benefited Most?

Consistently, respondents answered that industry (i.e. forestry and mining) were the main beneficiaries of the process, distantly followed by tourism and recreation (figure 5). Despite concerns about government bias indicated in responses to other parts of the survey, only three respondents felt that the provincial government benefited most, a response rate equal in frequency to *First Nations*, *conservation/environment*, *community/general public* and *all sectors*. Only one individual mentioned the agricultural sector as a major beneficiary. The frequencies of responses for this question are displayed in figure 5.

Figure 5. Responses to the Question: "Who Benefited Most from the Process?"



5.6.3 Strengths and Weaknesses of the Process

Most responses to this question focused on weaknesses of the process but some participants did indicate strengths (figure 6). Consistent with other results related to social capital and relationship building, the most frequently reported strength was 'Exchange of ideas, values, interests and information'. Other strong points mentioned included local involvement, inclusive representation, and skills development in interests-based negotiation. In terms of weaknesses, respondents made several comments about power imbalances related to skills, training and access to resources. Seven table representatives also indicated that the timeline was insufficient. Less frequently, but still significantly, respondents highlighted bias, government-to-government negotiations and poor process management as weak points of the process. Bias and government-to-government negotiations are further confirmed as problematic by responses in other parts of the survey. Some respondents also indicated that government communicated poorly, was not transparent enough and that there was a lack of First Nations participation. Results for this question are displayed in figure 6.

Figure 6. Most Frequently Reported Process Strengths and Weaknesses



5.6.4 Strengths and Weaknesses of First Nations Participation

Non-aboriginal participants appreciated the increased understanding they gained about First Nations' culture and interests, citing this benefit most frequently as the primary strength of First Nations involvement (figure 7). Several respondents indicated that the unique cultural perspective and different types of knowledge were also significant contributions. Unsurprisingly, lack of participation was considered the greatest weakness of First Nations involvement. Only one of five possible nations, The Office of the Wet'suwet'en, participated in the process from start to finish. This response is closely linked to the next most frequently cited weakness: government-to-government negotiations. Many respondents felt that First Nations had too high a BATNA because they knew negotiations would be finalized post-LRMP consensus.

Figure 7. Most Frequently Reported Strengths and Weaknesses of First Nations Participation



Several comments implied perceptions that even The Office of the Wet'suwet'en did not always participate in good faith because it knew there would be another chance to negotiate at the second tier of the Morice LRMP process. Less frequently cited weaknesses included power imbalances created by First Nations involvement, confusion about impact of parallel processes, such as treaty processes, lack of respect shown to First Nations, inconsistent attendance, and lack of transparency. Frequencies of responses to this question are displayed in figure 7.

5.6.5 Most Useful Information

Most table representatives who answered this question highlighted 'Maps and resource inventories' as the most useful information utilized during the process (figure 8). This

result is consistent with both the NCLRMP and the Haida Gwaii LRMP evaluations (McGee, 2006; Astofooroff, 2008). Local knowledge from table representatives and sector interest statements were also considered very useful, as was background information provided by ILMB such as the socio-economic and environmental base cases. Frequencies of responses for this question are displayed in figure 8.

Figure 8. Most Frequent Responses to the Question: "What Information was Most Useful?"



5.6.6 Suggestions for Improvement

Consistent with responses to the closed-ended questions, participants indicated most frequently that a longer timeframe would improve the Morice LRMP process (figure 9). Also consistent with other results, participants were concerned with post-process implementation and follow-up, with four respondents indicating that a key improvement to the process would be to follow-up on commitments. Of these respondents, most implicated the provincial government as responsible for failures to implement aspects of the plan. Next in frequency, three individuals felt table representatives who were paid for their time by their employer held an unfair advantage and suggested equal compensation for all representatives to balance power. A few participants suggested changes to the two-tier process design such as permitting multi-stakeholder discussion about government-to-

government changes, and incorporating First Nations land use plans into the first tier of negotiations. Respondents also suggested improving resource inventories and scenario analyses prior to consensus agreement and increasing involvement of the general public. Results for *suggestions for improvement* are displayed in figure 9.

Figure 9. Most Frequently Reported Suggestions for Process Improvement



5.6.7 General Feedback

Survey participants provided fewer responses in the *general feedback* section. However, three types of responses stood out most frequently (figure 10). The first was appreciation for the opportunity to interact with other sectors and for the education provided by the process as a whole. Second, respondents were frustrated with an apparent failure to implement and monitor the Morice LRMP. Third, two respondents felt strongly that the provincial government had its own agenda prior to process inception and manipulated the negotiations. Both respondents indicated that future CP processes should be independently managed. *General feedback* responses are shown in figure 10.

Figure 10. Most Frequently Reported General Feedback



5.7 Survey Results – Important Features for Success

The CP literature cites several key elements important for process success. To verify the importance of these features, Frame (2002) coded results from her literature review into 20 key elements of success and included these into a section of the questionnaire, which asked participants to rank the features. Results from the Morice LRMP evaluation show that respondents considered 19 of the 20 factors to be important or very important (figure 11). *Inclusive representation* and *commitment to implementation and monitoring* were rated most frequently at the highest level of importance. Other factors that scored highly included: *flexible and adaptive process design*, *high quality information*, *clear understanding of interests*, *effective process management*, and *clearly defined purpose and objectives*. *Voluntary participation* received the lowest score with most participants agreeing it was only *somewhat important*. Results for *important features for success* are displayed in figure 11.

Figure 11. Importance of Features for Achieving Process Success



5.8 Comparison with Other LRMP Evaluations

Earlier sections highlight the Morice LRMP as part of a family of LRMPs initiated after the onset of the Liberal government's New Relationship with First Nations. Three members of this family, the coastal LRMPs (NCLRMP, CCLRMP, Haida Gwaii LRMP), were unique in their use of ecosystem-based management to guide decision-making, and in their reliance on an independent multi-stakeholder agency to gather and interpret technical information (the Coast Information Team). The Morice LRMP, on the other hand, did not rely on ecosystem-based management or an independent technical team, but like the others, it did utilize a two-tiered model designed meet the BC's legal obligation to consult and accommodate First Nations. The inner workings of the Morice government-to-government process are not part of this analysis, but as the survey results make clear, the existence of second-tier negotiations had a significant negative impact on stakeholder satisfaction and perceptions of success during the first tier of negotiations. For this reason, it is useful to compare the Morice LRMP with other LRMPs that utilized the government-to-government model. A total of six LRMP processes used government-to-government negotiations, five of which built the two-tiered model into process design from the outset[18]. To date, only four have been studied. Overall, compared with the other examined LRMPs in this family, the Morice LRMP is moderately successful. The NCLRMP and CCLRMP both achieved higher levels of agreement for more criteria than the Morice LRMP, while the Haida Gwaii LRMP achieved lower levels of agreement for more criteria. Combined averages for statements related to each criterion are displayed in table 54 (process) and table 55 (outcome). The results from Frame's (2002) evaluation are also included for comparison.

[18] The Lillooet LRMP entered government-to-government negotiations post-process but managers did not originally build this level of negotiation into the process design.

Table 54. Process Criteria Summary Comparison for LRMP Agreement Ratings

Process Criterion	Frame's LRMPs	North Coast	Central Coast	Haida Gwaii	Morice
1. Purpose and Incentives	**82%**	**75%**	**92%**	**87%**	**89%**
2. Inclusive Representation	67%	62%	62%	80%	64%
3. Voluntary Participation	**73%**	**76%**	**79%**	**73%**	**82%**
4. Self Design	69%	68%	67%	51%	59%
5. Clear Ground Rules	71%	75%	81%	64%	65%
6. Equal Opportunity and Resources	**56%**	**57%**	**65%**	**60%**	**63%**
7. Principled Negotiation and Respect	65%	66%	86%	56%	74%
8. Accountability	**65%**	**61%**	**71%**	**65%**	**68%**
9. Flexible, Adaptive, Creative	73%	71%	72%	74%	61%
10. High Quality Information	**63%**	**64%**	**56%**	**61%**	**58%**
11. Time Limits	58%	70%	65%	49%	73%
12. Implementation and Monitoring	60%	53%	75%	19%	51%
13. Effective Process Management	69%	70%	84%	64%	66%
14. Independent Facilitation	76%	85%	83%	54%	80%

Comparison of the LRMPs is notable for its consistent results across all processes for several criterion that received levels of agreement higher than 50% (i.e. success ratings of medium and/or high), and had either a low degree of variation between results (10% or less), or achieved 75% agreement or higher for all four processes. These criterion (in bold) include: (1) *purpose and incentives*, (2) *voluntary participation*, (3) *equal opportunity and resources*, (3) *accountability*, (4) *high quality information*, (5) *knowledge, understanding and skills*, (5) *relationships and social capital*, and (6) *understanding and support of SDM*.

Table 55. Outcome Criteria Summary Comparison for LRMP Agreement Ratings

Outcome Criterion	Frame's LRMPs	North Coast	Central Coast	Haida Gwaii	Morice
Perceived as Successful	63%	63%	77%	37%	64%
Agreement	62%	50%	62%	33%	65%
Conflict Reduced	55%	69%	62%	33%	58%
Superior to other Methods	64%	68%	90%	55%	70%
Creative and Innovative	73%	82%	79%	69%	90%
Knowledge, Understanding, and Skills	**90%**	**92%**	**95%**	**80%**	**95%**
Relationships and Social Capital	**83%**	**94%**	**93%**	**87%**	**86%**
Information	77%	82%	76%	67%	77%
Second Order Effects	66%	65%	85%	28%	40%
Public Interest	69%	75%	79%	38%	76%
Understanding and Support of SDM	**80%**	**84%**	**86%**	**87%**	**95%**
First Nations Participation	n/a	82%	93%	85%	67%

'purpose and incentives', '*knowledge, understanding and skills'*, '*relationships and social capital*', and '*understanding and support of SDM*' received 75% or higher in all four processes, indicating that participants in all LRMPs were motivated to participate and felt the issues were important, they gained valuable training and knowledge from the process, they built understanding of other sector interests that resulted in greater social capital, and they agreed that CP is the best available technique for land use planning.

Each process was also successful at meeting '*equal opportunity and resources'*, '*accountability*', '*flexible, adaptive, creative'*, and '*high quality information*' but with room for improvements within each criterion. The fact that these results are consistent across all LRMPs implies that improvement may be required for overall LRMP design in relation to these criteria, and not just for individual processes. However, in general, the LRMPs were perceived as providing a balance of opportunity and resources to all sectors,

being accountable to the general public, and utilizing high quality information that was complimented by process flexibility and adaptive/creative solutions to land use problems.

The comparison is also notable for the fact that where low success ratings were indicated, they were not consistent across all four LRMPs. This is a valuable result as it implies that by studying the successes and challenges of other processes, strategies for improvement may be revealed. For example, the least successful criterion across all processes was *implementation and monitoring* (table 55), but the CCLRMP achieved 75% agreement for this criterion. Perhaps lessons are available from the CCLRMP that could improve BC's LRMP track record for *implementation and monitoring*. Closer examination of the CCLRMP reveals that evaluation took place soon after process completion, which may explain the more optimistic result. However, Cullen (2006) demonstrates that more time and energy was expended post-CCLRMP process to develop a detailed implementation plan that included deadlines and clear roles.

Some criteria with low levels of agreement (50% or less) from at least one of the four studies did not achieve significantly higher agreement in any of the other studies. These criteria, along with (1) *implementation and monitoring*, are particular areas of concern for improving BC's CP design and include: (2) *time limits* (3) *agreement*, and (4) *conflict reduced*.

5.9 General Assessment

To summarize, the Morice process was certainly successful at achieving consensus (with one abstention). Results from the Morice LRMP evaluation also indicate that participants were satisfied with the process for all 14 of the process criteria and 10 of the 11 outcome criteria. Based on these results, the case study joins the growing body of empirical evidence supporting CP as a worthwhile new planning practice, and an improvement over the traditional technocratic system. Of particular note, despite the fact that nearly half of respondents were dissatisfied with process outcomes, most agreed that CP was the best way to conduct land use planning and that the public interest was served, indicating that several participants felt the public good superseded their individual sector interests. Additionally, the process secured over 8% of Morice Crown land as protected areas and

placed another 28% under more flexible forms of protection. This accomplishment was attained without major losses to the economic drivers in the region (forestry, mining, agriculture) and provided significant gains to promising sectors such as tourism by enhancing the region's recreational value.

The results of this study are also useful because they highlight several areas requiring improvement within the 17 evaluation criteria that achieved medium or low success ratings (see table 56 and table 57). This section reviews the main indicators of the Morice process' success, and identifies the most important barriers to achieving higher levels of agreement.

Table 56. Summary of Success Ratings for Process Criteria

Process Criteria	Success Rating[19]
1. Purpose and Incentives	High
2. Inclusive Representation	Medium
3. Voluntary Participation and Commitment	High
4. Self-Design	Medium
5. Clear Ground Rules	Medium
6. Equal Opportunity and Resources	Medium
7. Principled Negotiation and Respect	Medium
8. Accountability	Medium
9. Flexible, Adaptive, Creative	Medium
10. High Quality Information	Medium
11. Time Limits	Medium
12. Commitment to Implementation and Monitoring	Medium
13. Effective Process Management	Medium
14. Independent Facilitation	High
OVERALL PROCESS AGREEMENT RATING	**Medium**

[19] Success ratings: High = greater than 75% agreement, Medium = 50-75% agreement, Low = less than 50% agreement.

Table 57. Summary of Success Ratings for Outcome Criteria

Outcome Criteria	Success Rating
1. Perceived as Successful	Medium
2. Agreement	Medium
3. Conflict Reduced	Medium
4. Superior to Other Methods	Medium
5. Innovation and Creativity	High
6. Knowledge, Understanding, and Skills	High
7. Relationships and Social Capital	High
8. Information	Medium
9. Second-order Effects	Low
10. Public Interest	High
11. Understanding and Support of SDM	High
12. Impact of First Nations Participation	Medium
OVERALL OUTCOME AGREEMENT RATING	**Medium**

5.9.1 What Were the Most Successful Aspects of the Process?

The success of the Morice process was primarily a result of the cumulative impact of moderate performance for the majority of evaluation criteria as displayed in tables 56 and table 57. However, within each criterion, the Morice process performed exceptionally well for a number of individual questionnaire statements. Most notably, 90% agreement or higher was achieved for 14 survey statements. Each of these high scoring survey results is shown in table 58.

Table 58. High Scoring Survey Results Indicating Very Successful Aspects of the Process

Survey Statement	Level of Agreement
A1. I became involved in the process because I/my organization felt it was the best way to achieve our goals/ with respect to land use planning.	95%
A2. I had clear goals in mind when I first became involved in the LRMP process.	100%
B2. There were significant differences in values among participants.	96%
B26. The issues we were dealing with in the LRMP process were significant problems requiring timely resolution.	100%
A3. I was fully committed to making the process work.	100%
B37. The overlay of resource values on maps was a useful technique for evaluating land use options.	91%
B24. Deadlines during the process were helpful in moving the process along.	91%
B31. The presence of an independent facilitator/mediator improved process effectiveness.	91%
C9. The planning process produced creative ideas for action.	90%
C10. As a result of the process, I have a good understanding of the interests of other participants.	100%
C11. As a result of the process, I now have a better understanding of how government works with respect to land and resource management.	95%
C12. As a result of the process, I have a better understanding of my region.	100%
C13. I gained new or improved skills as a result of my involvement in the process	90%
C15. I have better working relationships with other parties involved in land use planning as a result of the LRMP process.	90%

C24. The government should involve the public in land and resource use decisions.	100%

According to the results in table 58, all respondents had clear goals in mind when they entered the process, they were fully committed to making it work, and had incentives to participate because they felt the issues were significant and required timely resolution. Additionally, participants learned from the process – they took away new knowledge about their region, new and improved skills, and a better understanding of the interests of other sectors and how government works. Stakeholders found the map overlay technique useful for evaluating land use options and agreed that deadlines and an independent facilitator are useful for moving the process along and improving effectiveness. Overall, participants became involved in the process because they felt it was the best way to achieve their goals, and every respondent agreed that the government should continue to involve the public in land and resource management decisions.

Each of these high scoring statements point to certain pre-conditions and process techniques that contributed to CP success at the Morice table. However, it is important to compare these achievements with characteristics participants agree are most crucial to CP success. Based on results shown previously in figure 11, most of the questionnaire statements in table 58 rank relatively low on the scale of important CP features. For example, many of the statements in the table correlate with *urgency of issues* and *timetable* in figure 11, but these two features are ranked among the least important factors for CP success. On the other hand, *inclusive representation* and *commitment to a plan for implementation and monitoring* were perceived as the most important, yet survey statements related to these features received some of the lowest levels of agreement in the study. These results reveal that although the Morice LRMP was successful overall, the process did not perform as well as it could have for the features participants viewed as most important. Regardless, three key features did stand out as consistently strong aspects of the Morice process: *Social capital*, *strong purpose and incentives*, and *effective process management*.

a. Social Capital

As is true for many CP processes, social capital was one of the major successes of the Morice process. Participants saw value in new networks, particularly due to increased inter-sectoral understanding and improved communications among stakeholders. While spin-off partnerships and new collaborative organizations may not have materialized, many of the relationship improvements between sectors continued beyond the LRMP process, extending out into general day-to-day interactions between stakeholders.

b. Strong Purpose and Incentives

Participants in the Morice LRMP process were motivated. They had the foreknowledge of successful LRMPs from across the province and were optimistic that the process would help their individual sectors achieve outcomes that improved the status quo. In addition, survey results reveal that most participants felt the process was in the public interest. Sector representatives came to the table voluntarily with a commitment to making the process work. This strong sense of purpose was perhaps reflective of the issues at stake, which were a significant source of division between various sectors in BC before the LRMPs began. Typical CP problems such as participant burnout were less problematic during the Morice process due to this high degree of motivation from table representatives.

c. Effective Process Management

The Morice process was on a tight schedule relative to other LRMP processes, but the government team still managed to guide stakeholders toward a consensus agreement by the deadline. Clearly, the process benefited from lessons learned during 24 previous or concurrent regional CP processes throughout the province. Process managers drew on a wealth of experience and information to tailor the Morice version to the needs of local stakeholders within the defined limits. The fact that most participants felt respected by other table representatives and agreed that principled negotiation occurred is a strong indicator that process managers did their jobs well. The use of independent facilitation was well received by participants and most thought the process was flexible enough to allow creative, innovative solutions as problems arose. For the most part, stakeholders

were provided with the training they needed to participate effectively, and most agreed that they walked away from the Morice LRMP having developed valuable new knowledge and skills as a result. Despite some criticisms about process design discussed in upcoming sections, the Morice planning team should be commended for achieving their task while still maintaining such positive feedback from most stakeholders.

5.9.2. Comparison with Literature Review Strengths

In addition to standout features contributing to the success of the Morice process, numerous other CP strengths were demonstrated. Returning to the strengths and challenges of CP emphasized in the literature (see chapter two), it is useful to review which CP characteristics the Morice LRMP embodied. The strengths identified from the literature review are shown in table 59 and CP strengths represented by the process are indicated by black dots. In addition to previously highlighted strengths such as *social capital* and *new, shared knowledge base,* the majority of respondents agreed the process had strong *representation* with all appropriate interests and values present at the table. Participants also came away with an overall sense of *satisfaction and teamwork* evidenced by agreement that the process was a positive experience and teamwork was fostered (82% agreement). *New, higher quality solutions* were generated according to the majority of participants who agreed the process was innovative and superior to other methods. Most stakeholders considered the process the best way to develop a land use plan and agreed the consensus-based approach was effective, revealing a high overall degree of *legitimacy/buy-in*. Several stakeholders stated concerns about implementation and monitoring, but they nevertheless negotiated an agreement that successfully partitioned regional land use according to stakeholder interests, thereby developing an *implementable plan*. Further, the Morice LRMP process designated new protected areas and generated management directions to protect the environment, which merits recognition of *environmental benefits*. Whether the agreement will be more *durable* is a question for future studies and the question of *cost* was not addressed by this study due to the fact that participants had no access to information about cost and had no basis for cost comparison with other planning methods.

Table 59. Strengths of Collaborative Planning Demonstrated by the Morice LRMP Process

Strengths	**Increased Social/Political Capital**	●
	New shared knowledge-base	●
	Representation	●
	Satisfaction, Teamwork	●
	New, Higher Quality Solutions	●
	Legitimacy/Buy-in	●
	Low Cost	
	Implementable plan	●
	Environmental Benefits	●
	Durable Agreement	

● Indicates (in table 59) which strengths from the literature review (chapter 2) are demonstrated by the Morice LRMP case study results (blank means the strength was not assessed or was not present).

5.9.3 What Needed Improvement?

While the Morice LRMP met every process criteria and 10 of 11 outcome criteria, the majority of criteria were only moderately met, indicating room for improvement. Individual questionnaire statements that achieved 50% agreement or less indicate specific areas of challenge and are detailed in table 60. Combined with results from other parts of the survey, these statements highlight six major problem areas within the Morice LRMP process: (1) *First Nations participation*, (2) *public accountability*, (3) *time allotment*, (4) *implementation*, (5) *balance of power*[20], and (6) *stakeholder satisfaction and community improvements*.

[20] Although none of the survey statements in table 60 indicate problems with *balance of power* (item 5), several responses to open-ended questions highlight this issue and results for related survey statements indicated this as an area for improvement.

Table 60. Low Scoring Survey Results Indicating Unsuccessful Aspects of the Process

Survey Statement	Level of Agreement
B8. I am satisfied with the way First Nations were involved in the process.	48%
B7. First Nations roles were clearly defined.	39%
B19. The process had an effective strategy for communicating with the broader public.	39%
B25. The time allotted to the process was realistic.	42%
B39. The table developed a clear strategy for plan implementation.	45%
C3. I am satisfied with the outcome of the process.	52%[21]
C17. The LRMP process produced information that has been understood and accepted by all participants	50%
C21. I am aware of spin-off partnerships or collaborative activities or new organizations that arose as a result of the process.	32%

a. First Nations Participation

As shown in table 60 (B8; B7), participants were dissatisfied with the way First Nations were involved in the process and felt the role of First Nations was not clearly defined. Follow-up conversations with survey participants confirmed that First Nations participation was highly problematic during the Morice process for several reasons. Most frequently, participants were uncomfortable with a lack of participation from four of five possible First Nations. Common reasons for lack of First Nations participation during other LRMP processes included lack of capacity and refusal to participate as mere stakeholders rather than as separate governments (McGee, 2006; Cullen, 2006; Frame, 2002). In the Morice case study, lack of capacity was certainly a contributing factor, but

[21] This result is included because it is very close to 50%, and results for open-ended questions revealed a significant level of dissatisfaction with process outcomes.

the two-tier government-to-government model attempted to address the second problem of negotiating status. Unfortunately, in addressing one problem, the two-tier strategy produced another. Non-aboriginal sectors resented the 'extra' negotiating power held by First Nations and were frustrated with their inability to provide input during government-to-government talks. Some respondents felt First Nations had an unfair advantage in the decision-making power they held outside the process. One participant stated, "It was harmful to the process to know that they [First Nations] could agree to, alter, or reject our decisions in separate negotiations." The second tier of negotiations also provided First Nations with higher BATNAs than other sectors that reduced, rather than increased, their incentives to participate at the multi-stakeholder planning table. Some table representatives felt First Nations had little motivation to participate in the collaborative process because the 'real' negotiations would take place after the LRMP table finished. Indeed, true consensus was not achieved because the only First Nation that participated for the duration abstained from final consensus agreement, deferring its decision to the second tier of talks. Without significant First Nations participation, CP ideals of inclusive representation were undermined at the Morice table. Meanwhile, the two-tier model eroded trust and buy-in among participants.

Other responses reveal that First Nations may have had good reason to limit their engagement with the LRMP process. One non-aboriginal respondent stated, "First Nations were not properly respected as a government at the table" and "their lack of resources made it very difficult for them to participate." Another non-aboriginal respondent said, "First Nations values were not really taken seriously, Eurocentric arrogance prevailed," and, "no serious effort was made to include First Nations interests." These opinions imply the problem may have systemic roots more related to process design and bias against First Nations' status as a separate government. If this is the case, it is not surprising that First Nations opted to expend their energy and resources at the second level of negotiations. The two-table process is a significant step forward in establishing meaningful dialogue and relationship building with First Nations. But clearly, in the case of the Morice LRMP, the design of the second tier was a significant impediment to the quality of the planning process.

The literature states that CP is not well suited to deeply embedded, values-laden disputes (Moote et al., 1997; Frame et al., 2004; Scholz and Stiftel, 2005). But the LRMP experience in BC proves that strong process design can, to a large degree, overcome difficult ideological differences among stakeholders. Unfortunately, in the case of First Nations, claims in the literature have proven correct as evidenced by limited aboriginal participation in all but three LRMP processes, as well as by stakeholder resentment toward government-to-government negotiations. Based on the Morice LRMP and other examples, it appears there are limits to what good process design can accomplish where intractable issues are at stake. For First Nations in BC, "deeply embedded" and "values-laden" are understatements. An added dimension of sovereignty complicates the nature of land use disputes where BC's aboriginal population is concerned. Perhaps this issue of sovereignty provides clues about *what kind* of deeply embedded disputes place limits on CP's utility. Actions of the current BC government and First Nations governments reveal a mutually held position that shared decision-making with public stakeholders is not appropriate during government-to-government negotiations. Assuming this position becomes entrenched and the new hierarchy of negotiations is permanent, the problem remains of securing public buy-in to decisions made between the governments, as well as producing high quality plans that are representative of collaborative agreement among all interest groups.

b. Public Accountability

The plan document states that news releases and public notices were issued during the process (BC ILMB, 2007). Meeting minutes and other documentation also show that public input was solicited about the initial process design and an open chair was available during the process for any member of the public who wished to observe table proceedings (BC ILMB, 2007). Prior to table consensus, a hearing also took place to generate public feedback about the draft plan agreement (BC MSRM, 2003a; BC ILMB, 2009c). Public comments from the hearing were incorporated into the plan prior to table approval. Nevertheless, despite these clear efforts to include the public, respondents did not feel the process was transparent. Poor facilitation may have generated low incentives to

participate for some members of the public. One comment from the survey results stated, "I was disappointed, frustrated, with professional speakers rebutting comments of the locals." Additionally, most participants disagreed that effective lines of communication were established between the table and the public (table 60, B19). One individual even felt that "the Morice LRMP was *designed* to limit public participation" (emphasis added). Some respondents thought that relying on sector representatives for the bulk of the process was insufficient representation and that the general public should have been more involved for the process to be accountable. As one individual pointed out, "[some] people who sat at the table don't even live here." Indeed, this statement appears to be true as more than half of table representatives who received questionnaires have current mailing addresses outside the region. Others felt that the process should be managed independently and that the provincial government's "minds were made on decisions prior to our participation in the LRMP process." More effective mechanisms to ensure public accountability might have alleviated some participants' concerns, particularly those expressed about the provincial government pushing its own agenda.

c. Time Allotment

The CP literature highlights adequate time as an important driver of process success (Leach et al., 2002). Without sufficient time, participants in CP processes are less likely to move through all the necessary stages of group development that enable them to work together effectively. Respondents consistently identified time constraints as detrimental to the Morice LRMP process in both closed- and open-ended responses. One individual stated that they "felt hurried" and that, "we always had to decide before we were ready," while another felt there was "inadequate time to understand the trade offs required." Indeed, the minutes reveal that the multiple accounts analysis was not presented to the group until the second-to-last meeting; so detailed scenario examination by table participants was not necessarily reflected in the final consensus agreement. A higher degree of success might have been achieved if the timeline better fit the context of the process.

d. Implementation

While the Morice LRMP improved sustainability in the region by designating land use zones such as protected areas and no-timber harvest areas, the implementation status of general management directions and other objectives in the plan document were unclear to participants. This lack of clarity caused a perception of non-implementation among several stakeholders. Whether or not implementation of management directions actually took place is beyond the scope of this study, but stakeholders' perceptions can be explained by poor post-process communication and failure by the provincial government to act on some of its agreed upon commitments.

At the end of the Morice LRMP process, selected sector representatives from the Morice planning table formed a Plan Implementation and Monitoring Committee (PIMC). The plan document states, "Implementation of the Morice LRMP is the responsibility of provincial government agencies," and that the PIMC and First Nations will, "be involved in reviewing plan implementation to ensure the plan direction is reflected in more detailed plans and operational resource management activities" (BC ILMB, 2007, p. ii). Section 6 of the document also states, "A terms of reference document will be prepared, with the participation of members of the PIMC, that defines the role and responsibilities of the Committee," and, "the public, including the PIMC, have an important role to play in monitoring the LRMP" (BC ILMB, 2007, pp. 186-187). Under *Section 6.4 Roles and Responsibilities*, the Morice LRMP describes the duty of the Ministry of Agriculture and Lands to, "Establish and coordinate the activities of a PIMC, including preparation of Monitoring Reports," and to, "Develop a terms of reference and ground rules for the PIMC," "Sponsor an annual PIMC meeting," and "Review recommendations from the PIMC on proposed plan amendments" (BC ILMB, 2007, p. 188). To date (December, 2009), the Morice PIMC is still waiting for the provincial government to act on these commitments.

Collaborative planning side-benefits such as social capital are underwhelming if effective implementation mechanisms are not embedded in the plan and if the plan fails to meet its objectives. Many Morice table representatives were dissatisfied with the lack of focus on

implementation strategies and post-agreement follow-up. Telephone and e-mail conversations confirmed that several objectives in the Morice LRMP remain unimplemented two years after the agreement was finalized. One response captures participant frustration with a lack of consistency post-process: "Government representation should not have disappeared immediately after table completion of consensus…they were replaced by inexperienced workers with no knowledge of the Morice LRMP." This statement implies that personnel turnover may be partially responsible for the lack of government action, but another survey response viewed the problem as political: "The things that I/my sector negotiated for are not happening. Our "business as usual government" appears to be committed to a lack of commitment."

e. Balance of Power

Responses to closed-ended survey statements indicate room for improvement in terms of power and equity, and the frequency of related comments in the open-ended responses is high enough that this issue merits its own discussion. Participants overwhelmingly felt the Morice LRMP process favoured the forestry and mining sectors and some had the impression that the process was largely driven by a provincial government agenda. Several table representatives also resented the extra power enjoyed by First Nations via government-to-government negotiations. Viewed as a whole, the process was a success, but the overall impression from results and follow-up conversations was that the Morice LRMP struggled to maintain participant buy-in due to perceived imbalances of power. These imbalances fell into three main categories: skills and training, resources, and political influence.

In relation to skills and training, one response stated that the Morice process, "relied heavily on the ability of individuals to express themselves" and that "moderators deferred to stronger personalities." Other comments indicated that higher levels of technical expertise on the part of government and industry were valuable contributions, but also provided an unfair advantage to those sectors.

Some participants had greater resources at their disposal. The fact that some representatives were paid for their attendance at table meetings while others volunteered

their time, “created animosity between participants,” to the extent that it, “caused a lot of people to drop out,” according to one respondent. In addition, because many representatives were not paid for their attendance, time was in uneven supply. Volunteers with other commitments outside the process had less time available to review and comprehend information before meetings, making it more difficult for them to understand trade-offs inherent in agreement options.

In relation to political influence, some respondents expressed frustration with what they viewed as an unfair overshadowing of other sectors’ interests in favour of First Nations’ interests. One respondent felt that the “whole event [official plan announcement] was spun to promote the government’s New Relationship,” and that First Nations were “given special treatment” during the process. Others felt that the “Forestry Sector and Mining Sector strongly dominated the planning process,” and that, “their interests were given absolute priority due to their economic importance.” The provincial government was also perceived as wielding unfair influence. One participant claimed that the government “changed outcomes away from the table arbitrarily and without notice” and that provincial government sector representatives were collaborating with the process team between meetings.

f. Stakeholder Satisfaction and Community Improvements

Nearly half of sector representatives were dissatisfied with the outcome of the process but they still agreed that, given the chance, they would participate in a similar process again, that the LRMP process was the best way of developing a land use plan, and that the process outcomes were in the public interest. This apparent contradiction may seem puzzling until one recalls that this study took place five years after the Morice table reached consensus and two years after a final agreement was reached with First Nations. As noted in previous sections, many participants answered statement C3 (table 60) while looking through the lens of frustration at current failures to act on the plan.

Respondents also disagreed that the Morice LRMP process realized several supposed benefits of CP. For example, *second-order effects* was the only unmet criterion from survey responses. Most stakeholders did not observe spin-off partnerships, collaborative

activities, or new organizations that emerged as a result of the process. Further, stakeholders did not agree that the process produced information that was understood and accepted by all participants, implying that the new knowledge base may be of little practical use beyond the process. Nevertheless, it is still interesting that given the advantage of hindsight and despite these frustrations, participants would still turn to CP as the planning method of choice. This provides one of the clearest indications from this study that although far from perfect, CP is the best alternative available and that careful design, rather than a rejection of the approach, is key to planning success.

5.9.4 Comparison with Literature Review Challenges

Collaborative planning challenges identified in the literature review (chapter two) are displayed in table 61 and those represented by the Morice process are indicated with a black dot. While the process was a success, areas for improvement outlined above (section 5.9.3) demonstrate two CP challenge categories as most prevalent during the process: *power imbalances* and *unrepresentative* (First Nations). In addition, two other CP challenges were demonstrated by the process, evidenced by moderate agreement levels for individual survey statements or participant feedback in open-ended responses: *increased or unreduced conflict*, and *disingenuous inclusion*. These challenges were not significant enough to render the process unsuccessful, but they do point toward additional areas for improvement. *Increased or unreduced conflict* is highlighted here because only 58% of respondents agreed conflict over land use in the area had decreased. Perceptions of *disingenuous inclusion* were demonstrated in open-ended responses and related to implementation problems, which supported two participants' view that government used CP as a smokescreen to generate public consent for business as usual. For the remaining CP challenges, although some respondents did indicate that lack of compensation hampered their ability to participate effectively, *participant burn-out/attrition* was not problematic due to the relatively short process duration (18 months). Several respondents highlighted the issue of *accountability*, but this was in relation to transparency and public involvement in the process rather than concern about a shift in responsibility from government to stakeholders. Some individuals submitted responses implying that the

Morice LRMP process produced a *lowest common-denominator agreement*, but these were not direct statements and were in the minority.

Table 61. Collaborative Planning Challenges Demonstrated by the Morice LRMP Process

Challenges	**High Cost**	
	Participant Burn-out/Attrition	
	Power Imbalances	●
	Unrepresentative	●
	Increased or Unreduced Conflict	●
	Disingenuous Inclusion	●
	No Accountability	
	Lowest common-denominator agreements	

● Indicates (in table 61) which challenges from the literature review (chapter 2) are demonstrated by the Morice LRMP case study results (blank means the challenge was not assessed or was not present).

The next chapter concludes this study by discussing particular areas of focus for future applications of CP in the Morice region and the rest of BC, and by providing a short summary of this report's highlights in the concluding remarks.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

Earlier in this study, two debates were introduced. The first was between a technocratic planning paradigm and a participatory planning paradigm, while the second was between participatory planning and more radical planning praxis that criticizes CP from the perspective of power relations. While the Morice evaluation indicates that problems of power and equity were not significant enough to render the process unsuccessful, some concerns about power imbalances were highlighted by several questionnaire responses. Challenges around First Nations participation also raised questions that might support radical critiques of CP. Nevertheless, on the whole, the Morice process performed well. The preceding evaluation joins a long inventory of CP studies that documents the benefits of CP relative to technocratic planning. In practice, technocratic approaches are still prevalent in North America. Brunner and Steelman (2005), for example, emphasize that remnants of scientific management remain entrenched in the current North American governance paradigm. As such, this evaluation provides support for CP by highlighting the success of the BC regional planning experience, which was based on a very deliberate, and large-scale move away from technocratic planning practice. The next section provides recommendations to help future processes better meet the criteria used in this evaluation, and to address some concerns about power and equity highlighted by process participants.

6.1 Recommendations

No CP process will ever be perfect. The best that can be achieved is constant reflection and revision in an attempt to translate lessons learned into process improvements. Every process is different and a myriad of context-specific factors contribute to success or failure, many of which are beyond the control of managers. Therefore, recommendations must be taken in context and treated as tools for learning, not as recipes for success. While the Morice LRMP was successful overall, it experienced obstacles. Based on the drivers and barriers to CP success derived from the literature review in chapter two, table 62 highlights recommendations for overcoming the most prevalent barriers experienced by the Morice process. A new barrier, *post process commitment and follow-up,* is

included for recommendations eight and nine due to implementation concerns indicated by the Morice LRMP evaluation. Inclusion of this additional category is also consistent with Frame's (2002) evaluation framework, which incorporates *implementation and monitoring* as an evaluation criterion. Each recommendation is described in more detail below.

Table 62. Recommendations to Overcome Barriers to Morice LRMP Success

Recommendations	Barriers Addressed	How Addressed?
1. Promote self-design of process and periodically revisit and adjust as required.	*Pre-conditions*	Buy-in
	Access to resources	Skills
	Process mechanics	Flexibility
2. Extend process timeline as required.	*Access to resources*	Time
3. Critically review and revise sector interest statements.	*Access to resources*	Skills
4. Create a participant compensation package with financial or in-kind benefits.	*Access to resources*	Funds
5. Utilize a hybrid process design that incorporates semi-collaborative interaction with First Nations governments during a single tier of parallel planning processes.	*Degree of inclusiveness*	Representation; Clarity of roles
	Degree of authority	Clarity of roles
	Alternatives for stakeholders	First Nations' BATNAs
6. Improve participant training about First Nations governance and history.	*Degree of inclusiveness*	Clarity of roles
	Degree of authority	Clarity of roles
	Alternatives for stakeholders	First Nations' BATNAs
7. Aggressively seek public engagement throughout the process.	*Communications & dispute resolution*	Accountability
8. Clearly define implementation goals, deadlines and responsibilities before consensus is achieved.	*Process mechanics*	Completeness of process
	Post process commitment and follow-up	Clarity of roles; Timebound
9. Establish a regional trust fund to harness social capital post-process.	*Post process commitment and follow-up*	Funds

RECOMMENDATION 1. Provide stakeholders with process design options prior to onset of negotiations and allow them to produce their own design. Periodically revisit and adjust as required.

One reason perceptions of bias and government manipulation occurred during the Morice LRMP process was because participants were not adequately involved in its design. The government team was well prepared as a result of pre-negotiation activities, with a draft terms of reference, ground rules and a work plan already complete prior to process inception. Unfortunately, flexibility was lost in that preparedness and managers sacrificed an opportunity to secure stakeholder buy-in. Instead, the government team should have prepared a set of design options that stakeholders could choose by consensus, thereby providing a stronger sense of self-design as well as preliminary negotiation practice. In addition, providing table representatives with the opportunity to periodically assess and adjust their process design would have increased their sense of ownership, reduced allegations of government process manipulation, and improved proceedings by giving participants the flexibility and autonomy required to revisit design strategies that were not working well.

RECOMMENDATION 2. Extend process timeline as required.

Compared to other LRMPs, the Morice process at 18 months was short. The average duration for LRMP processes that reached consensus was about four and a half years, within a range of 2-10 years (see table 12). The Central Coast LRMP process, for example, required 8 years for completion (Cullen, 2006). The Morice process should have extended beyond the 18-month deadline to ensure participants had time to adequately consider costs and benefits before consensus agreement was achieved.

RECOMMENDATION 3. Follow up interests-based negotiation skills training with critical review and revision of sector interest statements.

As outlined in chapter four, analysis of sector interest statements indicated that participants in the Morice LRMP process did not properly understand the difference between interests and positions. This distinction is a key component of interests-based negotiations, so the fact that stakeholders did not understand this crucial aspect of CP

indicates that further training was required. Morice table representatives were exposed to interests-based negotiation training at three points during the process (appendix A). First, an independent facilitator introduced the concept during the initial meeting. Second, by the fourth meeting, stakeholders had participated in three half-day workshops in interests-based negotiation and ADR conducted by the Justice Institute of British Columbia. Lastly, an independent facilitator conducted a review of negotiation skills during the fifteenth meeting (of eighteen). Clearly these training exercises were insufficient and follow-up was required. Sector interest statements were prepared near the beginning of the process; an important time to ensure training was absorbed. Critical review and revision of interest statements guided by an independent facilitator would provide table representatives with a valuable learning opportunity to solidify their negotiation skills and thereby contribute more constructively to the process.

RECOMMENDATION 4. Create a participant compensation package that offers volunteers a choice of either financial or in-kind benefits. Orient in-kind options toward skills training required for process participation.

The fact that representatives from more powerful sectors received a salary during their participation in the Morice LRMP process bred resentment among representatives who volunteered their time. Financial compensation placed paid individuals at an advantage over unpaid individuals because those who had to juggle jobs outside the process had less time to study process documents and comprehend trade-offs inherent in various scenarios proposed at the table. In addition, representatives from sectors such as forestry, mining and government had access to more information, resources and training. Public or trust funds (see recommendation 9) should be used to create a compensation package for volunteers. Such a package might emphasize non-financial incentives for sector representatives such as training and skills development. Instead of a salary, participants might opt to take additional training sessions tailored to their individual needs, for example, negotiation or GIS skills training. These in-kind benefits would place fewer burdens on funding sources, while still generating greater perceptions of equality among participants. In addition, such compensation might encourage participation of stakeholders who otherwise could not attend the process.

RECOMMENDATION 5. Utilize a hybrid process design that incorporates semi-collaborative interaction with First Nations governments during a single tier of parallel planning processes.

Problems of First Nations' capacity, and their distrust of negotiations with sub-governmental stakeholders present significant obstacles to achieving a truly collaborative land use planning practice in BC. Yet, when the time and effort committed to second-tier negotiations are considered, it seems capacity is not the limiting factor. The second tier of negotiations took longer than the first tier negotiations during the Morice process. Therefore, the major obstacle for First Nations in Morice is not capacity but lack of trust in the negotiation process. The new two-tier process design alleviated much of First Nations' distrust in Morice and other regions, but it left first-tier stakeholder representatives feeling frustrated, powerless and redundant. Interestingly, while government-to-government process design generated dissatisfaction among participants, changes to the Morice table's agreement were relatively minor, revealing that non-aboriginal stakeholder concerns are based more on principle than on significant land use issues. Therefore, to improve this problem, the major obstacle to overcome is participant and First Nations perceptions. Overcoming perceptual challenges will encourage better First Nations representation by reducing their BATNAs and improving clarity around roles, and will also alleviate non-aboriginal resentment of the government-to-government model.

One source of process participants' difficulty with the two-tier model was that they were unaccustomed to viewing First Nations as nations. This is largely a product of lag-time between paradigm shifts in the legal, political, and policy arenas and non-aboriginal conceptions of how First Nations fit into Canadian society. After more than a century of disregarding First Nations' claims at the provincial level and trying to assimilate them into Canadian society at the federal level, it is no surprise the non-aboriginal public is confused. First Nations' new negotiating status in BC represents an appropriate, long overdue response by the provincial government in recognition of First Nations' constitutional rights. The public will be required, over time, to adjust its perception of Canada-BC-First Nations relations. In the meantime, stronger linkages between CP tables and government-to-government negotiations will alleviate perceptions of exclusion, improve transparency, and increase participant buy-in. One aboriginal respondent

suggested that second-tier alterations to the Morice plan should have gone back to the Morice table for feedback before finalizing the agreement, which reveals potential willingness on the part of First Nations to create stronger linkages.

Rather than relying on consecutive processes, First Nations planning proposals should be developed in parallel with collaborative planning tables. Open channels of communication should be established between CP tables and affected First Nations governments. Communications should occur as a kind of 'shuttle diplomacy' with the provincial government acting as intermediary between the CP table and First Nations. In this way, First Nations will feel secure that their status as a separate government is observed, and both tables will receive the benefit of information generated by the other table. The plan produced by the CP table will be of higher quality due to First Nations input, and First Nations' interests will be incorporated into the initial consensus-based plan proposal, thereby streamlining final agreement between BC and First Nations governments. Instead of engaging in a long, drawn-out government-to-government process, this hybrid design will save time and money for the provincial government and First Nations, while also alleviating perceptions of unfairness on the part of CP table participants. Perceptions of transparency between processes will be further improved by encouraging First Nations to attend CP table meetings as observers and permitting CP table participants to attend First Nations planning meetings whenever feasible.

RECOMMENDATION 6. Improve participant training about First Nations governance and history.

Stakeholders' resentment of the new negotiating arrangement between First Nations and the provincial government may also have resulted from poor participant education/training about the history and current structure of First Nations governance in BC. Appendix A outlines skills training workshops and presentations conducted during the Morice process. Only two presentations related to First Nations were conducted, one for cultural heritage values and the other for botanical forest products. Neither of these presentations provided stakeholders with an historic understanding of First Nations' efforts towards sovereignty or events leading to current negotiating arrangements. Several survey comments implied participants held the provincial government responsible for the two-tier arrangement, when in fact Canada-wide legal obligations were a large part of

why this arrangement emerged. Education and training about First Nations' legitimate status as separate governments and their role in BC land use decisions might alleviate misconceptions among some participants and generate greater acceptance of government-to-government negotiations.

RECOMMENDATION 7. Aggressively seek public engagement throughout the process.

Lack of government transparency and accountability is a common complaint from the public that is entrenched in the psyche of many citizens. Public notices and open-chairs will not overcome this bias. Public communication strategies used during the Morice LRMP are sufficient if process managers wish only to achieve due diligence. However, if their goal is to truly erode perceptions of institutional opacity, then CP managers need a more aggressive approach to public communication. Greater public accountability could be achieved by replacing the government communications team with a professional public relations manager, who could easily accomplish each of the following suggestions and more: (1) Hold regular public information sessions packaged and promoted in interesting ways, with enough time for questions and answers, (2) engage high-school students in dialogue about the LRMP process, (3) generate regular, online updates, not just news releases, about process accomplishments and challenges, (4) open a variety of portals for collecting public feedback about the process including anonymous online and telephone options, raise awareness about these tools at every event.

RECOMMENDATION 8. Clearly define upcoming implementation goals, deadlines and responsibilities before consensus is achieved. Establish a protocol for consistent communication between government and a multi-stakeholder implementation and monitoring committee.

One reason the Morice LRMP performed so poorly for *implementation and monitoring* was that linkages between the Integrated Land Management Bureau and sector representatives were essentially severed post process. Partly this was due to personnel turnover at ILMB, but it was also a result of government failure to include the Plan Implementation and Monitoring Committee in implementation efforts as promised via the LRMP agreement. Not only should this linkage be re-established now, but events should also serve as a lesson for future applications of CP in the region. Prior to plan agreement, managers should ensure that well-defined communication protocols exist that are well

understood by all parties, with clear goals, deadlines and responsibilities for post-process activities that the primary implementing agency is prepared to uphold. Leaders should also be established who are responsible for monitoring implementation progress and ensuring that promises of public inclusion in implementation and monitoring are kept post-process.

RECOMMENDATION 9. Establish a regional trust fund and create other incentives to harness social capital post-process.

Proponents often cite social capital among the most important outcomes of CP, and the Morice LRMP evaluation supports this claim. But despite a high level of agreement that the process generated social capital, Morice participants were unaware of any spin-off partnerships, collaborative activities, or new organizations that resulted from the process. In contrast, one of the greatest outcomes of the NCLRMP and CCLRMP processes was the establishment of the $120 million Coast Opportunities Fund (COF). Half of this fund was donated by philanthropic private sources interested in protecting the Great Bear Rainforest and the other half was matched by a combined contribution from the BC and Canadian governments (Smith and Sterrit, 2007). Sixty million dollars from the COF are now held in perpetuity, with the interest dedicated "solely to conservation management, science and stewardship jobs in First Nations communities" (Smith and Steritt, 2007, p. 9). The other half of the fund is used for much needed investment in "sustainable business ventures in First Nations' territories and communities" (Smith and Sterrit, 2007, p.9). Without the networks and second-order effects initiated during the LRMP processes, the COF would likely not exist. The COF is a leading example of how regions can initiate creative solutions that tap into built social capital and utilize its benefits into the long term. It is true that the North and Central Coast cases were unique due to high-profile conservation efforts by international ENGOs (Smith and Sterrit, 2007), prompting one survey respondent to describe the Morice LRMP as the "poor cousin of the Coast LRMPs". However, the creation of the COF provides an example of what is possible for future CP processes. Utilizing such a fund would encourage stronger commitment to implementation and monitoring and could be used to extend the timeline of future CP processes and neutralize some sources of inequality among participants by providing necessary funds for a compensation package.

6.2 Limitations of this Study and Recommendations for Further Research

As outlined in chapter two, it is standard practice within the field of CP research to rely on evaluations of participant satisfaction as indicators of process success. The Morice LRMP evaluation relied largely on this measure, coupled with literature review, document analysis and follow-up conversations/communications with process participants. Coglianese (2003) argues that participant satisfaction is a poor proxy indicator for success. Her argument is based on three points: (1) "satisfaction does not necessarily equate with good public policy", (2) participant satisfaction is "an incomplete measure because it excludes those who do not participate", and (3) there are "problems in applying, measuring, and interpreting participant satisfaction that make it a problematic metric" (p. 70). For Coglianese, the fact that process participants are happy with a policy decision does not mean the decision is a good one. Further, because it is unrealistic to expect researchers to collect the opinions of everyone affected by a policy decision, it is unlikely results will display any meaningful measure of satisfaction. In alignment with CP-like ideals, Coglianese argues that satisfaction studies should be representative of society or not relied on at all. Interpretation of survey results is also problematic for Coglianese because results tend to overlook extremes of satisfaction and dissatisfaction in favour of average levels of agreement, perceptions are often erroneous, and satisfaction can be affected by extraneous factors. For example respondents who were unwittingly misled during a process might say they were satisfied, while respondents who accomplished a great deal but had extremely high expectations might be dissatisfied (Coglianese, 2003). Finally, Coglianese argues, "participants in policy processes are not randomly selected from the overall population" (p. 80). This contributes to bias within the sample population used for a survey.

On the other hand, process participants by virtue of their intimate involvement with the process can provide valuable insights into the successes and failures of policy decisions with which they were involved. These responses can be richer and more meaningful than those from members of the public who have no knowledge of the process and its implications for the larger community. Further, while Coglianese's (2003) arguments

may point out the fallacy of drawing lines of causation between process success and the success of *policy outcomes* based on participant satisfaction, the survey portion of this study was dedicated to assessing CP *process success* and not the success of *policy outcomes*. For that purpose, the only appropriate sample population was the people who experienced CP: the process participants.

It is true, however, that some linkages between CP success and 'successful' policy outcomes were implied in this report, particularly regarding the expansion of Morice protected areas, which were achieved without significant impact to industry. Constraining the evaluation of CP entirely to within-process outcomes is not the most compelling measure of success because CP processes have intended consequences for larger society. For this reason, the Morice LRMP evaluation did not rely entirely on process participants to gather information but triangulated survey and follow-up results with document analysis. Nevertheless, document analysis is not the strongest method for measuring policy success.

Mascarenhas (1999), who was discussed earlier in chapter three would agree with Coglianese's points and made an attempt to address some shortcomings in CP research by interviewing almost 200 people from a wide range of locations, backgrounds and occupations throughout BC who were both participants and non-participants in LRMP processes. Unsurprisingly, the study revealed problems with CP that are underrepresented in the rest of the literature. Mascarenhas' approach does not supply a perfect sample population but it does remove some degree of bias. Further study should follow in the footsteps of Mascarenhas by expanding sample populations beyond process participants so that more robust linkages can be made between process success/failure and policy success/failure.

In addition, Joseph (2004) and Albert (2004) both assessed LRMP implementation to provide an indicator of policy success post-process. Evaluations of implementation are an important piece of the CP evaluation puzzle and each process evaluation should be coupled with an implementation assessment before conclusive claims about policy success, and indeed the success of CP itself, are made. Future evaluations of CP can also

utilize other research tools such as impact analysis, cost-effectiveness analysis, and benefit-cost analysis to better test whether processes yielded the types of results they were intended to achieve (Coglianese, 2003).

6.3 Concluding Remarks

Collaborative planning emerged as part of a backlash against top-down, science-based land use management. In British Columbia, the push for more participatory approaches began when the public realized traditional planning methods failed to protect non-extractive resource values such as sustainability and cultural heritage. The Morice LRMP was part of a legacy of change initiated in the 1990s by a government intent on finding common ground among a multitude of stakeholders who claimed an interest in provincial Crown land. Today, as a result, the province boasts 85% of its landmass as collaboratively managed (Frame et al., 2004, also appendix B). This accomplishment marks a sea change in land use planning paradigms on a large scale, particularly since British Columbia continues to rely heavily on CP as a planning technique despite dramatic changes in overall government policy during the last nine years.

The purpose of this study was to evaluate CP effectiveness for creating a sustainable land and resource management plan in the context of one case study: the Morice LRMP process. Evaluating CP effectiveness is important because it adds to the growing body of literature that documents strengths and weaknesses of CP. Most significantly, CP case study evaluations supply lessons learned that contribute to future process improvements. Among the last of a number of case studies completed across BC, the Morice LRMP evaluation contributes to a major research effort that took advantage of a unique opportunity to study CP's application on such a large scale. The Morice process itself was unique within the LRMP family in its use of an innovative strategy to incorporate First Nations' constitutional rights. As such, the Morice LRMP provides valuable lessons.

The Morice process' application of CP left room for improvement. The process struggled to achieve important goals such as public buy-in, improved First Nations participation and more balanced power relations between government and stakeholders. These issues, combined with a lack of government commitment to implementation and monitoring,

made several stakeholders critical of the process, leading some to view it as another government attempt to secure public consent for business as usual.

Further, BC's effort to meet its legal obligations to First Nations by relying on a two-tiered, government-to-government approach threatened to undermine the success of the Morice process. This finding is perhaps one of the most important outcomes of the Morice evaluation, for it reveals that the two-tiered model in its current form weakens CP's potential to secure high quality agreements. Despite BC's attempt to improve First Nations representation with the two-tiered approach, the goal of observing aboriginal constitutional rights while still satisfying provincial stakeholders remains poorly achieved.

Recommendations in this report that address aboriginal participation are only temporary fixes directed toward current political and legal climates in the province. While useful in the short-term, these solutions do not address the fact that CP ideals of shared-decision making are sacrificed in the current government-to-government model. The possibility exists that limits to collaborative planning's utility have been reached on the issue of First Nations participation and that the provincial government's current solution is the best of imperfect options. Indeed, First Nations certainly have good reason to distrust collaborative processes that historically failed to adequately recognize their status as separate governments.

However, if collaborative planning is to be effectively utilized as a planning tool in British Columbia, it is important to revisit process design in an attempt to reverse the un-collaborative turn created by current two-tiered negotiation models. This remodeling should continue to protect First Nations' constitutional rights while also ensuring all relevant stakeholder groups contribute equally to high quality, inclusive land use decisions. Further studies of CP in BC should focus on incorporating aboriginal perspectives that may reveal solutions to this difficult problem.

Despite these priorities for improvement, The Morice case study reinforces that a return to technocratic planning will not provide sustainable land use solutions for British

Columbia. Morice table representatives accomplished a daunting task: agree to a sustainable land use plan for 1.5 million hectares of Crown land in 18 months in such a way that all stakeholders are satisfied with the outcome. Empirical evidence from the Morice process and other cases in BC and around the world consistently point to CP as an effective and efficient decision-making tool for environmental disputes. Morice stakeholders were largely pleased with the performance of CP as a planning tool and felt that it contributed significantly to the quality of the final land use decision. This study adds to the now substantial set of empirical evidence that says CP was the right tool for the task in BC.

7. APPENDICES

Appendix A. Morice LRMP Presentations and Workshops

	Title	Presented By
Meeting 1	LRMP Principles	Independent Facilitator
	Key LRMP Success Factors	Independent Facilitator
	Introduction to Interests Based Negotiation	Independent Facilitator
Meeting 2	Morice LRMP Provincial Perspective	Government Team
	General Management Direction (GMD)	Government Team
	Cultural Heritage Resource Theme	First Nations
	Economic Development Action Plan Framework	Government Team
	Results Based Code (Forest Practices Code)	Forest Practices Branch (MOF)
	Morice Timber Supply Area	Ministry of Forests
Meeting 3	Morice LRMP Timber Supply Analysis	Ministry of Forests
	Draft GMD – Timber	Government Team
	Draft GMD – Settlements	Government Team
	Protected Area Strategy	Government Team
	Draft GMD – Protected Areas	Government Team
	Morice Agriculture and Range	Ministry of Agriculture
	Energy and Minerals in the Morice LRMP	Ministry of Sustainable Resource Management
Meeting 4	Draft GMD – Agriculture and Range	Ministry of Agriculture
	Draft GMD – Energy and Minerals	Government Team
	Recreation in the Morice Plan Area	Ministry of Sustainable Resource Management
	Tourism in the Morice Plan Area	Ministry of Sustainable Resource Management
	Visual Quality in the Morice Plan Area	Ministry of Forests
	Interests Based Negotiation Training (3 half-day sessions)	Justice Institute of BC
Meeting 5	Wildlife and Biodiversity in the Morice Plan Area	Government Team
	Guide Outfitting in BC	Guide Outfitters/Trappers Sector
	Access in the Morice Plan Area	Ministry of Sustainable Resource Management
Meeting 6	Geographic Information Systems and Mapping	Ministry of Sustainable Resource Management
	Fish and Aquatic Resources in the Morice TSA	Government Team
	Mountain Pine Beetle in the Morice	Ministry of Forests

	Title	Presented By
	Current Bark Beetle Strategy for the Morice TSA	Morice Forest District (MOF)
Meeting 7	Sustainability Principles	Local Sustainability Sector
	Small Business/Woodlot Economic Diversity	Small Business/Woodlot Sector
	Botanical Forests and the Wet'suwet'en Territorial Stewardship Plan	Office of the Wet'suwet'en
Meeting 8	Monosodium Methane Arsenate	Government Team
Meeting 9	Draft Socio Economic Base Case	Pacific Analytics Consulting
	Draft Environmental Base Case	Government Team
Meeting 10	Process Assessment	Independent Facilitator
Meeting 11	Socio Economic Development Action Plan	Government Team
Meeting 12	Visual Quality Objectives as they Relate to the Timber Harvesting Land Base	Timber Sector
	Provincial LRMP Monitoring Approach	Government Team
Meeting 14	Introduction to Scenario Analysis	Government Team
Meeting 15	Review of Negotiation Skills	Independent Facilitator
Meeting 17	Interim Scenario Analysis (SELES)	Government Team
	Preliminary Socio Economic Assessment	Pierce Lefebvre Consulting
	Interim Scenario Analysis (Environmental Risk Assessment)	Government Team
Meeting 18	Scenario Analysis Impacts on Long Term Yield (SELES)	Government Team
	Update – Socio Economic Assessment	Pierce Lefebvre Consulting
	Update – Environmental Risk Assessment	Government Team

(Adapted from BC ILMB, 2009c)

Appendix B. CORE and LRMP Plan Areas and Protected Areas as Proportions of the BC Land Base - 2009

Process	**Plan Area** (Proportion of Provincial Land-base)	**Protected Areas** (Proportion of Provincial Land Base)
CORE		
Cariboo-Chilcotin CORE	8.5%	1.0%
West Kootenay-Boundary CORE	4.5%	0.5%
East Kootenay CORE	4.3%	0.7%
Vancouver Island CORE	3.5%	0.5%
LRMP		
Kispiox LRMP	1.3%	0.1%
Kamloops LRMP	2.3%	0.5%
Fort Nelson LRMP	10.4%	1.1%
Fort St. John LRMP	4.9%	0.2%
Vanderhoof LRMP	1.5%	0.1%
Bulkley LRMP	0.8%	0.04%
Robson Valley LRMP	1.5%	0.3%
Lakes District LRMP	1.7%	0.6%
Dawson Creek LRMP	3.1%	0.2%
Fort St. James LRMP	3.4%	0.2%
Prince George LRMP	3.6%	0.3%
MacKenzie LRMP	6.8%	0.9%
Cassiar-Iskut-Stikine LRMP	5.5%	1.4%
Okanagan-Shuswap LRMP	2.7%	0.2%
Kalum South LRMP	2.3%	0.5%
LRMP with Government to Government Negotiations (see Ch. 3)		
Lillooet LRMP	1.2%	0.2%
Central Coast LRMP	4.9%	1.4%
North Coast LRMP	1.8%	0.4%
Morice LRMP	1.6%	0.1%
Sea to Sky LRMP	1.2%	0.3%
Haida Gwaii LRMP	1.0%	0.5%
TOTAL	84.3%	12.5%

(Adapted from BC ILMB 2007, 2009b, 2009e; Pierce Lefebvre Consulting, 2001)

Appendix C. Detail of Government-to-Government Changes to Morice Table Recommendations

Section	Government-to-Government Additions/Deletions/Changes
General Management Direction	
3.1.1 (1) Consultation Objectives/Directions	*(Addition)* • Consultation with First Nations will occur consistent with case law and requirements resulting from treaty settlement
3.2.1 (1-8) Community Resiliency Objectives/Directions	*(Addition)* • Entire section added, primarily economic sustainability and community well-being objectives
3.2.6 (1-5) Recreation Objectives/Directions	*(Additions)* • Notification and consultation is to occur prior to industrial development adjacent to features, facilities and trails • Motorized access is maintained for First Nation users undertaking traditional and subsistence activities, including in non-motorized recreation zones • Consultation requirements added to "Guidelines for the Management of Recreation/Tourism Features, Facilities and Trails" *(Changes)* • "Retain over time, all existing and future access routes and methods of transport across all land use designations for tenure holders' access to trapline areas and guide territories, including in non-motorized recreation zones" *from "*Maintain access for existing tenure holders"
3.3.3 (1) Agriculture and Range Objectives/Directions	*(Deletion)* • Removal of Morice West from arable land availability and leasing targets
3.3.4 (1) Botanical Forest Products Objectives/Directions	*(Addition)* • Yekooche First Nation will provide data to help with implementation of this objective
3.3.5 (1) Guide Outfitting Objectives/Directions	*(Deletion)* • Maintain target of 2003 quota numbers for bull moose (111), grizzly (9), and mountain goat (16) *(Changes)* • Language broadened for some directions (weaker access restrictions)

3.3.6 Minerals and Energy Objectives/Directions	*(Additions)* • "Cumulative impacts" added to "Issues" section • "Economic stewardship for full mine lifecycle including post mine closure", "Reclamation to productive end land use", and "Develop cumulative impacts toolbox" added to "Goals" section • The Yekooche First Nation request engagement in development of reclamation plans
3.4.1 Biodiversity Objectives/Directions	*(Deletion)* • Consult Monitoring Committee for removal of areas from Old Growth Area status
3.4.3 Water Objectives/Directions	*(Addition)* • Provide maximum practicable water quality within the defined Morice Water Management Area via monitoring, contaminant identification and sourcing, impact assessment, data collection involving Wet'suwet'en, application of baseline data, and establishment of comprehensive water quality objectives
3.4.6 Invasive Organisms Objectives/Directions	*(Addition)* • Entire section added, primarily objectives for elimination and limitation of spread
3.4.7 Point Source Pollution Objectives/Directions	*(Addition)* • Section added consisting of one objective for clean water and soils via avoidance of point source pollution
3.4.8 Use of Fertilizers and Pesticides	*(Addition)* • Section added consisting of two objectives for avoidance of adverse fertilizer impacts and minimization of pesticide use in silviculture
Area Specific Management Direction	
4.2.3 Friday Lake-Nakinilerak Lake-Hautête Lake	*(Deletion)* • Removal of objective to limit roaded access to Nakinilerak Lake (weaker language used)
4.2.12 Twinkle-Horseshoe Lake Chain	*(Addition)* • Maintenance of the non-motorized recreational experience of the canoe chain applies to gas powered boats only
4.2.15 Le Talh Giz (Old Fort Mountain)	*(Addition)* • Area Specific Resource Management Zone added as cultural heritage area for management consistent with First Nations cultural values
Protected Areas	

5.3.5 Babine Lake Marine Parks Protected Area	*(Addition)* • Maintain cultural values and incorporate into management plans in consultation with the Nedo'ats Hereditary Chiefs and Lake Babine First Nations • 7 Parks changed to Conservancies
5.3.6 Morice Lake Protected Area	*(Addition)* • Additional Protected Area due to cultural significance to The Office of the Wet'suwet'en
5.3.7 Atna River Protected Area	*(Addition)* • Additional Protected Area to be managed for maintenance of cultural heritage features and values and ecological features
Implementation, Monitoring & Amendment	
6.4.2 First Nations	*(Addition)* • The LRMP is without prejudice to aboriginal rights and treaty negotiations

(Derived from comparison of BC MSRM, 2004a; BC ILMB, 2007)

Appendix D. Morice LRMP Survey

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of the following survey is to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the LRMP process in BC. The alternative dispute-resolution experience in BC provides an excellent opportunity to evaluate shared decision-making because it is one of the few jurisdictions where these approaches have been implemented in a systematic way. The findings will contribute to improving the land use planning process in British Columbia.

This is an anonymous and voluntary survey. Your responses are confidential and cannot be linked to your identity or to any other information about you.

PART A: YOUR PARTICIPATION IN THE PROCESS

Please check whether you strongly agree (SA), somewhat agree (SWA), somewhat disagree (SWD) or strongly disagree (SD) with the following statements. Check the not applicable (NA) box if the question does not apply to you.

To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about the LRMP process you participated in?	**SA**	**SWA**	**SWD**	**SD**	**NA**
1. I became involved in the process because I/my organization felt it was the best way to achieve our goals/ with respect to land use planning.					
2. I had clear goals in mind when I first became involved in the LRMP process.					
3. I was fully committed to making the process work.					
4. I was involved in the design of the LRMP *process* (i.e. ground rules, roles, procedures).					
5. On an ongoing basis, I was able to influence the *process* used in the LRMP.					
6. I had or received sufficient training to participate effectively.					
7. I had or received sufficient funding to participate effectively.					
8. My participation made a difference in the outcomes of the LRMP process.					
9. Due to constraints of the process, I was unable to effectively communicate with and gain support from my constituency.					
10. The process helped to ensure I was accountable to the constituency I was representing.					
11. The organization/sector/group I represented provided me with clear direction throughout the process.					

PART B: THE LRMP PROCESS

Please check whether you strongly agree (SA), somewhat agree (SWA), somewhat disagree (SWD) or strongly disagree (SD) with the following statements. Check the not applicable (NA) box if the question does not apply to you.

To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about the LRMP process you participated in?	**SA**	**SWA**	**SWD**	**SD**	**NA**
1. All appropriate interests or values were represented in the process.					
2. There were significant differences in values among participants.					
3. All government agencies that needed to be involved were adequately represented.					
4. All participants were committed to making the process work.					
5. The process participants collectively identified and agreed upon clear goals and objectives.					
6. Participant roles were clearly defined.					
7. First Nations roles were clearly defined.					
8. I am satisfied with the way First Nations were involved in the process.					
9. The procedural ground rules were clearly defined.					
10. Stakeholders had a clear understanding that if no consensus was reached, the provincial government would make the decisions.					
11. All interests/perspectives had equal influence at the LRMP table.					
12. The process reduced power imbalances among participants.					
13. The process encouraged open communication about participants' interests					
14. All participants demonstrated a clear understanding of the different stakeholder interests around the table.					
15. The process was hindered by a lack of communication and negotiation skills.					
16. The process generated trust among participants.					
17. The process fostered teamwork.					
18. Generally, the representatives at the table were accountable to their constituencies.					
19. The process had an effective strategy for communicating with the broader public.					
20. The process was effective in representing the interests of the broader public.					
21. The process was flexible enough to be adaptive to new information or changing circumstances.					
22. Participants were given the opportunity to periodically assess the process and make adjustments as needed.					
23. The process had a detailed project plan (for the negotiation process) including clear milestones.					
24. Deadlines during the process were helpful in moving the process along.					
25. The time allotted to the process was realistic.					
26. The issues we were dealing with in the LRMP process were significant problems requiring timely resolution.					
27. The process was hindered by lack of structure.					
28. Process staff acted in a neutral and unbiased manner.					
29. The agency responsible for managing the LRMP process acted in a neutral and unbiased manner.					
30. Process staff (including facilitator(s) if used) were skilled in running meetings.					

To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about the LRMP process you participated in?	SA	SWA	SWD	SD	NA
31. The presence of an independent facilitator/mediator improved process effectiveness.					
32. The independent facilitator/mediator acted in an unbiased manner.					
33. The Government Technical Team provided high-quality scientific and social information to the planning table.					
34. The process lacked adequate high-quality information for effective decision-making.					
35. The setting of the provincial guide of 12% Protected Areas was helpful to reaching consensus.					
36. The process was well prepared with the information needed to accommodate protected areas within the LRMP.					
37. The overlay of resource values on maps was a useful technique for evaluating land use options.					
38. The multiple accounts method was a useful way of evaluating land use options.					
39. The table developed a clear strategy for plan implementation.					
40. At the end of the process, the table participants shared a strong commitment to plan implementation.					

PART C: THE OUTCOMES OF THE PROCESS

Please check whether you strongly agree (SA), somewhat agree (SWA), somewhat disagree (SWD) or strongly disagree (SD) with the following statements. Check the not applicable (NA) box if the question does not apply to you.

To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about the outcomes of the LRMP process you participated in?	SA	SWA	SWD	SD	NA
1. The LRMP process I participated in was a success.					
2. The LRMP process was a positive experience.					
3. I am satisfied with the outcome of the process.					
4. The resulting plan addressed the needs, concerns, and values, of the group I represented.					
5. First Nations participation made a significant difference in the outcome of the LRMP process.					
6. As a result of the LRMP process, conflict over land use in the area has decreased.					
7. The LRMP process was the best way of developing a land use plan.					
8. I/my organizations' interests have been accommodated better through the LRMP process than they would have been through other means.					
9. The planning process produced creative ideas for action.					
10. As a result of the process, I have a good understanding of the interests of other participants.					
11. As a result of the process, I now have a better understanding of how government works with respect to land and resource management.					
12. As a result of the process, I have a better understanding of my region.					

13. I gained new or improved skills as a result of my involvement in the process.					
14. The relationships among table members improved over the course of the process.					
15. I have better working relationships with other parties involved in land use planning as a result of the LRMP process.					
16. Contacts I acquired through my participation in the LRMP process are useful to me and/or my sector/organization					
17. The LRMP process produced information that has been understood and accepted by all participants.					
18. Information acquired through my participation in the LRMP process is useful to me and/or my sector/organization					
19. I have used information generated through the LRMP process for purposes outside of the process.					
20. I have seen changes in behaviours and actions as a result of the process.					
21. I am aware of spin-off partnerships or collaborative activities or new organizations that arose as a result of the process.					
22. I believe the outcome of the LRMP process served the common good or public interest.					
23. I believe that consensus based processes are an effective way of making land and resource use decisions.					
24. The government should involve the public in land and resource use decisions.					
25. Knowing what I know now I would get involved in a process similar to the LRMP again.					

PART D: CRITERIA FOR SUCCESS

Please check very important (VI), important (I), somewhat important (SI), not important (NI) or not applicable (NA).

Based on your experience of having participated in a consensus–based, shared decision-making process, how important is each of the following factors in achieving a successful process and outcome?	**VI**	**I**	**SI**	**NI**	**NA**
Inclusive representation of all relevant stakeholder/interest groups					
Voluntary participation (all participants are free to leave at any time or pursue other avenues if agreement not reached)					
Commitment of stakeholders to the process because it was the best way of meeting objectives					
Clearly defined purpose and objectives					
Consensus requirement					
Clearly defined consequence or alternative outcome if consensus not reached (e.g. knowing the provincial government would make the decisions if no consensus reached)					
Urgency of issues addressed in the process providing incentive to reach agreement					
Process designed by participants					
Clear rules of procedure					

Participants having equal opportunity and resources (skills, resources, money, support)					
Mutual respect and trust in the negotiation process					
Effective process management (including process coordinator/staff)					
Timetable (including deadline for reaching agreement)					
Use of an independent facilitator or mediator					
Stakeholder groups having a clear understanding of their own and other stakeholders' interests					
Accountability of representatives to their constituencies					
Accountability and openness of process to the public					
Access to high-quality information					
Process design that is flexible and adaptive					
Commitment to a plan for implementation and monitoring					

PART E: GENERAL QUESTIONS

Please answer the following questions.

1. What were the most significant achievements of the planning process?

2. Who benefited most from the outcomes of the planning process?

3. Comment on the strengths and weaknesses of the planning process?

4. Comment on the strengths and weaknesses of First Nations involvement in plan development.

7. What information was most useful for developing the plan?

8. The process could have been more effective by making the following changes:

9. Do you have any other comments about the LRMP process you participated in?

Appendix E. Morice LRMP Survey Results

RESPONSES TO PARTS A & B

	SA	SWA	SWD	SD	NA
Purpose and Incentives					
A1. I became involved in the process because I/my organization felt it was the best way to achieve our goals/ with respect to land use planning.	15	6	0	1	0
A2. I had clear goals in mind when I first became involved in the LRMP process.	8	12	0	0	1
B2. There were significant differences in values among participants.	16	6	1	0	0
B5. The process participants collectively identified and agreed upon clear goals and objectives.	7	10	5	2	0
B10. Stakeholders had a clear understanding that if no consensus was reached, the provincial government would make the decisions.	10	8	5	0	0
B26. The issues we were dealing with in the LRMP process were significant problems requiring timely resolution.	7	16	0	0	0
Inclusive Representation					
B1. All appropriate interests or values were represented in the process.	10	8	1	3	0
B3. All government agencies that needed to be involved were adequately represented.	6	8	3	5	0
B8. I am satisfied with the way First Nations were involved in the process.	5	6	5	7	0
Voluntary Participation					
A3. I was fully committed to making the process work.	20	2	0	0	0
B4. All participants were committed to making the process work.	8	7	5	3	0
Self Design					
A4. I was involved in the design of the LRMP process (i.e. ground rules, roles, procedures).	9	4	6	1	2
A5. On an ongoing basis, I was able to influence the *process* used in the LRMP.	3	10	3	6	0
Clear Ground Rules					
B6. Participant roles were clearly defined.	8	9	3	3	0
B7. First Nations roles were clearly defined.	6	3	9	5	0
B9. The procedural ground rules were clearly defined.	9	10	3	1	0
Equal Opportunity and Resources					
A6. I had or received sufficient training to participate effectively.	8	7	6	0	1
A7. I had or received sufficient funding to participate effectively.	8	4	3	5	2
A8. My participation made a difference in the outcomes of the LRMP process.	6	10	3	3	0
B11. All interests/perspectives had equal influence at the LRMP table.	4	8	5	5	1
B12. The process reduced power imbalances among participants.	3	12	2	6	0

Principled Negotiation and Respect					
B13. The process encouraged open communication about participants' interests	13	6	3	1	0
B14. All participants demonstrated a clear understanding of the different stakeholder interests around the table.	6	11	5	1	0
B15. The process was hindered by a lack of communication and negotiation skills.	0	9	12	2	0
B16. The process generated trust among participants.	3	13	5	2	0
B17. The process fostered teamwork.	5	13	1	3	0
Accountability					
A9. Due to constraints of the process, I was unable to effectively communicate with and gain support from my constituency.	1	5	9	7	0
A10. The process helped to ensure I was accountable to the constituency I was representing.	7	11	3	1	0
A11. The organization/sector/group I represented provided me with clear direction throughout the process.	8	7	6	1	0
B18. Generally, the representatives at the table were accountable to their constituencies.	6	14	3	0	0
B19. The process had an effective strategy for communicating with the broader public.	1	10	14	3	0
B20. The process was effective in representing the interests of the broader public.	1	13	8	1	0
Flexible, Adaptive, Creative					
B21. The process was flexible enough to be adaptive to new information or changing circumstances.	5	10	5	2	1
B22. Participants were given the opportunity to periodically assess the process and make adjustments as needed.	5	8	7	3	0
High Quality Information					
B33. The Government Technical Team provided high-quality scientific and social information to the planning table.	5	4	5	1	7
B34. The process lacked adequate high-quality information for effective decision-making.	1	6	12	3	0
B35. The setting of the provincial guide of 12% Protected Areas was helpful to reaching consensus.	0	13	6	4	0
B36. The process was well prepared with the information needed to accommodate protected areas within the LRMP.	2	10	6	4	0
B37. The overlay of resource values on maps was a useful technique for evaluating land use options.	9	11	1	1	0
B38. The multiple accounts method was a useful way of evaluating land use options.	3	13	3	1	2
Time Limits					
B23. The process had a detailed project plan (for the negotiation process) including clear milestones.	9	11	3	0	0
B24. Deadlines during the process were helpful in moving the process along.	11	10	2	0	0
B25. The time allotted to the process was realistic.	4	6	8	6	0

Implementation and Monitoring					
B39. The table developed a clear strategy for plan implementation.	2	8	8	4	0
B40. At the end of the process, the table participants shared a strong commitment to plan implementation.	2	11	7	2	1
Effective Process Management					
B27. The process was hindered by lack of structure.	2	5	11	5	0
B28. Process staff acted in a neutral and unbiased manner.	5	8	4	6	0
B29. The agency responsible for managing the LRMP process acted in a neutral and unbiased manner.	7	7	3	6	0
B30. Process staff (including facilitator(s) if used) were skilled in running meetings.	11	6	4	1	0
Independent Facilitation					
B31. The presence of an independent facilitator/mediator improved process effectiveness.	11	9	1	1	0
B32. The independent facilitator/mediator acted in an unbiased manner.	10	6	5	2	0

RESPONSES TO PART C

	SA	SWA	SWD	SD	NA
Perceived as Successful					
C1. The LRMP process I participated in was a success.	6	9	3	3	2
C2. The LRMP process was a positive experience.	6	9	4	3	1
C3. I am satisfied with the outcome of the process.	4	7	5	5	2
Agreement					
C4. The resulting plan addressed the needs, concerns, and values, of the group I represented.	3	10	4	3	2
Conflict Reduced					
C6. As a result of the LRMP process, conflict over land use in the area has decreased.	1	10	2	6	3
Superior to Other Methods					
C7. The LRMP process was the best way of developing a land use plan.	4	12	3	2	2
C8. I/my organizations' interests have been accommodated better through the LRMP process than they would have been through other means.	7	5	5	4	2
Creative and Innovative					
C9. The planning process produced creative ideas for action.	5	14	2	0	2
Knowledge, Understanding and Skills					
C10. As a result of the process, I have a good understanding of the interests of other participants.	13	8	0	0	1
C11. As a result of the process, I now have a better understanding of how government works with respect to land and resource management.	9	11	1	0	1

C12. As a result of the process, I have a better understanding of my region.	12	9	0	0	1
C13. I gained new or improved skills as a result of my involvement in the process.	9	10	1	1	1
Relationships and Social Capital					
C14. The relationships among table members improved over the course of the process.	7	11	3	0	1
C15. I have better working relationships with other parties involved in land use planning as a result of the LRMP process.	8	11	1	1	1
C16. Contacts I acquired through my participation in the LRMP process are useful to me and/or my sector/organization	9	7	2	2	2
Information					
C17. The LRMP process produced information that has been understood and accepted by all participants	2	8	7	3	2
C18. Information acquired through my participation in the LRMP process is useful to me and/or my sector/organization	3	14	1	2	2
C19. I have used information generated through the LRMP process for purposes outside of the process.	5	9	3	2	3
Second Order Effects					
C20. I have seen changes in behaviours and actions as a result of the process.	2	6	4	3	5
C21. I am aware of spin-off partnerships or collaborative activities or new organizations that arose as a result of the process.	2	4	10	3	3
Public Interest					
C22. I believe the outcome of the LRMP process served the common good or public interest.	2	14	2	3	1
Understanding and Support of SDM					
C23. I believe that consensus based processes are an effective way of making land and resource use decisions.	10	6	4	0	2
C24. The government should involve the public in land and resource use decisions.	15	6	0	0	1
C25. Knowing what I know now I would get involved in a process similar to the LRMP again.	14	4	3	5	1
First Nations					
C5. First Nations participation made a significant difference in the outcome of the LRMP process.	7	7	2	5	2

RESPONSES TO PART D

	VI (3)	I (2)	SI (1)	NI (0)
Voluntary participation	4	10	4	3
Urgency of issues	7	10	5	0
Consensus requirement	11	7	4	1
Timetable (including deadline for reaching agreement)	11	6	4	1
Equal opportunity and resources (skills, resources, money, support)	11	7	3	1
Process designed by participants	13	6	2	1
Mutual respect and trust in the negotiation process	14	6	1	1
Accountability of representatives to their constituencies	13	7	2	0
Commitment of stakeholders to the process	14	6	2	0
Use of an independent facilitator or mediator	13	9	0	0
Accountability and openness of process to the public	13	9	0	0
Clearly defined consequence or alternative outcome if no consensus	15	7	0	0
Clear rules of procedure	16	5	1	0
Clearly defined purpose and objectives	17	4	1	0
Effective process management	16	6	0	0
Clear understanding of interests (self and others)	16	6	0	0
Access to high-quality information	17	4	1	0
Process design that is flexible and adaptive	16	6	0	0
Commitment to a plan for implementation and monitoring	18	3	1	0
Inclusive representation of all stakeholder/interest groups	19	3	0	0

RESPONSES TO PART E

1. Significant Achievments	
Increased accountability for District Forest Manager	1
First Nations involvement	1
Inclusive stakeholder representation	1
Capacity building	2
Resolution of conflicts	2
Sector interests met	2
Protected areas established	3
Deadlines met	3
Plan produced	4
Consensus	5
Relationships, communication, understanding, networks	8

2. Who Benefited Most?	
Agriculture	1
All sectors	3
Community/General Public	3
Conservation/Environment	3
First Nations	3
Government	3
Tourism & Recreation	5
Industry (Forests, Mining)	13

3. Strengths and Weaknesses	S	W
Information not shared equally		1
Some sector representatives from outside region		1
Lack of monitoring and reporting post-process		1
Inconsistent attendance of some sector representatives		1
Uncertainty about Mountain Pine Beetle		1
Lack of First Nations participation		3
Poor government communication/transparency		3
Poor process management		4
Government-to-government negotiations		4
Bias		4
Insufficient timeline		7
Power imbalance		12
Setting of provincial guideline 12% Protected Areas	1	
Independent facilitation	1	
Interests-based negotiation skills development	2	
Local involvement/Inclusive representation	3	
Exchange of ideas, values, interests and information	5	

4. Strengths and Weaknesses of First Nations Participation	S	W
Input not adequately incorporated into plan		1
Increased political tension within group		1
Disconnect between hereditary vs. Band governance		1
Information not shared openly by First Nations		2
Inconsistent attendance		2
Lack of respect toward First Nations		2
Confusion around parallel processes (treaty)		2
Created power imbalance		2
Government-to-government negotiations		10
Lack of representation/participation		11
Improved negotiating power of other sectors	1	
Contributed unique perspective/source of knowledge	4	
Increased understanding about culture and interests	5	

5. Most Useful Information	
Theme-based presentations	1
Field trips	1
Scenario analyses	1
Knowledge of Forest sector politics/strategies	1
None	1
Internet	1
Background information	4
Sector interest statements	5
Local/table rep. knowledge	5
Maps and resource inventories	11

6. Recommendations for Improvement	
Permit First Nations' voice to be recorded in main process	1
Disallow industry lobbying of government during process	1
Share *all* information equally among sectors	1
Do not alter consensus agreement (as with G2G negotiations)	1
Maintain continuity of government staff post-process	1
Permit discussion about G2G changes	1
More flexibility in land use designations	1
Facilitator should provide regular process assessments	1
Increase government accountability	1
More clearly defined implementation/monitoring	1
Local government as part of planning team, not stakeholder	1
More efficient process management	1
Incorporate First Nations planning into LRMP	1
Fund sector-specific research for sectors with less resources	1
Use an information team similar to the Coast Information Team	1
Consider resources values equally/reduce bias	1
Greater public participation (sector representative insufficient)	2
Improve resource inventories and scenario analyses	2
Compensation for participation (equal for all)	3
Continue momentum/follow-up post-process (esp. government)	4
Longer timeframe	6

7. General Feedback	
Government should let table come to formal agreement on G2G results	1
Province had its own agenda and controlled the process - should be independently managed	2
Not a level playing field	
Frustrated about failure to implement and monitor plan	4
Our "business as usual" government appears to be committed to a lack of commitment	1
Interaction with other sectors was valuable/process educational	4
Professional speakers should not rebut comments of locals	1
Don't have elected local or provincial reps as sector reps	1

Adequate funding is key for this type of process	1
Process turned out very well	1
Participants did not understand LRMP's place in legislative framework	1
Impacts of competing plan objectives not addressed	1
Process not perfect, but not sure if there is a better way	1
Offended by lack of sector recognition at formal plan announcement (New Relationship spin)	1
Efforts were not recognized or acknowledged	1
Expert level of Provincial Government inadequate	1

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